Banner Advertise

Wednesday, August 15, 2012

[chottala.com] Declassified US documents on coups in 1975

Soviets were rebuilding and expanding Sylhet Airport and their Fleet was anchored in Chittagong rebuilding and expanding that port. Sh. Mujib had taken all the powers in his hand to declare Bangladesh a Communist Country. What did you expect USA to do?
---------

--- In chottala@yahoogroups.com, Isha Khan <bdmailer@...> wrote:
>
> *Declassified US documents on Bangladesh coups in 1975 *
>
> We do not know what message the US Embassy in Dhaka had sent to the State
> Department after the Pilkhana massacre. We will have to wait for another 30
> years to get full text of the official message from the US Embassy.
>
> However, I can share with you the message the US Embassy in Dhaka had sent
> after the August 1975 coup. This declassified document confirms Sheikh
> Mujib was warned by the US about the coup but he simply brushed the
> information aside.
>
> The Embassy also provided early analysis of the August 15 coup against
> President Mujibur Rahman. It tentatively predicted that the United States
> would enjoy greater influence under the government of new president
> Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed.
>
> The Embassy had also provided a narrative account and analysis of the
> military unrest and resulting coup of November 3, 1975.
>
> http://bdfact.blogspot.com/2009/03/declass...bangladesh.html<http://bdfact.blogspot.com/2009/03/declassified-us-documents-on-bangladesh.html>
>
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> *Telegram 5470 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State,
> November 10, 1975, 1010Z*
>
> 1. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OFFER A CAPSULE SUMMARY OF THE CHAOTIC EVENTS OF
> LAST WEEK IN BANGLADESH WHICH SAW THREE DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS, MUCH
> KILLING, AND THE AVOIDANCE OF CIVIL WAR, WITH ATTENDANT POSSIBILITY OF
> INDIAN INTER-VENTION, BY THE NARROWEST OF MARGINS. THIS ACCOUNT IS SECRET.
> THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BRIGADIER MOSHARRAF, CHIE FOF THE ARMY GENERAL
> STAFF, WHO HAD BEEN EMBITTERED BY HIS FAILURE TO SHARE IN THE PROMOTIONS
> RECEIVED BY SOME OFHIS COLLEAGUES AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
> MUJIB BY THE MAJORS ON AUGUST 15 AND WHO WAS ALSO BELIEVED TO BE ON A LIST
> OF ARMY OFFICERS TO BE INVESTIGATED WHICH HAD RECENTLY BEEN DRAWN UP BY THE
> MAJORS, BEGAN IN THE EARLYHOURS OF MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 3.
>
> WE DO NOT KNOW POSITIVELY WHETHER MOSHARAFF WAS THE ARCHITECT OF THE
> CONFRONTATION, AS MANY CONTEND, OR WHETHER, AS ONE GOOD SOURCE HAS TOLD
> TOLD US, HE SIMPLY WENT ALONG WITH SUBORDINATES WHO WERE DETERMINED TO END
> THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE MAJORS IN THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT, A ROLE WHICH
> HAD RESULTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IN THE HARRASSMENT OF SOME OF THE
> MILITARY OFFICERS. THIS SOURCE ALSO HELD THAT ONE OF MOSHARRAF'S
> OBJECTIVES--ALTHOUGH HE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY MINDFULOF THE PERSONAL GLORY THAT
> MIGHT AWAIT HIM--WAS TO TAKE CONTROL OF HIS SUBORDINATES' PLANS IN SUCH A
> WAY AS TO AVOID MAJOR BLOODSHED.
>
> 3. MOSHARRAF AND HIS ALLIES QUICKLY TOOK CONTROL EARLY MONDAY MORNING OF
> THE ARMY CANTONMENT AS WELL AS MOST OF THE CITY OF DACCA AND PRESSED THEIR
> CONFRONTATION WITH THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT BY FLYING A MIG FIGHTER AND
> ARMED HELICOPTER OVER THE CITY IN A SHOW OF STRENGTH WHICH WAS ALSO
> INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE THE TANK CREWS LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT. AGAINST THIS
> BACKGROUND, MOSHARRAF LEVIED FOUR DEMANDS ON MOSHTAQUE:
>
> 1) THAT MOSHARRAF REPLACE MAJOR GENERAL ZIAUR RAHMAN, HIS PERSONAL RIVAL,
> AS CHIEFOF STAFF; 2) THAT THE MAJORS BE RETURNED TO REGULAR ARMY
> DISCIPLINE; 3) THAT THE TANK FROCES LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT BE DISARMED;
> AND 4) THAT MOSHTAQUE REMAIN IN OFFICE.
>
> OUTGUNNED AND APPARENTLY INTEND ABOVE ALL ON AVOIDING BLOODSHED, WHICH
> WOULD ALSO HAVE INVITED INDIAN INTERVENTION, MOSHTAQUE EVENTUALLY YIELDED
> AFTER NEGOTIATING DURING THE COURSE OF A LONG DAY A COMPROMISE WITH
> MOSHARRAF BY WHICH THE MAJORS AND SOME OF THEIR COLLEAGUES, TO WHOM
> MOSHTAQUE WAS INDEBTED FOR HIS PRESIDENCY, WERE PERMITTED
>
> SECRET
>
> *SECRET PAGE 03 DACCA 05470 01 OF 02 101306Z *
>
> TO DEPART BANGLADESH.
>
> BEFORE THIS COMPROMISE HAD BEEN REACHED, THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT HAD
> CALLED ON THE ARMY FORCES AT COMILLA TO COME TO ITS AID BUT HAD BEEN
> REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE COMILLA COMMANDER WOULD ONLY RESPONDTO THE
> ORDERS OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (WHO WAS THEN UNDER ARREST)OR THE CHIEF
> OF THE GENERAL STAFF (I.E., MOSHARRAF).
>
> 4. THE CONFRONTATION BROUGHT ANOTHER BLOODY RESULT WHICH,WE HAVE GOOD
> REASON TO BELIEVE, HAD BEEN PART OF AN EARLIER CONTINGENCY PLAN TO BE
> CARRIED OUT IN THE EVENT THAT MOSHTAQUE WERE TO BE KILLED, I.E., THE MURDER
> OF HIS FORMER COLLEAGUES IN THE AWAMI PARTY LEADERSHIP WHO WERE NOW HIS
> POLITICAL ENEMIES--FORMER PRIME MINISTER MANSOOR ALI,FORMER VICE PRESIDENT
> SYED NAZRUL ISLAM, FORMER PRIMEMINISTER, FINANCE MINISTER AND INDIOPHILE
> TAJUDDIN AHMED, AND FORMER INDUSTRIES MINISTER KAMARUZZAMAN. THESE LEADERS
> WERE KILLED, EVIDENTLY AT THE ORDER OF ONE OR MORE OF THE MAJORS, EARLY
> MONDAY MORNING AT DACCA JAIL. THE EVENT ADDED A NOTE OF MYSTERY TO
> MOSHARRAF'S ACQUIESCENCE LATER IN THE DAY TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE MAJORS,
> ONE VERSION HAVING IT THAT MOSHARRAF DID NOT YET KNOW OF THE DEED WHEN THE
> PLANE LEFT DACCA AT MIDNIGHT MONDAY.MANY OBSERVERS ALSO NOTED THAT ONE
> EFFECT OF THE MURDERS WAS TO REMOVE THE LOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF ANY
> PRO-INDIAN GOVERNMENT.
>
> 5. WITH THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION DEFUSED TO A DEGREE BY THE DEPARTURE OF THE
> MAJORS, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MOSHTAQUE AND MOSHARRAF CONTINUED ON TUESDAY
> AND WEDNESDAY, RESULTING IN MOSHARRAF'S DESIGNATION AS CHIEF OF STAFF LATE
> TUESDAY NIGHT, AND EVENTUALLY IN MOSHTAQUE'S RESIGNATION EARLYTHURSDAY
> MORNING WITH THE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT THATA NON-POLITICAL FIGURE,
> CHIEF JUSTICE A.S.M. SAYEM, WOULDBE APPOINTED PRESIDENT. SAYEM WAS SWORN IN
> ON THURSDAY AND PROMPTLY DISSOLVED THE PARLIAMENT. REPORTS, WHICH WE
> ACCEPT, WERE RIFE THAT THE CABINET HAD ALREADY RESIGNED IN PROTEST AGAINST
> THE MURDER OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS.
>
> 6. BUT IT NOW BECAME CLEAR THAT MOSHARRAF'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER IN THE ARMY
> WAS UNPALATABLE TO MOST OF HIS FELLOW SECRET
>
> SECRET PAGE 04 DACCA 05470 01 OF 02 101306Z
>
> OFFICERS AND ENLISTED RANKS, BOTH BECAUSE GENERAL ZIA EVIDENTLY HELD A MUCH
> WIDER POPULAR FOLLOWING AMONG THE MBUT ALSO, AND VERY IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE
> MOSHARRAF WAS WIDELY SEEN, WHETHER ACCURATELY OR NOT, AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
> INDIAN POLICY. THIS PERCEPTION WAS BUTTRESSED BY THE PRO-MUJIB PROCESSION
> ON TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY'S HARTAL TO PROTEST THE KILLINGS AT DACCA JAIL.
> THE LOWER RANKS REVOLTED IN THE EARLY HOURS OF FRIDAY MORNING, QUICKLY
> OVERTHROWING THE MOSHARRAF FORCES AND, ACCORDING TO VIRTUALLY ALL ACCOUNTS,
> KILLING MOSHARRAF. EXTENSIVE FIRING WENT THROUGHOUT THE CITY ALL NIGHT AND
> ALL DURING THE DAY FRIDAY, MOST OF IT CELEBRATORY AFTER MOSHARRAF WAS
> OUESTED. ONE AUTHORITIATIVE SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT ONLY ABOUT THIRTY WERE
> KILLED IN THE OVERTHROW; OTHER REPORTS HAVE REACHED US WHICH PUT THE FIGURE
> IN THE HUNDREDS.
>
> 7. THE SUCCESSFUL REVOLT OF THE LOWER RANKS NOW BROUGHT ANEW PROBLEM, THE
> RAMPANT INDISCIPLINE OF THE ENLISTED MEN,MANY OF WHOM NOW TURNED ON
> OFFICERS AGAINST WHOM THEY MIGH THAVE GRUDGES AND OTHERS BEGAN PRESENTING
> DEMANDS ON THE ARMY LEADERSHIP FOR A BETTER DEAL IN THEIR FUTURE
> TREATMENT.WIDESPREAD REPORTS WERE CURRENT THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND THAT LARGE
> NUMBERS OF MILITARY OFFICERS HAD FLED OR WERE ATLEAST STAYING AWAY FROM THE
> CANTONMENT OUT OF FEAR OF THE RAMPAGING SEPOYS, AND SEVERAL REPORTS REACHED
> US OF THE MURDER OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND OF THEIR WIVES.
>
> 8. MEANWHILE THE POST-MOSHARRAF GOVERNMENT TOOK SHAPE IN A MEETING EARLY
> FRIDAY MORNING BETWEEN GENERAL ZIA,MOSHTAQUE AND PRESUMABLY OTHER PRINCIPAL
> AIDES. MOSHTAQUE WAS OFFERED THE PRESIDENCY A NEW BUT DECLINED ON THE
> GROUND THAT, IN THE STILL EXPLOSIVE SITUATION, THE COUNTRY REQUIRED A
> NON-POLITICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL PRESIDENT.CONSEQUENTLY THE DECISION WAS
> REACHED TO KEEP JUSTICE SAYEM IN THE PRESIDENCY AND TO TURN OVER TO HIM AS
> WELL THE FUNCTIONS OF CHIEF OF THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION,
>
> SECRET PAGE 02 DACCA 05470 02 OF 02 101246
>
> A ROLE WHICH HAD BEEN FILLED BRIEFLY BY GENERAL ZIA. WEWERE POINTEDLY
> ASSURED THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS ENJOYED FULL SUPPORT BOTH WITHIN THE
> MILITARY AND WITHIN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SO THAT THE WAY WAS NOW CLEAR
> FOR THERESTORATION OF STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY.
>
> 9. AS OF MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 10, THE SITUATION HAD RETURNED TO AN
> APPARENT NORMALCY, WITH INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE RESUMED ON SUNDAY, BUT
> THE GENERAL UNEASINESS WAS STILL BEING FED BY REPORTS OF CONTINUED KILLINGS
> AMONG THE MILITARY AND OF POSSIBLE INDIAN ACTIONS ALONG THE BORDER.THE
> PROSPECT WAS FOR, AT BEST, A CONTINUED STATE OF TENSION AND UNCERTIANTY.
>
> 10. COMMENT. THREE CONCLUSIONS IMPLICIT IN THE ABOVE ACCOUNT SHOULD BE
> UNDERLINE. THE FIRST IS THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN THE
> COUP AND COUNTER-COUP APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN NON-POLITICAL, EXCEPT IN THE
> SENSE THAT MOSHARRAF HAD THE ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGE OF APPEARING TO BE
> PRO-INDIAN. THE ARMY FORCES WHICH OVERTHREW MOSHTAQUE AND THE MAJORS APPEAR
> TO HAVE ACTED PRIMARILY OUT OF A SENSE OF GRIEVANCE AGAINST THE MAJORS. THE
> COUNTER-COUP WAS THE WORK OF LOWER RANKS WHO FAR PREFERRED ZIA TO MOSHARRAF
> AND WHO WERE ALSO CONCERNED WHRE MOSHARRAF'S LOYALTYMIGHT LIE. WE HAVE NO
> REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE REGIMES OF THE PAST WEEK WERE
> ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-INDIAN, OR PRO-SOVIET IN CHARACTER.
>
> 11. THE SECOND IS THAT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT INDIA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
> ANY OF THE WEEK'S ACTIONS.
>
> 12. THE THIRD IS THE CONFIRMATION OF HOW STRONGLY AND PERVASIVELY
> ANTI-INDIA ANTIPATHIES ARE FELT HERE-FROM THE TOP OF THE LEADERSHIP TO THE
> LOWEST GROUPS OF THE SOCIETY. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSHARRAF
> WAS PRO-INDIAN, AND SOME THAT HE WAS NOT, HE WAS WIDELY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH
> AND THE WILD CELEBRATIONS HERE OF HIS OVERTHROW CARRIED DISTINCTLY
> ANTI-INDIAN OVERTONES.
>
> BOSTER
>
> http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97075.htm
>
> --------------------------------------------
>
> *Minutes of the Secretary of State's Regional Staff Meeting, Washington,
> August 15, 1975, 8 a.m. *
>
> The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting
> Friday, August 15, 1975
>
> Participants:
>
> THE SECRETARY OF STATE - HENRY A. KISSINGER
>
> P Mr. Sisco
> E Mr. Robinson
> T Mr. Maw
> AF Ambassador Mulcahy, Acting
> ARA Mr. Rogers
> EA Mr. Zurhellen, Acting
> EUR Mr. Armitage, Acting
> NEA Mr. Atherton
> INR Mr. Hyland
> S-P Mr. Lord
> EB Mr. Enders
> S/PRS Mr. Funseth, Acting
> PM Mr. Vest
> PM Ambassador Buffum
> H Ambassador McCloskey
> L Mr. Leigh
> S/S Mr. Borg, Acting
> S Mr. Bremer
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's talk about Bangladesh.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: Well, it was a remarkably well-planned and executed coup for
> Bangladesh.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does that mean? Is Mujibur alive or dead?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: Mujibur is dead; his immediate clique, which was largely
> family, nephews, brothers.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: I get good advice from INR.
>
> MR. HYLAND: He wasn't dead when I talked to you.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Really? Did they kill him after some period?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: As far as we know -- I can't say we have got all the details.
> But the indications are that the plan was to kill him. And they simply
> surrounded his palace and went in and killed him. That is as far as we know
> now.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him that last year?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: In March we had lots of indications --
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him about it?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: We told him at the time.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him who it was going to be, roughly?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I will have to check whether we gave him the names.
>
> MR. HYLAND: We were a little imprecise on that.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: He brushed it off, scoffed at it, said nobody would do a
> thing like that to him.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: He was one of the world's prize fools.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: But it seems that the coup leaders are in complete control.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who are they?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: They are military officers, middle and senior officers, who
> are generally considered less pro-Indian than the past leadership;
> pro-U.S., anti-Soviet.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely inevitable.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: Islamic. They have changed the name to the Islamic Republic --
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: That they would be pro-U.S. was not inevitable. In
> fact, I would have thought at some turn of the wheel they were going to
> become pro-Chinese, and anti-Indian I firmly expected. I always knew India
> would rue the day that they made Bangladesh independent. I predicted that
> since '71.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think our biggest problem is going to be to avoid too close
> an embrace.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why -- because they are friendly to us?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think they are going to want us to come in with promises.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: The principle being we only embrace on the
> sub-continent those who oppose us. What is the principle?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think our principle ought to be we are giving about all the
> aid we can really give or Bangladesh can really absorb.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before we implement it, let's check that. I know we
> can't do a huge increase in aid. But I think if people who think they are
> pro-U.S. come to us and then get a technical lecture that unfortunately we
> can't do any more -- there must be some maneuvering we can do on food aid
> and some token increase in aid.
>
> MR. ENDERS: We can do a little more on food aid.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like them to get it, if they are indeed what
> you say they are, which I don't know.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: These are all the initial indications.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then they ought to get a friendly reception.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think the immediate question is how we comport ourselves
> with the new government. It seems to me despite what the memo says which we
> sent you, which I didn't have time to go over carefully this morning -- I
> think we ought to simply respond to any overtures.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: What did the memo say?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: It says we ought to hold off on a decision on recognition.
> But I don't think that needs to be posed as that sharp a question.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: We ought to recognize.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I don't know what recognizing means in this case. I think we
> simply --
>
> MR. SISCO: Just continue. That memo said also we have to check all this
> with the Indians, as if to give the Indians a veto. I certainly don't agree
> with that.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think it would be useful --
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: We certainly shouldn't go to the Indians.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think there might be some merit in an exchange of views
> with them.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: After we have done it. We will not even discuss
> establishing contact with the new government with the Indians. After
> contact is established, we would be interested to hear their views, as long
> as they clearly understand that they cannot tell us what to do, and as long
> as they cannot go to the Bangladesh and tell them -- and then ask
> Bangladesh for their views, so that they can be transmitted to us.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I fully agree.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what India would dearly love to do.
>
> You better let me see any approaches.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think we have to prepare a telegram today, and we will
> clear it with you, on what we say to the Indians. And the Pakistanis are
> important. There will be some move towards Pakistan.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: I also want to see you for a few minutes on a sober
> instruction to Bhutto, and some of his ideas on commitments. Okay.
>
> http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97038.htm
>
> ------------------------------------------------------
>
> *Telegram 3964 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State,
> August 16, 1975, 1135Z*
>
> FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
>
> TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7733INFO
> AMEMBASSY ISLAMABADAM
> EMBASSY KATHMADUAM
> EMBASSY NEW DELHIAM
> CONSUL CALCUTTA
> CINCPAC
> C O N F I D E N T I A L DACCA 3964
> CINCPAC FOR POLADE.O. 11652: GDSTAGS: PINT, PFOR, BG, US, IN, UR, CH, XD
>
> SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON THE COUP IN BANGLADESH
>
> 1. THE EVENTS OF THE FIRST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS GIVE PROMISE THAT THE COUP
> WHICH BEGAN AT 0515 LOCAL TIME ON AUGUST 15 WILL NOT BE CHALLENGED. THE
> OATHS OF FEALTY TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT SWORN BY THE SERVICE CHIEFS, THE
> HEADS OF THE PARAMILITARY BANGLADESH RIFLES AND RAKKHI BAHINI ANDTHE HEAD
> OF THE POLICE BRING ALL ARMED ELEMENTS INTO SUPPORT OF THE NEW REGIME.. THE
> PUBLIC HAS DISPLAYED NO PARTICULAR JIBILATION AT THE FALL OF MUJIB BUT
> RATHER ACALM ACCEPTANCE, AND PERHAPS SOME SENSE OF RELIEF. THERELATIVE EASE
> WITH WHICH POWER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED SUGGESTS ABOVE ALL THE DEGREE TO
> WHICH MUJIB AND THE BANGALEES HAD BECOME ALIENATED FROM ONE ANOTHER, THE
> BANGALEES FROM MUJIB BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO MEET THEIR ASPIRATIONS AND
> HIS APPARENT DESIRE TO HOLD POWER LARGELY FOR PERSONAL AGRANDIZEMENT AND
> DYNASTIC REASONS, AND MUJIB
>
> CONFIDENTIAL
>
> CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 DACCA 03964 161135Z
>
> FROM THE BANGLAEES AS HE GREW MORE ISOLATED FROM OBJECTIVE COUNSELS AND
> BEGAN TO SUFFER THE CLASSIC PARANOIA OF THE DESPOT. THE QUICKENING TEMPO OF
> SHEIKH MUJIB'S EFFORTS SINCE EARLY JUNE TO INSURE HIS STRANGLEHOLD ON
> POWER,TOGETHER WITH THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF HIS NEPHEW SHEIKHMONI,
> DOUBTLESS MADE THE COUP PLOTTERS CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTHER DELAYS IN TAKING
> ACTION WAS POSSIBLE. THAT INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY WAS CHOSEN MAY HAVE BEEN
> MERELY INCIDENTAL, BUTWE NOTE THE COINCIDENCE.
>
> 2. IT IS TOO EARLY TO OFFER ANY SURE OPINIONS ON THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS.
> THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER KHONDAKAR MUSHTAQUE AHMED SEEMS LITTLE
> LIKELY TO AROUSEANY SENSE OF ENTHUSIASM. ALTHOUGH PURGED--BY DEATH OR
> EXCLUSION--OF THOSE WHO WERE CLOSEST TO SHEIKH MUJIB, IT IS STILL A
> COLLECTION OF OVERLY FAMILIAR FIGURES WHO ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THE POOR
> ADMINISTRATION OF POST-LIBERATION BANGLADESH. CLEARLY, ITS COMPOSITION IS
> INTENDED TO SUGGEST THAT BANGLADESH UNDER MUSHTAQUE WILL OFFER CONTINUITY,
> BUT ALSO THAT THERE WILL BE GREATER MODERATION. MUSHTAQUE'S RADIO ADDRESS
> LATE ON AUGUST 15 (DACCA 3955) SUPPORTS THIS VIEW, CONDEMNING AS IT DOES
> THE DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF SHEIKH MUJIB'S RULE BUT CLEARLY SUGGESTING
> THAT IN SOFAR AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE CONCERNED, BUSINESS WILLBE MUCH AS
> USUAL.
>
> THERE IS ALREADY SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL WANT TO
> STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD, INCLUDING PAKISTAN. AT THE SAME
> TIME,MUSHTAQUE'S WELL-KNOWN ANTIPATHY TO INDIA NOTWITHSTANDING,THE NEW
> REGIME WILL NOT WANT TO AROUSE UNDUE SUSPICIONS ON THE PART OF INDIA,
> CLEARLY COGNIZANT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING AN ADEQUATE MEASURE OF
> GOODWILL ON THE PART OF ITS IMPOSING NEIGHBOR. (PERHAPS ONE REASON FOR THE
> COMPOSITION OF THE CABINET, WITH ITS EXCLUSIVE RELIANCEON OLD FACES, IS A
> HOPE TO DEMONSTRATE TO INDIA ITS BASIC CONTINUITY.)
>
> INSOFAR AS THE MAJOR POWERS ARE CONCERNED, MUSHTAQUE HAS STATED HIS
> GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH"CLOSER AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE BIG
> POWERS LIKETHE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA." THIS WOULD SEEM
> TO MEAN MORE BALANCE IN ITS RELATIONS, AND THUS SOME DIMINUTION IN THE
> INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
>
> CONFIDENTIAL
>
> CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 DACCA 03964 161135Z
>
> 3. THE EVIDENCE SO FAR SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH
> THE NEW GOVERNMENT COULD TURN OUT TO BE ON AN EVEN MORE CORDIAL BASIS THAN
> THEY WERE UNDER MUJIB. THE NEW PRESIDENT HAS IN THE PAST BEEN STRIKINGLY
> OVERT IN SUGGESTING HIS "PRO-AMERICAN" ATTITUDE; MOREOVER,THE FIGURES IN
> THE OLD REGIME WHO WERE KNOWN FOR THEIR LEFTIST AND ANTI-AMERICAN VIEWS
> (SHEIKH MONI AND SAMAD,EXAMPLE) ARE NOW GONE. THE POSSIBILITY IS ALSO
> STRONG THAT THEY WILL LOOK TO US FOR EVEN LARGER AMOUNTS OF AID--MUSHTAQUE
> HAS ARGUED WITH US BEFORE THAT WE ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO CAN TRULY HELP
> BANGLADESH--SO THAT OUR PROBLEM MAY WELL PROVE TO BE ONE OF TEMPERING THE
> NEW REGIME'S EXPECTATIONS OF US.
>
> 4. WE CANNOT PRESENTLY JUDGE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUSHTAQUE'S
> GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY. WE NOTE WITH INTEREST THAT EVERY OFFICIAL
> STATEMENT STRESSES THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE TAKEOVER. WE ARE
> TOLD THAT THEY MILITARY ARE AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN PREPARING MARTIALLAW
> ORDERS WHICH WOULD, IF THE PAKISTANI PATTERN IS FOLLOWED, SERVE AS BASIS
> LAW OF THE COUNTRY. WHETHER THIS MEANS A GROWTH OF TENSION BETWEEN THE
> CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY WE CANNOT YET SAY, BUT WE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT
> THAT ONE OF THE FIRST STATEMENTS BY MUSHTAQUE WOULD HAVE BEEN A PROMISE OF
> A NEW, MORE LIBERAL CONSTITUATION THAN THAT IMPOSED LAST JANUARY BY MUJIB.
> THE CIVILIANS PROBABLY HAVEA MOMENTARY ADVANTAGE IN LIGHT OF THEIR
> EXPERIENCE; MOREOVER, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OUSTER
> OF MUJIB, WE ARE LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THATTHE COUP PLANNERS PREPARED
> FOR LITTLE BEYOND THE EVENTITSELF.
>
> HOWEVER, THE MILITARY--AND BY THIS WE MEAN THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHO PLANNED
> AND LED COUP--DID WORK THE OVERTHROW OF SHEIKH MUJIB, AND WE SUSPECT
> THAT,HAVING TASTED BLOOD, THEY WILL WANT AT THE VERY LEAST TO EXERCISE SOME
> MEASURE OF INFLUENCE OVER THE COURSE OFEVENTS. WE HAVE NO REASON TO LOOK
> FOR BANGALEE QUADDAFI SAMONG THE COUP PLANNERS; RATHER, AS MEMBERS OF THE
> OLD,SERVICE-ORIENTED MIDDLE CLASS WHICH WAS THREATENED BY SHEIKH MUJIB,
> THEY MAY PROVE A MORE MODERATE FORCE THAN HAS BEEN SEEN IN EAST BENGAL
> SINCE PAKISTANI PERIOD. CONFIDENTIAL
>
> CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 DACCA 03964 161135Z
>
> 5. ONE POINT TO BE EMPHASIZED IS THAT, WHILE THE OVERTHROW OF SHEIKH MUJIB
> WAS SUCCESSFUL, IF BLOODLY, A GREAT DEAL REMAINS TO BE DONE. MUSHTAQUE'S
> SPEECH IS SIGNIFICANT LARGELY FOR ITS GENERALITIES AND ITS ECHOES OF
> EARLIER AWAMI LEAGUE RHETORIC, BUT CONCRETE ACTIONS HAVE SO FAR BEEN FEW.
> WE ARE NOT SURPRISED THAT THE DEGREE OF DIRECTION DISPLAYED SO FAR IS
> LIMITED FOR WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO THINK THAT THOSE PRIVY TO THE PLANNING
> OF THE COUP WERE SMALL IN NUMBER AND THUS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PREPARING ANY
> ELABORATE PLANS FOR THE GOVERNACE OF BANGLADESH WAS VERY SMALL.
>
> HOWEVER, UNLESS EARLY STEPS ARE TAKEN TO DEMONSTRATEVIGOR AND WILL, THE
> ADVANTAGE NOW HELD BY THE NEWREGIME WILL BEGIN TO DIMINISH, AN WE MAY
> CONFRONT AN UNSETTLED--AND UNSETTLING--SITUATION AS CONTENDERS FOR POWER
> EMERGE. NO ONE NOW ON THE BANGLAEE POLITIICAL STAGEHAS KIND OF COMMANDING
> PERSONALITY WHICH SUSTAINED SHEIKH MUJIB FOR SO LONG. THE CIVLIAN
> GOVERNMENT FALTERS, WE MAY FIND THE MILITARY CONCLUDING THAT IS MUST AGAIN
> SAVE THE NATION.
>
> BOSTER
>
> CONFIDENTIAL
>
> http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97064.htm
>




------------------------------------

[* Moderator's Note - CHOTTALA is a non-profit, non-religious, non-political and non-discriminatory organization.

* Disclaimer: Any posting to the CHOTTALA are the opinion of the author. Authors of the messages to the CHOTTALA are responsible for the accuracy of their information and the conformance of their material with applicable copyright and other laws. Many people will read your post, and it will be archived for a very long time. The act of posting to the CHOTTALA indicates the subscriber's agreement to accept the adjudications of the moderator]
Yahoo! Groups Links

<*> To visit your group on the web, go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/chottala/

<*> Your email settings:
Individual Email | Traditional

<*> To change settings online go to:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/chottala/join
(Yahoo! ID required)

<*> To change settings via email:
chottala-digest@yahoogroups.com
chottala-fullfeatured@yahoogroups.com

<*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to:
chottala-unsubscribe@yahoogroups.com

<*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to:
http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/

Re: [chottala.com] RE: Sk. Mujib: This day, 15 August 1975



Many things to said role of Safiullaha and Mujibs cheif of Air..as they are both part of this Awami league administration, they can only speak of their role, I can only make assumptions..their is apparently two list of what was called Mukti Bahani , each list lists different people as Mukti Juddho time sector commanders as just some where not even Military personnel people that were non military that took on arms and became fighters..

Now I am pretty sure..above listed were among with other military personnel as any other figuring out at minimum what is going on. The thing is only thing many knew over the Radio it was AMI DALIM Bolchi. I guess neither Safiullaha nor air Cheif Khondokar took responsibility of the event that was going on. Their has to be difference of opinion among the Mukti Joddha to have two different lists..remind you Col..Tahir was also a Mukti Joddha like Jalil two who suffered during Zia rule too

The above two mentioned seemed have served Bangladesh Govt in Ambassadorial capacity and etc even in Zia administration...The thing is Dalim and all, I can swear at a minimum had Zia with them to dare what happened and I think If not Dalims, Zias soon as ascending to power..invoked ISLAMIC REPUBLIC of Bangladesh and then Press was freed..everything went in the same direction...so did the foreign Aid flew in and etc.I have to say has either Safiullaha or mujibs air chief had to feel they were less in strength..not to try anything different..

Guess what Khodokar mustaque ask his survivors regretted their role in the Coup and before death asked for forgiveness. I have always suspected the role of Zia in the Coup against Mujib based on a comment of OLI AHMED to my father and I have mentioned it many after the coup what OLI TOLD my father, who proudly took credit that he was in the same sector with..Zia and fought along and was Bir Bikram, I will mention that in subsequent emails

The thing is Neither Safiullha nor Air Chief Khodokar was with another freedom fighter Khaled Mushraff..more Pn some these as I go.. 


From: Shahadat Hussaini <shahadathussaini@hotmail.com>
To: Mohammad Gani <mgani69@gmail.com>; bangladeshi googlesgroups <bangladeshiamericans@googlegroups.com>; khabor <khabor@yahoogroups.com>; alochona <alochona@yahoogroups.com>; mokto mona <mukto-mona@yahoogroups.com>; chottala yahoogroups <chottala@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 9:48 AM
Subject: [chottala.com] RE: Sk. Mujib: This day, 15 August 1975

 
 
If you do not mind Gani Bhai, I want to add a little more here.
Shafiullah did not failed but went with popular militry sentiment prevailing at that time with all his concious, even when Sheikh informed him that the army people may have already killed Sk Kamal in the encounter (What a coward Muktijuddha he is?). A legal (per constititution) President has called upon for help wheather he was at all popular or not, he should have acted positively per his oath. Not only that he suggested that Sheikh should try to flee from the back door to save his life.
Tight after the incident, in a few hour, he rushed  to the Radio station without even being asked or requested by the then junta and took the oath of submission with consious mind again, with the popular public sentiment
 
Shahadat Suhrawardy

 

Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2012 21:18:45 -0400
Subject: Sk. Mujib: This day, 15 August 1975
From: mgani69@gmail.com
To: bangladeshiamericans@googlegroups.com

15August2012
Mohammad Gani
Baltimore/  Cambridge
******************

"Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman frantically telephoned Major General KM Shafiullah, chief of staff of the Bangladesh army, when a group of soldiers, heavily armed and backed by tanks and armoured cars, attacked his residence in the pre-dawn hours on August 15, 1975. The Father of the Nation sought Shafiullah's assistance in warding off the rebels. In the event, Shafiullah failed to come to his aid".
                                                                                                                                                             
                                                                                               
Ref: The Daily Star, 15 August 2012
  


This day, 15 August 1975: 

Sk. Mujibur Rahman was assassinated
with his immediate & extended family members:
 
                                                        
       
                              
                                                                       Sk. Russel                      Abdullah babu

 
     
     
Sk. Kamal                         Sultana Kamal                       Sk. Jamal                      Sk. Abu Naser                 
 
     
   Shahid Serniabat                
Parveen Sultana                 Jamil Uddin                   Abdur Rab Serniabat

 
     
Baby Serniabat                     
     Arju Moni                           Arif Serniabat                   Sk. Russel

 
 
 Nayeem Khan Rintu
 
 
*************************************************************************************************************************************


                                            E X T R A !


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 






**************************************************************************************************************
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
   

рззрзпрзкрзп рж╕рж╛рж▓рзЗ рж╣рзБрж╕рзЗржи рж╢рж╣рзАржж рж╕рзЛрж╣рж░рж╛ржУржпрж╝рж╛рж░рзНржжрзАрж░ рж╕рж╛ржерзЗ рж╢рзЗржЦ ржорзБржЬрж┐ржм



 
 
                                  Mujib/Bhuttu (January 1971)  (Dacca)
 



****************************************************************************************************************************************

 
 
 
 




 
 
 
 
 
 




__._,_.___


[* Moderator�s Note - CHOTTALA is a non-profit, non-religious, non-political and non-discriminatory organization.

* Disclaimer: Any posting to the CHOTTALA are the opinion of the author. Authors of the messages to the CHOTTALA are responsible for the accuracy of their information and the conformance of their material with applicable copyright and other laws. Many people will read your post, and it will be archived for a very long time. The act of posting to the CHOTTALA indicates the subscriber's agreement to accept the adjudications of the moderator]




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

[chottala.com] EID PRAYER 8/19/12 - 11600 Falls Rd, Potomac, MD



EID MUBARAK !

By the Grace of Allah, Eid Al-Fitr Prayer will be held at

9:30 AM on Sunday, August 19, 2012

Medina Center, 11600 Falls Road, Potomac, MD 20854

 

v Plenty of parking at the center and next door  at 11510 Falls Road, courtesy of Congregation Har Shalom

v You may bring something to share at a potluck after the prayer

v You may bring your prayer rug--will be a bit comfortable

 

v Successful Tarawii with Khateme Holy Quran, by Qari Syed Sharafat Ali, was done on Tuesday, 8/14/12, with overflow congregation

v Qiayaam ul- Layl during the last ten nights of Ramadan is continuing

v Masjid remains open for Itikaaf during the last 10 days of Ramadan

 

v Zakat Al-Fitr for the needy must be paid before the Eid prayer.  You may send your check(s) to Medina Center for distribution to needy families 

 

May Allah Bless you and your family!

 

For Inquiry:  Mohamed Muhsin 301-537-8350, Sultan Chowdhury 240-476-1351, Abid Chaudhry 301-728-8563

 

Management Committee:

Mohamed Muhsin

Sultan Chowdhury

Sr. Tasmeea Noor

Daud Wurie

Abid Chaudhry

Faisal Lodhi



__._,_.___


[* Moderator's Note - CHOTTALA is a non-profit, non-religious, non-political and non-discriminatory organization.

* Disclaimer: Any posting to the CHOTTALA are the opinion of the author. Authors of the messages to the CHOTTALA are responsible for the accuracy of their information and the conformance of their material with applicable copyright and other laws. Many people will read your post, and it will be archived for a very long time. The act of posting to the CHOTTALA indicates the subscriber's agreement to accept the adjudications of the moderator]




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

Re: [chottala.com] CIA Agents Reveal Secrets Of The CIA



I used to work at Learjet...One colleague one day mentions to me indicating our then supervisor, that supervisors father had died recently in a Texas Hospital very lone some death. My supervisor himself did not find out about his fathers death much after his death. He further stated that rumor has it his father had CIA ties. It seems supervisors parents were divorced many years ago and etc and at least our supervisor was more or less grown up. I did used to have good relation with that supervisor. I had to leave that company in a bitter situation after the change in that supervisor. Many things are at dispute..how I had to leave the company...

After leaving the company I one day visited few I knew back then from Bangladesh. I came to find out their was this  Bangladesh student who did get job at same company and in the same dept also had to leave the company he was Moslem and even had MS degree in Industrial Engineering. I kind of visited with him how did he like working their and etc, how did he like some of the supervisors and other engineers as I knew most of them..

It seemed he also had difficulty like me in The dept, in fact he hinted of an very similar experience over a pay raise issue and how it was dealt and why he was not offered the permanent opportunity as some others where, even when he was offered at much lesser wage then his contemporary's.

Only thing he had good to say was about the same Supervisor, I had good relation ship with. He stated same same as me then gentleman knew his stuff and did train him at his work accordingly...I guess two people from Bangladesh One moslem and me Buddhist,  came out with same opinion on a supervisor whose father rumored to have CIA a ties. I have not come across any one that or introduced me that they were tied to CIA..could not tell CIA from Mossad..I have even heard similar comments or remarks even from Blacks tied to those days about the same supervisor...Kid you not he was hard when he needed to be..

By the way from what I heard and read from CIA directors remark..CIA does not admit or deny  one that had ties to CIA that is what they mention...That is only know situation I have come across any where where CIA relation was mentioned even in remote way..I guess the movie was in then Bangladesh KEY ASHOL KEY NOKOL ..

Debasish barua


From: Isha Khan <bdmailer@gmail.com>
To:
Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 11:53 PM
Subject: [chottala.com] CIA Agents Reveal Secrets Of The CIA

 
CIA Agents Reveal Secrets Of The CIA


'Secrets of the CIA is a revealing 90-minute documentary. In this riveting exposé, five former CIA agents describe how their initial pride and enthusiasm at serving their nation turned to anguish and remorse, as they realized that they were actually subverting democracy and killing innocent civilians all in the name "national security" and promoting foreign policy agendas.
A Notre Dame football star, an aerospace engineering senior at Iowa State, an attractive high school graduate, a young patriot, and an Olympic shooting champion all were recruited by the CIA at a young age. These five brave individuals risk retaliation in revealing the story of their gradual disillusionment and finally defection from the CIA, as they eventually became convinced beyond a shadow of a doubt that they were serving neither democracy, nor the people of their country.'

See video:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4RXPJmqkxmI&feature=player_embedded#t=0s

http://www.whiteowlconspiracy.com/2012/08/cia-agents-reveal-secrets-of-cia.html




__._,_.___


[* Moderator�s Note - CHOTTALA is a non-profit, non-religious, non-political and non-discriminatory organization.

* Disclaimer: Any posting to the CHOTTALA are the opinion of the author. Authors of the messages to the CHOTTALA are responsible for the accuracy of their information and the conformance of their material with applicable copyright and other laws. Many people will read your post, and it will be archived for a very long time. The act of posting to the CHOTTALA indicates the subscriber's agreement to accept the adjudications of the moderator]




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___

RE: [chottala.com] Declassified US documents on coups in 1975



BDR tragedy: the RAW connection!



From:

RAW-এর অগোচরে বাংলদেশের কোন ঘটনাই ঘটানো সম্ভব নয়। আর RAW জানা মানে AL জানা। আসলে BDR-বিদ্রোহ ঘটনা একটা সংবদ্ধ প্রচেষ্ঠার ফল। এখানে পুরো ঘটনার জরিত ইসরাইলী গোয়েন্দা সংস্থা মোসাদ, RAW, AL, এবং জেঃ মইন ইউ গংরা। এই বিদ্রোহ ঘটনার নিলনকশা তৈরী করেছে ইসরাইলী গোয়েন্দা সংস্থা মোসাদ। অনেক আগে থেকে শুরু করে ঘটনার প্রথম দিন পর্যন্ত তা বাস্তবায়নের কাজ করে গেছে RAW । তারা একটা সংগবদ্ধ কিলিং স্কোয়াড পাঠিয়েছিল। কিছু BDR জওয়ানদের সাথে নিয়ে ঐ কিলিং স্কোয়াড বেশিরভাগ হত্যাকান্ডের কাজ তারা প্রথম দিন দুপুরের মধ্যই সেরে ফেলে। হত্যাকান্ডের পর RAW-এর কিলিং স্কোয়াডটি আলোচনার নামে মন্ত্রী-এমপিদের সাথে আসা RAW-এর কালো কাঁচের শেড দেওয়া গাড়ীতে করে পালিয়ে যায়। এবং RAW-এর কাজ মূলতঃ এখানেই শেষ। এরপর আত্তসমর্পনের নামে নাটক শুরু হয়। এই নাটকের মধ্যদিয়ে সারা রাত থেকে শুরু করে পরদিন দুপুর দুইটার মধ্যেই ঘটনার সাথে সরাসরি জরিত BDR-রা পালিয়ে যায়। এদের পালানোর সুবিদার্থে পিলখানায় মন্ত্রী-এমপিদের ঘন ঘন আসা-যাওয়া, অযথা কালক্ষেপন এবং আশে-পাশে মিটিং মিছিলের ব্যবস্থা করা হয়। আর জে: মইন ইউ গংরা তার নিয়ন্ত্রিত গোয়েন্দা সংস্থাগুলোকে বহু আগে থেকেই রাজনিতিবীদদের পিছনে লাগিয়ে দিয়ে নিরবিঘ্নভাবে পরিকল্পনা বাস্তবায়নের সুযোগ করে দেয়। এবং পরিকল্পনামাফিক গত দুই-তিন মাসে কর্নেল গুলজারের মত বেশ কিছু চৌকশ ও দেশপ্রেমিক সেনা কর্মকর্তাকে BDR-এ বদলি করা হয়।বিদ্রোহের দ্বিতীয় দিনে তার নির্দেশে হাসিনার বাসভবনে সেনা মোতায়েন করা হয়। তার জানা ছিলো যে, তার এবং সরকারের বিরুদ্ধে হয়তো কু করার চেষ্টা হবে, তারপর পাল্টা কু হবে। এই কু-পাল্টা-কু এর মাঝখানে আরও অনেক সেনা অফিসার (হতে পারে সেটা এইবারের চেয়েও অনেক বেশি) মারা যাবে। এর মধ্যেই RAW-এর পরিকল্পনা মত একদল আর্মিদের হাতে খালেদা, মওদুদ আহমেদ এবং মাহমুদুর রহমানদের মত লোকদের হত্যা করা হবে। সাধারন জনগনকে বুঝানো হবে যে, আর্মির উপর প্রতিশোধ নেওয়ার জন্য BDR-বিদ্রোহ তারাই ঘটিয়েছে। যার কারনে বিক্ষুব্ধ সেনাসদস্যদের হাতে তাদের নিহত হতে হয়েছে। তারপর খালেদা হত্যাকান্ড ও কু-এর সাথে জরিত থাকার অভিযোগে অনেক সেনাসদস্যকে কোর্ট মার্শালের মাধ্যমে মৃত্যদন্ড দেওয়া হবে। এবং এরা হবে BDR বিদ্রোহে সেনা কর্মকর্তাদের মত সবাই দেশপ্রেমিক সেনা কর্মকর্তা। এইভাবেই বাস্তবায়ন ক্লিন করার কাজ।তারপর শুরু হবে রাজনৈতিক হানাহানি। সেটা নিয়ন্ত্রন করার জন্য Indian সেনাবাহীনির সাহায্য চাওয়া হবে। এর মাধ্যমে বাংলাদেশের পরিণতি হবে সিকিম। India এই পর্যন্ত সন্তষ্ট থাকতে চাইবে। কিনতু মোসাদ, সিআইএ তাদের পরিকলপনা আরও অনেকদুর এগিয়ে নিয়ে যাবে যার মাধ্যমে বাংলাদেশের সর্বশেষ পরিণতি হবে আফগানিস্তান।যাইহোক সেনাবাহিনীর দেশপ্রেমিক সেনাকর্মকর্তাদের চরম ধৈর্য ও বিচক্ষনতায় এই পরিকল্পনা শেষ পর্যন্ত বাস্তবায়ন করা সম্ভব হয়নি। তবে সেই সম্ভাবনা এখনো উরিয়ে দেওয়া যায়না।তবে এইবার খেলা অন্য স্টাইলে শুরু হয়েছে। তদন্ত তদন্ত খেলা। সেনা সদস্যরা চাইলেও জেঃ মইন থাকাকালীন BDR-বিদ্রোহের ঘটনার সুষ্ঠ তদন্ত কখনোই হবেনা। তদন্তের নামে প্রহশন হবে। প্রথমে জামাত-বিএনপি কে টার্গেট করা হবে। তাদের জরিত করা সম্ভব নাহলে শেষ পর্যন্ত JMB বা অন্য কোন আন্ডারগ্রাউন্ড সংগঠনকে দায়ী করা হবে। তারা খুশি হয়েই এই দায়দায়িত্ব নিতে চাইবে কারণ এরা মূলতঃ 'র'-মোসাদেরই সৃষ্ট। কাজেই সত্য ঘটনা কোনদিনই প্রকাশ পাবেনা। বরং হতাহত সেনাকর্মকর্তাদের পরিবারকে নগদ অনুদান, চাকরী, খাওয়া-পড়া ইত্যাদি ব্যবস্থা করার মাধ্যমে সেনাবাহিনীকে সন্তষ্ট রাখার চেষ্টা করা হবে। অন্যদিকে জনগনের দৃষ্টি ভিন্ন খাতে প্রসারিত করতে নতুন কোন ঘটনার জন্ম দেওয়া হবে।এরপর কথিত জংগী মোকাবেলার জন্য ভারতের সাথে টাস্কফোর্স গঠন আরও তরান্বিত হবে। এই ক্ষেত্রেও বাংলাদেশের অবধারিত পরিণতি আফগানিস্তান।অনেকে মনে করতে পারেন, নিজ দেশের সেনাবাহিনীর বিরুদ্ধে আওয়আমীলীগের এই ষড়যন্ত্রে জরিয়ে লাভ কি এবং এতবড় রিস্ক নেওয়ার ক্ষেত্রে তাদের যুক্তি কি। লাভ ও যুক্তি অবশ্যই আছে।ঘটনাচক্রে জেঃ মইনদের ষড়যন্ত্রের শিকার হয়ে সেনাবাহিনী AL-কে ক্ষমতায় নিয়ে আসলেও AL কোনদিনই সেনাবাহিনীকে তাদের বন্ধু মনে করেনা। বরং সবসময় তাদের হুমকী মনে করে। এই কারনেই ক্ষমতায় আসতে না আসতেই সংসদের প্রথম অধিবেশনেই সেনাবাহিনীর বিরুদ্ধে তারা অপমানজনক বীল পাশ করেছে, যাতে এই বারের ভুল সংশোধন করে পরবর্তী নির্বাচন সুষ্ঠ করার ক্ষেত্রে সেনাবাহিনী কোন ভুমিকা না নিতে পারে। আর তাছারা 2021 শাল পর্যন্ত ক্ষমতায় থাকতে হলে দরকার একটা লেংড়া নুলা সেনাবাহিনী ।নিহতদের পদ পুরনের মাধ্যমে সম্ভব হবে হাসিনার ছেলে জয়ের পরিকল্পনা অনুযায়ী গড়া সেই সেকুলার সেনাবাহিনী। অন্যদিকে নতুন অফিসার নিয়োগের মাধ্যমে রক্ষিবাহিনীর মত পোষা BDR বাহিনী। শুধু লাভ আর লাভ। আর এদিকে ভারতের সামনে আগ্গাবহ বাংলাদেশের হাতছানি। আমেরিকা-ইসরাইলের টার্গেট সব সম্ভাবনাময় মুসলিম দেশে সন্ত্রাসের বিরুদ্ধে যুদ্ধের বিস্তার ঘটানো। এবং আফগানিস্তান-ইরাক বানিয়ে তৈল-গ্যাস-বন্দর দখল করা। নিজ নিজ স্বার্থে সবাই যেন একই সূত্রে গাথা।আর ঝুকি নেওয়ার কথা বলছেন? ঝুকি নেওয়া আওয়ামীলিগের জন্য এক ধরনের নেশা। কমপক্ষে 2021 সাল পর্যন্ত ক্ষমতায় টিকে থাকতে তারা যেকোন ঝুকি নিতে প্রস্তুত। আর তারা ভাল করেই জানে সেনাবাহিনীর বর্তমান অসহায় অবস্থার কথা। জেঃ মইনরা খুবই দক্ষতার সাথে সেনাবাহিনীকে গনবিচ্ছিন্ন করেছে। তার চক্রান্তে সেনাবাহিনী সাধারণ জনগনসহ জাতীয়তাবাদীদের দীর্ঘদিনের আস্থা হারিয়েছে। এ অবস্থায় সেনাবাহিনী কোন ভাবেই তাদের উপর প্রতিশোধ পরায়ন হতে পারবেনা। তারপরেও যদি কিছু হ্য় তাহলে ভারত-আমেরিকা উদ্ধার করার জন্যতো আছেই। কাজেই চিন্তা কি।এ অবস্থায় সম্মানিত পাঠক ভেবে দেখুন আমাদের করনীয় কি? আসন্ন বিপর্যয়ের কবল থেকে আমাদের এই প্রিয় মাতৃভূমিকে রক্ষা করতে কি করা উচিত।


 

To:
From: bdmailer@gmail.com
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2012 07:03:00 +0600
Subject: [chottala.com] Declassified US documents on coups in 1975

 
Declassified US documents on Bangladesh coups in 1975

We do not know what message the US Embassy in Dhaka had sent to the State Department after the Pilkhana massacre. We will have to wait for another 30 years to get full text of the official message from the US Embassy.

However, I can share with you the message the US Embassy in Dhaka had sent after the August 1975 coup. This declassified document confirms Sheikh Mujib was warned by the US about the coup but he simply brushed the information aside.

The Embassy also provided early analysis of the August 15 coup against President Mujibur Rahman. It tentatively predicted that the United States would enjoy greater influence under the government of new president Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed.

The Embassy had also provided a narrative account and analysis of the military unrest and resulting coup of November 3, 1975.

http://bdfact.blogspot.com/2009/03/declass...bangladesh.html

-----------------------------------------------

Telegram 5470 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, November 10, 1975, 1010Z

1. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OFFER A CAPSULE SUMMARY OF THE CHAOTIC EVENTS OF LAST WEEK IN BANGLADESH WHICH SAW THREE DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS, MUCH KILLING, AND THE AVOIDANCE OF CIVIL WAR, WITH ATTENDANT POSSIBILITY OF INDIAN INTER-VENTION, BY THE NARROWEST OF MARGINS. THIS ACCOUNT IS SECRET. THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BRIGADIER MOSHARRAF, CHIE FOF THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF, WHO HAD BEEN EMBITTERED BY HIS FAILURE TO SHARE IN THE PROMOTIONS RECEIVED BY SOME OFHIS COLLEAGUES AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT MUJIB BY THE MAJORS ON AUGUST 15 AND WHO WAS ALSO BELIEVED TO BE ON A LIST OF ARMY OFFICERS TO BE INVESTIGATED WHICH HAD RECENTLY BEEN DRAWN UP BY THE MAJORS, BEGAN IN THE EARLYHOURS OF MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 3.

WE DO NOT KNOW POSITIVELY WHETHER MOSHARAFF WAS THE ARCHITECT OF THE CONFRONTATION, AS MANY CONTEND, OR WHETHER, AS ONE GOOD SOURCE HAS TOLD TOLD US, HE SIMPLY WENT ALONG WITH SUBORDINATES WHO WERE DETERMINED TO END THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE MAJORS IN THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT, A ROLE WHICH HAD RESULTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IN THE HARRASSMENT OF SOME OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS. THIS SOURCE ALSO HELD THAT ONE OF MOSHARRAF'S OBJECTIVES--ALTHOUGH HE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY MINDFULOF THE PERSONAL GLORY THAT MIGHT AWAIT HIM--WAS TO TAKE CONTROL OF HIS SUBORDINATES' PLANS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID MAJOR BLOODSHED.

3. MOSHARRAF AND HIS ALLIES QUICKLY TOOK CONTROL EARLY MONDAY MORNING OF THE ARMY CANTONMENT AS WELL AS MOST OF THE CITY OF DACCA AND PRESSED THEIR CONFRONTATION WITH THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT BY FLYING A MIG FIGHTER AND ARMED HELICOPTER OVER THE CITY IN A SHOW OF STRENGTH WHICH WAS ALSO INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE THE TANK CREWS LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, MOSHARRAF LEVIED FOUR DEMANDS ON MOSHTAQUE:

1) THAT MOSHARRAF REPLACE MAJOR GENERAL ZIAUR RAHMAN, HIS PERSONAL RIVAL, AS CHIEFOF STAFF; 2) THAT THE MAJORS BE RETURNED TO REGULAR ARMY DISCIPLINE; 3) THAT THE TANK FROCES LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT BE DISARMED; AND 4) THAT MOSHTAQUE REMAIN IN OFFICE.

OUTGUNNED AND APPARENTLY INTEND ABOVE ALL ON AVOIDING BLOODSHED, WHICH WOULD ALSO HAVE INVITED INDIAN INTERVENTION, MOSHTAQUE EVENTUALLY YIELDED AFTER NEGOTIATING DURING THE COURSE OF A LONG DAY A COMPROMISE WITH MOSHARRAF BY WHICH THE MAJORS AND SOME OF THEIR COLLEAGUES, TO WHOM MOSHTAQUE WAS INDEBTED FOR HIS PRESIDENCY, WERE PERMITTED

SECRET

SECRET PAGE 03 DACCA 05470 01 OF 02 101306Z

TO DEPART BANGLADESH.

BEFORE THIS COMPROMISE HAD BEEN REACHED, THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT HAD CALLED ON THE ARMY FORCES AT COMILLA TO COME TO ITS AID BUT HAD BEEN REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE COMILLA COMMANDER WOULD ONLY RESPONDTO THE ORDERS OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (WHO WAS THEN UNDER ARREST)OR THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF (I.E., MOSHARRAF).

4. THE CONFRONTATION BROUGHT ANOTHER BLOODY RESULT WHICH,WE HAVE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE, HAD BEEN PART OF AN EARLIER CONTINGENCY PLAN TO BE CARRIED OUT IN THE EVENT THAT MOSHTAQUE WERE TO BE KILLED, I.E., THE MURDER OF HIS FORMER COLLEAGUES IN THE AWAMI PARTY LEADERSHIP WHO WERE NOW HIS POLITICAL ENEMIES--FORMER PRIME MINISTER MANSOOR ALI,FORMER VICE PRESIDENT SYED NAZRUL ISLAM, FORMER PRIMEMINISTER, FINANCE MINISTER AND INDIOPHILE TAJUDDIN AHMED, AND FORMER INDUSTRIES MINISTER KAMARUZZAMAN. THESE LEADERS WERE KILLED, EVIDENTLY AT THE ORDER OF ONE OR MORE OF THE MAJORS, EARLY MONDAY MORNING AT DACCA JAIL. THE EVENT ADDED A NOTE OF MYSTERY TO MOSHARRAF'S ACQUIESCENCE LATER IN THE DAY TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE MAJORS, ONE VERSION HAVING IT THAT MOSHARRAF DID NOT YET KNOW OF THE DEED WHEN THE PLANE LEFT DACCA AT MIDNIGHT MONDAY.MANY OBSERVERS ALSO NOTED THAT ONE EFFECT OF THE MURDERS WAS TO REMOVE THE LOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF ANY PRO-INDIAN GOVERNMENT.

5. WITH THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION DEFUSED TO A DEGREE BY THE DEPARTURE OF THE MAJORS, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MOSHTAQUE AND MOSHARRAF CONTINUED ON TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY, RESULTING IN MOSHARRAF'S DESIGNATION AS CHIEF OF STAFF LATE TUESDAY NIGHT, AND EVENTUALLY IN MOSHTAQUE'S RESIGNATION EARLYTHURSDAY MORNING WITH THE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT THATA NON-POLITICAL FIGURE, CHIEF JUSTICE A.S.M. SAYEM, WOULDBE APPOINTED PRESIDENT. SAYEM WAS SWORN IN ON THURSDAY AND PROMPTLY DISSOLVED THE PARLIAMENT. REPORTS, WHICH WE ACCEPT, WERE RIFE THAT THE CABINET HAD ALREADY RESIGNED IN PROTEST AGAINST THE MURDER OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

6. BUT IT NOW BECAME CLEAR THAT MOSHARRAF'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER IN THE ARMY WAS UNPALATABLE TO MOST OF HIS FELLOW SECRET

SECRET PAGE 04 DACCA 05470 01 OF 02 101306Z

OFFICERS AND ENLISTED RANKS, BOTH BECAUSE GENERAL ZIA EVIDENTLY HELD A MUCH WIDER POPULAR FOLLOWING AMONG THE MBUT ALSO, AND VERY IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE MOSHARRAF WAS WIDELY SEEN, WHETHER ACCURATELY OR NOT, AS AN INSTRUMENT OF INDIAN POLICY. THIS PERCEPTION WAS BUTTRESSED BY THE PRO-MUJIB PROCESSION ON TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY'S HARTAL TO PROTEST THE KILLINGS AT DACCA JAIL. THE LOWER RANKS REVOLTED IN THE EARLY HOURS OF FRIDAY MORNING, QUICKLY OVERTHROWING THE MOSHARRAF FORCES AND, ACCORDING TO VIRTUALLY ALL ACCOUNTS, KILLING MOSHARRAF. EXTENSIVE FIRING WENT THROUGHOUT THE CITY ALL NIGHT AND ALL DURING THE DAY FRIDAY, MOST OF IT CELEBRATORY AFTER MOSHARRAF WAS OUESTED. ONE AUTHORITIATIVE SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT ONLY ABOUT THIRTY WERE KILLED IN THE OVERTHROW; OTHER REPORTS HAVE REACHED US WHICH PUT THE FIGURE IN THE HUNDREDS.

7. THE SUCCESSFUL REVOLT OF THE LOWER RANKS NOW BROUGHT ANEW PROBLEM, THE RAMPANT INDISCIPLINE OF THE ENLISTED MEN,MANY OF WHOM NOW TURNED ON OFFICERS AGAINST WHOM THEY MIGH THAVE GRUDGES AND OTHERS BEGAN PRESENTING DEMANDS ON THE ARMY LEADERSHIP FOR A BETTER DEAL IN THEIR FUTURE TREATMENT.WIDESPREAD REPORTS WERE CURRENT THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF MILITARY OFFICERS HAD FLED OR WERE ATLEAST STAYING AWAY FROM THE CANTONMENT OUT OF FEAR OF THE RAMPAGING SEPOYS, AND SEVERAL REPORTS REACHED US OF THE MURDER OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND OF THEIR WIVES.

8. MEANWHILE THE POST-MOSHARRAF GOVERNMENT TOOK SHAPE IN A MEETING EARLY FRIDAY MORNING BETWEEN GENERAL ZIA,MOSHTAQUE AND PRESUMABLY OTHER PRINCIPAL AIDES. MOSHTAQUE WAS OFFERED THE PRESIDENCY A NEW BUT DECLINED ON THE GROUND THAT, IN THE STILL EXPLOSIVE SITUATION, THE COUNTRY REQUIRED A NON-POLITICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL PRESIDENT.CONSEQUENTLY THE DECISION WAS REACHED TO KEEP JUSTICE SAYEM IN THE PRESIDENCY AND TO TURN OVER TO HIM AS WELL THE FUNCTIONS OF CHIEF OF THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION,

SECRET PAGE 02 DACCA 05470 02 OF 02 101246

A ROLE WHICH HAD BEEN FILLED BRIEFLY BY GENERAL ZIA. WEWERE POINTEDLY ASSURED THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS ENJOYED FULL SUPPORT BOTH WITHIN THE MILITARY AND WITHIN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SO THAT THE WAY WAS NOW CLEAR FOR THERESTORATION OF STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY.

9. AS OF MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 10, THE SITUATION HAD RETURNED TO AN APPARENT NORMALCY, WITH INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE RESUMED ON SUNDAY, BUT THE GENERAL UNEASINESS WAS STILL BEING FED BY REPORTS OF CONTINUED KILLINGS AMONG THE MILITARY AND OF POSSIBLE INDIAN ACTIONS ALONG THE BORDER.THE PROSPECT WAS FOR, AT BEST, A CONTINUED STATE OF TENSION AND UNCERTIANTY.

10. COMMENT. THREE CONCLUSIONS IMPLICIT IN THE ABOVE ACCOUNT SHOULD BE UNDERLINE. THE FIRST IS THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN THE COUP AND COUNTER-COUP APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN NON-POLITICAL, EXCEPT IN THE SENSE THAT MOSHARRAF HAD THE ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGE OF APPEARING TO BE PRO-INDIAN. THE ARMY FORCES WHICH OVERTHREW MOSHTAQUE AND THE MAJORS APPEAR TO HAVE ACTED PRIMARILY OUT OF A SENSE OF GRIEVANCE AGAINST THE MAJORS. THE COUNTER-COUP WAS THE WORK OF LOWER RANKS WHO FAR PREFERRED ZIA TO MOSHARRAF AND WHO WERE ALSO CONCERNED WHRE MOSHARRAF'S LOYALTYMIGHT LIE. WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE REGIMES OF THE PAST WEEK WERE ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-INDIAN, OR PRO-SOVIET IN CHARACTER.

11. THE SECOND IS THAT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT INDIA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY OF THE WEEK'S ACTIONS.

12. THE THIRD IS THE CONFIRMATION OF HOW STRONGLY AND PERVASIVELY ANTI-INDIA ANTIPATHIES ARE FELT HERE-FROM THE TOP OF THE LEADERSHIP TO THE LOWEST GROUPS OF THE SOCIETY. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSHARRAF WAS PRO-INDIAN, AND SOME THAT HE WAS NOT, HE WAS WIDELY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH AND THE WILD CELEBRATIONS HERE OF HIS OVERTHROW CARRIED DISTINCTLY ANTI-INDIAN OVERTONES.

BOSTER

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97075.htm

--------------------------------------------

Minutes of the Secretary of State's Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, August 15, 1975, 8 a.m.

The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting
Friday, August 15, 1975

Participants:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE - HENRY A. KISSINGER

P Mr. Sisco
E Mr. Robinson
T Mr. Maw
AF Ambassador Mulcahy, Acting
ARA Mr. Rogers
EA Mr. Zurhellen, Acting
EUR Mr. Armitage, Acting
NEA Mr. Atherton
INR Mr. Hyland
S-P Mr. Lord
EB Mr. Enders
S/PRS Mr. Funseth, Acting
PM Mr. Vest
PM Ambassador Buffum
H Ambassador McCloskey
L Mr. Leigh
S/S Mr. Borg, Acting
S Mr. Bremer

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's talk about Bangladesh.

MR. ATHERTON: Well, it was a remarkably well-planned and executed coup for Bangladesh.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does that mean? Is Mujibur alive or dead?

MR. ATHERTON: Mujibur is dead; his immediate clique, which was largely family, nephews, brothers.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I get good advice from INR.

MR. HYLAND: He wasn't dead when I talked to you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Really? Did they kill him after some period?

MR. ATHERTON: As far as we know -- I can't say we have got all the details. But the indications are that the plan was to kill him. And they simply surrounded his palace and went in and killed him. That is as far as we know now.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him that last year?

MR. ATHERTON: In March we had lots of indications --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him about it?

MR. ATHERTON: We told him at the time.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him who it was going to be, roughly?

MR. ATHERTON: I will have to check whether we gave him the names.

MR. HYLAND: We were a little imprecise on that.

MR. ATHERTON: He brushed it off, scoffed at it, said nobody would do a thing like that to him.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He was one of the world's prize fools.

MR. ATHERTON: But it seems that the coup leaders are in complete control.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who are they?

MR. ATHERTON: They are military officers, middle and senior officers, who are generally considered less pro-Indian than the past leadership; pro-U.S., anti-Soviet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely inevitable.

MR. ATHERTON: Islamic. They have changed the name to the Islamic Republic --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That they would be pro-U.S. was not inevitable. In fact, I would have thought at some turn of the wheel they were going to become pro-Chinese, and anti-Indian I firmly expected. I always knew India would rue the day that they made Bangladesh independent. I predicted that since '71.

MR. ATHERTON: I think our biggest problem is going to be to avoid too close an embrace.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why -- because they are friendly to us?

MR. ATHERTON: I think they are going to want us to come in with promises.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The principle being we only embrace on the sub-continent those who oppose us. What is the principle?

MR. ATHERTON: I think our principle ought to be we are giving about all the aid we can really give or Bangladesh can really absorb.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before we implement it, let's check that. I know we can't do a huge increase in aid. But I think if people who think they are pro-U.S. come to us and then get a technical lecture that unfortunately we can't do any more -- there must be some maneuvering we can do on food aid and some token increase in aid.

MR. ENDERS: We can do a little more on food aid.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like them to get it, if they are indeed what you say they are, which I don't know.

MR. ATHERTON: These are all the initial indications.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then they ought to get a friendly reception.

MR. ATHERTON: I think the immediate question is how we comport ourselves with the new government. It seems to me despite what the memo says which we sent you, which I didn't have time to go over carefully this morning -- I think we ought to simply respond to any overtures.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What did the memo say?

MR. ATHERTON: It says we ought to hold off on a decision on recognition. But I don't think that needs to be posed as that sharp a question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We ought to recognize.

MR. ATHERTON: I don't know what recognizing means in this case. I think we simply --

MR. SISCO: Just continue. That memo said also we have to check all this with the Indians, as if to give the Indians a veto. I certainly don't agree with that.

MR. ATHERTON: I think it would be useful --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We certainly shouldn't go to the Indians.

MR. ATHERTON: I think there might be some merit in an exchange of views with them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: After we have done it. We will not even discuss establishing contact with the new government with the Indians. After contact is established, we would be interested to hear their views, as long as they clearly understand that they cannot tell us what to do, and as long as they cannot go to the Bangladesh and tell them -- and then ask Bangladesh for their views, so that they can be transmitted to us.

MR. ATHERTON: I fully agree.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what India would dearly love to do.

You better let me see any approaches.

MR. ATHERTON: I think we have to prepare a telegram today, and we will clear it with you, on what we say to the Indians. And the Pakistanis are important. There will be some move towards Pakistan.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I also want to see you for a few minutes on a sober instruction to Bhutto, and some of his ideas on commitments. Okay.

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97038.htm

------------------------------------------------------

Telegram 3964 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, August 16, 1975, 1135Z

FM AMEMBASSY DACCA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7733INFO
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABADAM
EMBASSY KATHMADUAM
EMBASSY NEW DELHIAM
CONSUL CALCUTTA
CINCPAC
C O N F I D E N T I A L DACCA 3964
CINCPAC FOR POLADE.O. 11652: GDSTAGS: PINT, PFOR, BG, US, IN, UR, CH, XD

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON THE COUP IN BANGLADESH

1. THE EVENTS OF THE FIRST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS GIVE PROMISE THAT THE COUP WHICH BEGAN AT 0515 LOCAL TIME ON AUGUST 15 WILL NOT BE CHALLENGED. THE OATHS OF FEALTY TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT SWORN BY THE SERVICE CHIEFS, THE HEADS OF THE PARAMILITARY BANGLADESH RIFLES AND RAKKHI BAHINI ANDTHE HEAD OF THE POLICE BRING ALL ARMED ELEMENTS INTO SUPPORT OF THE NEW REGIME.. THE PUBLIC HAS DISPLAYED NO PARTICULAR JIBILATION AT THE FALL OF MUJIB BUT RATHER ACALM ACCEPTANCE, AND PERHAPS SOME SENSE OF RELIEF. THERELATIVE EASE WITH WHICH POWER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED SUGGESTS ABOVE ALL THE DEGREE TO WHICH MUJIB AND THE BANGALEES HAD BECOME ALIENATED FROM ONE ANOTHER, THE BANGALEES FROM MUJIB BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO MEET THEIR ASPIRATIONS AND HIS APPARENT DESIRE TO HOLD POWER LARGELY FOR PERSONAL AGRANDIZEMENT AND DYNASTIC REASONS, AND MUJIB

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 DACCA 03964 161135Z

FROM THE BANGLAEES AS HE GREW MORE ISOLATED FROM OBJECTIVE COUNSELS AND BEGAN TO SUFFER THE CLASSIC PARANOIA OF THE DESPOT. THE QUICKENING TEMPO OF SHEIKH MUJIB'S EFFORTS SINCE EARLY JUNE TO INSURE HIS STRANGLEHOLD ON POWER,TOGETHER WITH THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF HIS NEPHEW SHEIKHMONI, DOUBTLESS MADE THE COUP PLOTTERS CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTHER DELAYS IN TAKING ACTION WAS POSSIBLE. THAT INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY WAS CHOSEN MAY HAVE BEEN MERELY INCIDENTAL, BUTWE NOTE THE COINCIDENCE.

2. IT IS TOO EARLY TO OFFER ANY SURE OPINIONS ON THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS. THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER KHONDAKAR MUSHTAQUE AHMED SEEMS LITTLE LIKELY TO AROUSEANY SENSE OF ENTHUSIASM. ALTHOUGH PURGED--BY DEATH OR EXCLUSION--OF THOSE WHO WERE CLOSEST TO SHEIKH MUJIB, IT IS STILL A COLLECTION OF OVERLY FAMILIAR FIGURES WHO ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THE POOR ADMINISTRATION OF POST-LIBERATION BANGLADESH. CLEARLY, ITS COMPOSITION IS INTENDED TO SUGGEST THAT BANGLADESH UNDER MUSHTAQUE WILL OFFER CONTINUITY, BUT ALSO THAT THERE WILL BE GREATER MODERATION. MUSHTAQUE'S RADIO ADDRESS LATE ON AUGUST 15 (DACCA 3955) SUPPORTS THIS VIEW, CONDEMNING AS IT DOES THE DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF SHEIKH MUJIB'S RULE BUT CLEARLY SUGGESTING THAT IN SOFAR AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE CONCERNED, BUSINESS WILLBE MUCH AS USUAL.

THERE IS ALREADY SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL WANT TO STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD, INCLUDING PAKISTAN. AT THE SAME TIME,MUSHTAQUE'S WELL-KNOWN ANTIPATHY TO INDIA NOTWITHSTANDING,THE NEW REGIME WILL NOT WANT TO AROUSE UNDUE SUSPICIONS ON THE PART OF INDIA, CLEARLY COGNIZANT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING AN ADEQUATE MEASURE OF GOODWILL ON THE PART OF ITS IMPOSING NEIGHBOR. (PERHAPS ONE REASON FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE CABINET, WITH ITS EXCLUSIVE RELIANCEON OLD FACES, IS A HOPE TO DEMONSTRATE TO INDIA ITS BASIC CONTINUITY.)

INSOFAR AS THE MAJOR POWERS ARE CONCERNED, MUSHTAQUE HAS STATED HIS GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH"CLOSER AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE BIG POWERS LIKETHE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA." THIS WOULD SEEM TO MEAN MORE BALANCE IN ITS RELATIONS, AND THUS SOME DIMINUTION IN THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 DACCA 03964 161135Z

3. THE EVIDENCE SO FAR SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT COULD TURN OUT TO BE ON AN EVEN MORE CORDIAL BASIS THAN THEY WERE UNDER MUJIB. THE NEW PRESIDENT HAS IN THE PAST BEEN STRIKINGLY OVERT IN SUGGESTING HIS "PRO-AMERICAN" ATTITUDE; MOREOVER,THE FIGURES IN THE OLD REGIME WHO WERE KNOWN FOR THEIR LEFTIST AND ANTI-AMERICAN VIEWS (SHEIKH MONI AND SAMAD,EXAMPLE) ARE NOW GONE. THE POSSIBILITY IS ALSO STRONG THAT THEY WILL LOOK TO US FOR EVEN LARGER AMOUNTS OF AID--MUSHTAQUE HAS ARGUED WITH US BEFORE THAT WE ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO CAN TRULY HELP BANGLADESH--SO THAT OUR PROBLEM MAY WELL PROVE TO BE ONE OF TEMPERING THE NEW REGIME'S EXPECTATIONS OF US.

4. WE CANNOT PRESENTLY JUDGE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUSHTAQUE'S GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY. WE NOTE WITH INTEREST THAT EVERY OFFICIAL STATEMENT STRESSES THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE TAKEOVER. WE ARE TOLD THAT THEY MILITARY ARE AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN PREPARING MARTIALLAW ORDERS WHICH WOULD, IF THE PAKISTANI PATTERN IS FOLLOWED, SERVE AS BASIS LAW OF THE COUNTRY. WHETHER THIS MEANS A GROWTH OF TENSION BETWEEN THE CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY WE CANNOT YET SAY, BUT WE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT ONE OF THE FIRST STATEMENTS BY MUSHTAQUE WOULD HAVE BEEN A PROMISE OF A NEW, MORE LIBERAL CONSTITUATION THAN THAT IMPOSED LAST JANUARY BY MUJIB. THE CIVILIANS PROBABLY HAVEA MOMENTARY ADVANTAGE IN LIGHT OF THEIR EXPERIENCE; MOREOVER, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OUSTER OF MUJIB, WE ARE LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THATTHE COUP PLANNERS PREPARED FOR LITTLE BEYOND THE EVENTITSELF.

HOWEVER, THE MILITARY--AND BY THIS WE MEAN THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHO PLANNED AND LED COUP--DID WORK THE OVERTHROW OF SHEIKH MUJIB, AND WE SUSPECT THAT,HAVING TASTED BLOOD, THEY WILL WANT AT THE VERY LEAST TO EXERCISE SOME MEASURE OF INFLUENCE OVER THE COURSE OFEVENTS. WE HAVE NO REASON TO LOOK FOR BANGALEE QUADDAFI SAMONG THE COUP PLANNERS; RATHER, AS MEMBERS OF THE OLD,SERVICE-ORIENTED MIDDLE CLASS WHICH WAS THREATENED BY SHEIKH MUJIB, THEY MAY PROVE A MORE MODERATE FORCE THAN HAS BEEN SEEN IN EAST BENGAL SINCE PAKISTANI PERIOD. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 DACCA 03964 161135Z

5. ONE POINT TO BE EMPHASIZED IS THAT, WHILE THE OVERTHROW OF SHEIKH MUJIB WAS SUCCESSFUL, IF BLOODLY, A GREAT DEAL REMAINS TO BE DONE. MUSHTAQUE'S SPEECH IS SIGNIFICANT LARGELY FOR ITS GENERALITIES AND ITS ECHOES OF EARLIER AWAMI LEAGUE RHETORIC, BUT CONCRETE ACTIONS HAVE SO FAR BEEN FEW. WE ARE NOT SURPRISED THAT THE DEGREE OF DIRECTION DISPLAYED SO FAR IS LIMITED FOR WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO THINK THAT THOSE PRIVY TO THE PLANNING OF THE COUP WERE SMALL IN NUMBER AND THUS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PREPARING ANY ELABORATE PLANS FOR THE GOVERNACE OF BANGLADESH WAS VERY SMALL.

HOWEVER, UNLESS EARLY STEPS ARE TAKEN TO DEMONSTRATEVIGOR AND WILL, THE ADVANTAGE NOW HELD BY THE NEWREGIME WILL BEGIN TO DIMINISH, AN WE MAY CONFRONT AN UNSETTLED--AND UNSETTLING--SITUATION AS CONTENDERS FOR POWER EMERGE. NO ONE NOW ON THE BANGLAEE POLITIICAL STAGEHAS KIND OF COMMANDING PERSONALITY WHICH SUSTAINED SHEIKH MUJIB FOR SO LONG. THE CIVLIAN GOVERNMENT FALTERS, WE MAY FIND THE MILITARY CONCLUDING THAT IS MUST AGAIN SAVE THE NATION.

BOSTER

CONFIDENTIAL

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97064.htm


__._,_.___


[* Moderator�s Note - CHOTTALA is a non-profit, non-religious, non-political and non-discriminatory organization.

* Disclaimer: Any posting to the CHOTTALA are the opinion of the author. Authors of the messages to the CHOTTALA are responsible for the accuracy of their information and the conformance of their material with applicable copyright and other laws. Many people will read your post, and it will be archived for a very long time. The act of posting to the CHOTTALA indicates the subscriber's agreement to accept the adjudications of the moderator]




Your email settings: Individual Email|Traditional
Change settings via the Web (Yahoo! ID required)
Change settings via email: Switch delivery to Daily Digest | Switch to Fully Featured
Visit Your Group | Yahoo! Groups Terms of Use | Unsubscribe

__,_._,___