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*East Pakistan: The End Game*
*By Brigadier (Retd.) Abdul Rahman Siddiqi*
Brigadier (Retd.) Abdul Rahman Siddiqi has devoted the best part of his life
to an in-depth study of military history and analysis of civil-military
relations in Third World countries, especially Pakistan. He is considered as
one of the best known writers and analysts of the problems of peace and war
in South Asia. He was awarded the Tamgha-i-Difa-i-Pakistan for active
service in the Chhamb-Jaurian area in 1965, and the Sitara-i-Khidmat in
1969. At present he is Executive Director of the Regional Institute for
Peace and Security Studies in Karachi.
*DESCRIPTION*
*Siddiqi also exposes the infamous General Niazi who shamelessly defended
the rapists by declaring that: "You cannot expect a man to live, fight and
die in East Pakistan and go to Jhelum for sex, would you?"
The East Pakistan tragedy was not just a failure of the military
establishment of the day but also the abysmal collapse of civil society in
West Pakistan. Launched at midnight, 25 March 1971, the military action went
on for nine long months without eliciting any concerted protest from the
West Pakistani public and political leadership. The few low voices raised
against the military action were too feeble to make the army change the
suicidal course it had set itself, leading to an ignominious military defeat
and the breakup of the country.
As chief of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) and press adviser to the
president and chief martial law administrator at that time, the author had
the unique advantage of observing the tragedy as it unfolded. As the ISPR
chief, he interacted with the national press and a cross-section of public
and political leadership in both wings. In his description and appraisal of
the various dramatis personae, he acts as an impartial observer.
Apart from the fresh light the book sheds on the traumatic episode, the
simplicity and candour of the narrative adds much to its readability. Thus,
the book may well contribute towards the much-needed bridge building between
Pakistan and Bangladesh. *
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*HERALD REVIEW*
*"In 1971, Pakistan was torn into two, its eastern half declaring itself the
independent nation of Bangladesh. While the broader details of this debacle
have since become comprehensible, historians are still trying to glean a few
remaining facts from the myths and half-truths that continue to linger some
33 years later.
Brigadier Abdul Rehman Siddiqi, who headed the Inter Services Public
Relations (ISPR) and was press advisor to army chief General Yahya Khan, was
clearly in the thick of things. Therefore, his book 'East Pakistan: The
Endgame — An Onlooker's Journal 1969-1971' will be of interest to those
wishing to penetrate the historical veil that has subsequently been draped
over the more unsavoury events of that era.
From the start, the author makes it clear that the book is based on his
diaries and other sources that he had personal access to as the ISPR chief.
He also admits to have "scrupulously avoided" relying on any subsequent
books or other published material that relates to the events. As a result,
the reader is presented with a first-hand account of those fateful days.
The narrative begins in February 1969 when President Ayub Khan, besieged by
street agitation, sought to negotiate his way out by calling for a Round
Table Conference (RTC). However, as Siddiqi explains, Yahya had already
started plotting against his boss. Unknown to most people at the time, the
army chief secretly met the East Pakistani leader Mujibur Rehman and asked
him not to relent on his demands. In fact, as Siddiqi points out, Yahya went
as far as to tell Mujib that "he could go ahead with his anti-Ayub campaign
without any let or hindrance from the army."
Siddiqi also reveals that a week before the RTC, he was ordered by General
Ghulam Umar to secretly prepare an advance draft for Yahya's address to the
nation as the chief martial law administrator. Two days later, Yahya flatly
refused Ayub's direct request for the army to come to the aid of the civil
government. According to Siddiqi, Yahya made it abundantly clear to his
superior that it was either complete martial law under his own control or
nothing. And Ayub knew then that his days were numbered. Following his
refusal to help Ayub quell the violent civic unrest, Siddiqi discloses how
Yahya cunningly enlisted the support of his old drinking buddy interior
minister Admiral A.R Khan, who persisted in presenting highly pessimistic
daily briefs to further undermine the president. When Siddiqi confronted
General Peerzada with these peculiar goings-on, he was politely told to hush
up. The dice had been cast and within a month Ayub departed from the scene
after handing over power to Yahya.
Following the takeover, Siddiqi claims that Yahya was quick to reveal his
true intentions and confided to some of his senior officers: "Gentlemen, we
must be prepared to rule this unfortunate country for the next 14 years or
so." Soon, Yahya announced general elections after being convinced by the
intelligence agencies that they would result in a split vote and a factious
national assembly, making it impossible for the new government to fulfil the
stipulation of an approved constitution within 120 days. This failure, the
thinking went, would then lead to fresh elections while power would
indefinitely remain in the army's firm grip.
However, the election results could not have been farther from Yahya's
calculations. Badly let down by the intelligence agencies, Yahya decided to
pursue a new course of action. His famous reference to Mujib as the future
prime minister was in reality no more than "a calculated manoeuvre aimed at,
first to set the military against Mujib, and second, to provoke the Pakistan
Peoples Party."
The worried generals then recruited Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to ensure that any
chance of a compromise with Mujib would be non-existent. In fact, as Siddiqi
informs us, General Umar even met many West Pakistani minority party leaders
to actively dissuade them from attending the first national assembly session
at Dhaka. Not surprisingly, East Pakistan soon went on the boil in the face
of such intransigence. And the army-controlled West Pakistani media
retaliated by accusing East Pakistanis of treason.
We all know what followed. The army's subjugation of East Pakistan resulted
in untold misery for millions of innocent Pakistanis, the death of many
thousands as well as the breakup of Jinnah's original Pakistan. And as
Siddiqi's narrative makes apparent, all this happened so that the generals
could maintain their hold on power. Since then, it has suited successive
army generals to place the blame on Bhutto. But the pertinent question is:
how many tanks, guns and soldiers did Bhutto have at his disposal? The
answer, of course, is none.
Another fact the author emphasises is the sheer profusion of war crimes
inflicted on hapless Pakistani citizens by its own army. The reader comes
across a devastated Major General Ansari telling Siddiqi that rape and
brutality were widespread. The general also confesses to a complete
breakdown in the "discipline of his junior officers [and that] there was
little he could do to check their :atrocities." If junior officers had run
amok, one shudders to think what the less-educated jawans got up to.
Siddiqi also exposes the infamous General Niazi who shamelessly defended the
rapists by declaring that: "You cannot expect a man to live, fight and die
in East Pakistan and go to Jhelum for sex, would you?" Even 30-plus years
later, the fact that most, if not all, of these perpetrators got away
scot-free, can provoke tears of rage and shame.
Ultimately, 'The End Game' is a brave and honest book and Siddiqi should be
commended for writing it, even if it took him all these years to muster the
resolve. A must-read for anyone interested in Pakistan's past." - Shehryar
Mazari, Herald, March 2005*
East Pakistan: The End Game
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