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Tuesday, January 11, 2011

[chottala.com] Killing thy Neighbour: India, and its Border Security Force By Rahnuma Ahmed



Killing thy Neighbour

 

India, and its Border Security Force
By Rahnuma Ahmed

Felani's clothes got entangled in the barbed wire when she was crossing the Anantapur border in Kurigram. It was 6 in the morning, Friday, 7th January 2011. Felani was 15, she worked in Delhi and was returning home with her father after ten years. To get married. She screamed. The BSF shot her dead. They took away her body.

The fence is made of steel and concrete. Packed with razor wire, double-walled and 8-foot high, it is being built by the government of India on its border with Bangladesh. When completed, it promises to be larger than the United States-Mexico fence, Israel's apartheid wall with Palestine, and the Berlin wall put together.  It has been dubbed the Great Wall of India.

The fence is being constructed, with floodlighting in parts, to secure India's borders against interests hostile to the country. To put in place systems that are able to "interdict" these hostile elements. They will include a suitable mix and class of various types of hi-tech electronic surveillance equipment such as night vision devices, handheld thermal imagers, battle field surveillance radars, direction finders, unattended ground sensors, high powered telescopes to act as a "force multiplier" for "effective" border management. According to its rulers, this is "vitally important for national security."

Seventy percent of fencing along the Bangladesh border has been completed. In reply to a question in the Rajya Sabha on November 10, 2010, the Indian state minister for home affairs said, fencing will be completed by March 2012. One estimate puts the project's cost at ₤600 million.

The colonial boundary division between East Pakistan/Bangladesh and India, notes Willem van Schendel, had little to do with modern concepts of spatial rationality. It was anything but a straight line, snaking "through the countryside in a wacky zigzag pattern" showing no respect for history, cutting through innumerable geographical entities, for example, the ancient capital of Gaur. It was reflective of someone with an "excessively baroque mind" (The Bengal Borderland: Beyond state and nation in South Asia, 2005).

The fence divides and separates. Villages. Agricultural lands. Markets. Families. Communities. It cuts across mangrove-swamps in the southwest, forests and mountains in the northeast (Delwar Hussain, March 2, 2009). It divides villages. Everyday village-life must now submit to a tangle of bureaucracy as Indian Muslim law clerk, Maznu Rahman Mandal and his wife Ahmeda Khatun, a Bangladeshi, discovered after Ahmeda's father died. To attend the latter's funeral in the same village, Bhira, they would now have to get passports from Delhi, visas from Kolkata (Bidisha Bannerjee, December 20, 2010). It split up Fazlur Rehman's family too, the fence snaked into their Panidhar village homestead, his younger brother who lived right next door, is now in another country (Time, February 5, 2009). Other border residents have had their homes split in two, the kitchen in one country, the bedroom in another.

To access one's field, or markets, residents must now line up at long queues at the BSF border outposts, surrender their identity cards. They must submit to BSF's regimen, which often means disregarding what the crop needs. As Mithoo Sheikh of Murshidabad says, "The BSF does not understand cultivation problems." By the time we get to the field it is noon. Sometimes we get water only at night. But we have to stop working at 4pm, because they will not let us remain in the field. If we disobey, they beat us, they file false charges. ("Trigger Happy." Excessive Use of Force by Indian Troops at the Bangladesh Border, Human Rights Watch, December 2010).

This lack of `understanding' percolates to the topmost levels of both border forces. During an official visit to Bangladesh and talks between the BSF and the BDR (Bangladesh Rifles, recently renamed Border Guard Bangladesh) in September 2010, Raman Srivastava, director general of the BSF, in response to allegations that BSF troopers were killing innocent and unarmed Bangladeshi civilians said: "The deaths have occurred in Indian territory and mostly during night, so how can they be innocent?" Ideas reciprocated by the BDR chief Maj. Gen. Mainul Islam in March 2010, who, while explaining that there was a history of "people and cattle trafficking during darkness" said, "We should not be worried about such incidents [killings]…. We have discussed the matter and will ensure that no innocent people will be killed."

Abdur Rakib was catching fish in Dohalkhari lake, inside Bangladeshi territory. It was March 13, 2009. A witness saw a BSF soldier standing at the border, talking loudly. "It seemed that he wanted the boy to give him some free fish." Heated argument, verbal abuse. "The BSF pointed a gun at the boy. The boy ran and the soldier started to shoot." Two were injured. Rakib was shot in the chest. He died instantly. He was 13.

Smuggling, cattle rustling and human trafficking has increased in the border areas as poor farmers and landless people faced by population increases, poor irrigation, flooding, and continuous river erosion struggle to make ends meet. While both BSF and BGB accuse each other of corruption, the reality, says the recent Human Rights Watch report, is that some officials, border guards, and politicians on both sides are almost certainly involved in smuggling. It quotes a senior BSF official, "There are a lot of people involved, including our chaps. That is why only these farmers, with one or two cows are caught, not groups that ferry large consignments of cattle or drugs."

A culture of impunity prevails, says Kirity Roy, head of Manabadhikar Suraksha Mancha (Masum), a Kolkata-based human rights organisation. We have repeatedly approached the courts, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), the National Minorities Commission, the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights. But none of the cases raised have been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. In some cases, family members appeared before the BSF court of inquiry but we, as the de facto complainant, were never summoned to appear or depose before any inquiry conducted by BSF. No verdicts have been made public.

An Indian Border Security Force (BSF) soldier looks at the body of a suspected intruder shot dead at the site of an alleged encounter on the India-Pakistan border at Mahwa, Atari some 50 kilometers (27 miles) west of Amritsar, India, Wednesday, March 4, 2009. The BSF claimed to have killed a Pakistani intruder, arrested another and seized heroin worth several million rupees in the international market after an exchange of fire early Wednesday. (AP Photo/Altaf Qadri)

Neither has BSF provided any details to Bangladeshi authorities of any BSF personnel having been prosecuted for human rights violation. Impunity is legally sanctioned as the BSF is exempt from criminal prosecution unless specific approval is granted by the Indian government. A new bill to prohibit torture is being considered by the Indian parliament, it includes legal impunity.

On April 22, 2009, when Rabindranath Mandal and his wife were returning to Bangladesh after having illegally gone to India for Rabindranath's treatment, a BSF patrol team from Ghojadanga camp detained them. She was raped. Rabindranath tried to save her, they killed him. The following morning, the BSF jawans left her and her husband's dead body at the Zero Line at Lakkhidari.

The reason for building the fence, said an Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson, is the same as the United States' Mexico fence. As Israel's fence on the West Bank. To prevent illegal migration and terrorist infiltration.

But Rizwana Shamshad points out that the hysteria generated by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) during the 1980s and 1990s—Bangladeshi Muslim `infiltration' by the millions constitutes a serious strain on the national economy, it poses a threat to India's stability and security, it represents a challenge to Indian sovereignty, demographic changes will soon lead to Bangladeshi citizens demanding a separate state from India—did not withstand investigation. A study carried out by the Centre for Study of Society and Secularism in 1995 revealed that the BJP-Shiv Sena allegations were not only an exaggeration, but a complete fabrication. Fears and insecurities had been deliberately whipped up to consolidate Hindutva ideology; migrants, it seemed, were more preoccupied with struggling to make a living. While the BJP-Shiv Sena had alleged that there were 300,000 illegal Bangladeshi migrants in Mumbai, they were able to detect and deport only 10,000 Bangladeshi migrants, when in power (1998-2004).

The numbers vary with each media or official report, writes Rizwana. A BJP National Executive meeting declared over 15 million (April 1992). Nearly 10 million, said former Union Home Minister Indrajit Gupta (May 6, 1997). The group of cabinet ministers (home, defence, external affairs, finance) set up by prime minister Vajpayee post-Kargil, reported 15 million (2000). The definitions, she adds, are prejudiced: Muslim migrants are described as `infiltrators.' Hindu migrants as `refugees.' Neither is there any mention of the Indian economy having benefited from cheap labour.

The HRW report notes, few killed by the BSF have ever been shown to have been involved in terrorism. In the cases investigated, alleged criminals were armed with nothing but sickles, sticks and knives, implements commonly carried by villagers. Nor do the dead bodies bear out BSF's justification that they had fired in self-defense. Shots in the back indicate that the victims had been shot running away. Shots at close range signal they were probably killed in custody.

BSF kills Indian nationals too. In Indian territory. Basirun Bibi and her 6 month old grandson Ashique, May 2010. Atiur Rahman, March 2010. Shahjahan Gazi, November 2009. Noor Hossain, September 2009. Shyamsundar Mondal, August 2009. Sushanta Mondal, July 2009. Abdus Samad, May 2009. The imposition of informal curfews on both sides of the border at night, reportedly to prevent the accidental shooting of villagers, has not lessened the number of innocent people killed.

Beatings, torture, rape, killings. What could be the reason for such compulsively violent behaviour? According to the HRW report, it could have been caused by previous deployment in the Indo-Pakistan border in Kashmir, by "difficult and tense periods of duty."

However, checkpoints, curfews, hi-tech electronic surveillance equipment, harassment, intimidation, beatings, torture and sniper fire remind me of Gaza. Not surprising, given that once finished, the fence will "all but encircle Bangladesh" (Time, February 5, 2009).

The 1947 colonial border division was reflective of someone with an "excessively baroque mind." Its brutal enforcement through fencing, through the deployment of trigger happy BSF soldiers, speak of a Nazi-state mentality.

Not too far-fetched given Israel and India's "limitless relationship" (Military Ties Unlimited. India and Israel, New Age, January 18, 2010). This includes Israeli training of Indian commandos in urban warfare and counter-insurgency operations (in Kashmir), and proposals for offering the Border Security Forces specialised training.
Given Israel's behaviour, which Auschwitz survivor, Hajo Meyer, likens to the Nazis. "I can write up an endless list of similarities between Nazi Germany and Israel."

Israel's inability to learn to live with its neighbours is increasingly turning it into a "pariah state" (British MP). Its "paranoia" has been noted by Israelis themselves (Gideon Levy). That a similar future awaits India, is increasingly clear.

Published in New Age, Monday December 10, 2011

 
 
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[chottala.com] Pakistan's Road to Disintegration .....





http://www.cfr.org/publication/23744/pakistans_road_to_disintegration.html

Pakistan's Road to Disintegration

Interviewee:
Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Interviewer:
Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting Editor

January 6, 2011

photo of Stephen P. CohenIn the first few days of this year, Pakistan's coalition government was thrust into crisis after losing a coalition partner, and then a top politician--Punjab Governor Salman Taseer--was assassinated. A leading expert on the country, Stephen P. Cohen, says these incidents are symptoms of the profound problems tugging the country apart. "The fundamentals of the state are either failing or questionable, and this applies to both the idea of Pakistan, the ideology of the state, the purpose of the state, and also to the coherence of the state itself," Cohen says. "I wouldn't predict a comprehensive failure soon, but clearly that's the direction in which Pakistan is moving." On a recent trip, he was struck by the growing sense of insecurity in Pakistan, even within the military, and the growing importance of China.

What's the situation in Pakistan these days, given a key partner's withdrawal from the coalition government, and the assassination of a leading member of the ruling coalition, who opposed the blasphemy law which has support among the country's Muslim population?

These are symptoms of a deeper problem in Pakistan. There is not going to be any good news from Pakistan for some time, if ever, because the fundamentals of the state are either failing or questionable. This applies to both the idea of Pakistan, the ideology of the state, the purpose of the state, and also to the coherence of the state itself. Pakistan has lost a lot of its "stateness," that is the qualities that make a modern government function effectively. So there's failure in Pakistan on all counts. I wouldn't predict a comprehensive failure soon but clearly that's the direction in which Pakistan is moving.

Given Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons and its strategic location between Afghanistan and India, for the United States this is a looming crisis, isn't it.

Crisis Guide: Pakistan

All U.S. policies toward Pakistan are bad, and some are perhaps worse than others. We don't know whether leveling with Pakistan is going to improve things or make it worse. Ideally, we would own a time machine in which we could roll back history and reverse a lot of decisions we made in the past. Hopefully, we won't make any more fundamentally wrong decisions in the future, but that may not prevent Pakistan from going further down the road to disintegration. Someone in the State Department was quoted in a WikiLeaks document [as saying] that if it weren't for nuclear weapons, Pakistan would be the Congo. I would compare it to Nigeria without oil. It wouldn't be a serious state. But the nuclear weapons and the country's organized terrorist machinery do make it quite serious.

If it is anybody's problem in the future, it is going to be China's problem. I just spent several weeks in Pakistan. One thing I discovered was the country insecurity in a way I had never seen it, even in military cantonments. The other was that China's influence in Pakistan was much greater and deeper than I had imagined it to be. In a sense that's India's problem, but in the long run, it will be China's problem.

Describe China's influence.

China is Pakistan's major military supplier. Of course, they supplied military technology and probably put Pakistanis in touch with the North Koreans for missile technology. The Chinese have one concern in Pakistan and that is the training of Chinese militants and extremists inside of Pakistan. The Chinese have no problem with the Tiananmen Square-type of crowd control. When the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) was blown up in Islamabad in 2007, it came after some ten Chinese were kidnapped and the Chinese complained publicly. The Pakistanis had ignored our protests about the Mosque for many years. But they moved quickly when the Chinese protested, killing many women and children in the process. That was one of the turning points in President Pervez Musharraf's career, because that turned many militants against him. Before that time, he had either ignored or supported them, but after Lal Masjid, they became his enemy.

How important are the militants or terrorists? Can they control the state?

Militants--whether you call them anti-American, anti-liberal, or anti-secular--seem to have a veto over politics in Pakistan, but they can't govern the state. The parties control the elections but they can prevent others from governing, and they may prevent the military from governing as well.

Some people have been hoping for a military coup, but you don't think that will happen?

We have to do what we can do and prepare for the failure of Pakistan, which could happen in four or five or six years.

I don't think the military wants to be in that position now. I don't think the military chief Ashfaq Kayani has such a game plan. He is as smart and calculating as President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq [military president from 1977 until his assassination in 1988] was. He is quite different from Musharraf--not an Islamist himself, but he has certainly supported them in the past. I know the Pakistan military cannot govern Pakistan. They've tried it three times in the past and each time failed. This time they would have to deal with more active militants. The liberal forces are in retreat, and I don't see the army supporting the liberal forces in Pakistan.

Talk about the anti-American feeling. How did it develop into such a strong national sentiment?

Historically, the Pakistani elite have created a narrative of U.S.-Pakistan relations which always shows the United States letting Pakistan down. A turning point was the Iranian revolution of 1979, [which] showed a lot of Pakistanis that standing up to the Americans, embarrassing the Americans, humiliating the Americans felt good. Whether they were Sunnis or Shiites in Pakistan, it felt good. It all goes back to everyone in Pakistan concerned about American policy toward Israel and the Middle East. They seem to care more about Israel and Palestine than they do about themselves. The irony of Pakistan is that their major foreign policy obsessions are ones that they can't do anything about, including Israel and Palestine. When the U.S. and NATO forces moved into Iraq and Afghanistan, that was seen as a direct threat to Pakistan. They feared that the Islamist states were being knocked off one after another, beginning with Iraq, and going on to Afghanistan, and winding up with Pakistan. Most of that is imagined, but many Pakistanis believe it is true.

We've had a breakup of the coalition government, which happens all the time around the world, but why was so much gloom and doom expressed in Pakistan?

It's the incapacity of the Pakistani state to educate its own people in a modern fashion; it's the failure of the Pakistani economy to grow at all. If this was an American analogy, you would say Pakistan is a house under water. Except for its territory, which is strategically important, there is not much in Pakistan that is of benefit to anyone. They failed to take advantage of globalization. They use terrorism as an aspect of globalization, which is the negative side of globalization. Go down the list of factors, they are almost all negative. There is not one that is positive. They need outsiders for economic help. The conflict with India drains most of their budget. They can't resolve foreign policy differences with India. They have quarrels with us over Afghanistan, although they are probably right that we don't understand the Afghanis either. The question in my mind is whether these are irreversible so that Pakistan can become a normal state.

Militants--whether you call them anti-American, anti-liberal, or anti-secular--seem to have a veto over politics in Pakistan, but they can't govern the state.

What do you think?

Hope is not a policy, but despair is not a policy either. We have to do what we can do and prepare for the failure of Pakistan, which could happen in four or five or six years.

Talk about the terrorists.

There has been an accommodation with the government. Terrorist attacks are down. There seems to be an agreement by the security forces to accommodate the terrorist groups. I don't see the government regaining its position in the frontiers. The Pakistani Taliban is a designated enemy, but the army cannot move against them. The army is worried about its integrity itself.

Discuss Taseer's assassination.

He was like Sherry Rehman, a close associate of Benazir Bhutto.  Rehman had introduced a private member's bill to repeal the blasphemy law, and [Taseer] backed her, and that apparently led to his guard killing him. The blasphemy law makes the medieval Catholic Church look liberal. Anyone who stands up and criticizes the law has his life in danger. Rehman is prominently mentioned in press coverage. I don't think she will back down. She is a lady of strong principles, like Benazir.

Is the fear of India genuine?

It is genuine, because it goes back to the identity of Pakistan. They can't figure out how to reconcile their strategic necessity of accommodation with India. Of course, India takes a hard line on a lot of issues, not just Kashmir. India has allowed China to acquire Pakistan as a strategic asset. It is now a trilateral game between the Chinese and Indians with the Pakistanis on the Chinese side.

 http://www.cfr.org/

http://www.cfr.org/publication/23744/pakistans_road_to_disintegration.html

Recommended Links on CFR.org

Pakistan's New Generation of Terrorists
Pakistan has emerged as a terrorist sanctuary for some of the world's most violent groups, including al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and homegrown militants, that threaten the stability of Pakistan as well as the region.





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[chottala.com] An Untold Story of 1971 War by Dr. Nuran Nabi



 An Untold Story of 1971 War by Dr. Nuran Nabi
 
---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Nuran Nabi <nurannabi@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, Jan 10, 2011 at 11:46 AM
Subject: An Untold Story of 1971 War


Dear All,
Please ask Sarmila Bose to read my book Bullets of'71 - A Freedom Fighter's Story (www.nurannabi.com) to educate herself on Bangladesh Liberation War and learn how Pakistani Army led by Gen Niazi committed war crimes in Bangladesh in 1971. Miss Bose will also learn how courageous (?) Pakistani Army killed unarmed civilians, raped thousands of women and forced more than 10 million people to become refugees in India and live in  sub-human conditions.
 
She served the Pakistani interest  earlier by publishing a fake research report on rape, and now she did it again by bestowing honor (courageous vs coward) to war criminal Gen Niazi and his Army.
 
Also please ask her to read the list of Pakistani army officers (from Generals to Lieutenants) accused of committing war crimes in Bangladesh in 1971 (Appendix A in my book).
 
Regards,
Nuran Nabi
 
On Sun, Jan 9, 2011 at 5:28 AM, Nirob Dorshok <nistabdhota@yahoo.com.au> wrote:
 

The Courageous Pakistan Army Stand on the Eastern Front: An Untold Story of 1971 Indo-Pak War


By SARMILA BOSE

 THERE is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don't lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defense of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, the nation dishonours itself.

 

My introduction to international politics was 1971, as a schoolgirl in Calcutta. Many images from that year are still etched in my mind, but the culminating one was the photo on Ramna racecourse of two men sitting at a table — the smart, turbaned Sikh, 'our' war-hero, Jagjit Singh Aurora, and the large man in a beret, A A K Niazi, commander of the other side, signing the instrument of surrender. Nearly a generation later, a chance interview for the BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) with Lt Gen. Aurora took me back to 1971. The interview was not about 1971, but about injustices suffered by Sikhs at the hands of the state General Aurora had served. I thought he was a bigger hero for what he had to say then. That view was reinforced as I read — with incredulity — the disparaging remarks by other Indian officers about him, and each other, in their books. If this is what happened to the winning commander, I wondered what had happened to the other man in the photo.

The result was a revelation.

 

It turns out that General Niazi has been my 'enemy' since the Second World War. As Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army fought on the Burma front in 1943-45 in their quest for India's freedom, Niazi was fighting on the other side, for the British Indian Army, under the overall command of General (later Field Marshal) William Joseph Slim. Slim and his 14th Army halted the advance of the INA and the Japanese at the Imphal campaign and turned the course of the war.

 

In the process of inflicting military defeat upon my ancestor, Niazi's performance was so exceptional that the British awarded him an on-the-spot Military Cross for action on the Assam-Burma front in June 1944. On another occasion they wanted to award a DSO, but he was too junior, so a Mention in Despatches was recorded. In the original record of his MC signed by his commanding officers all the way up to Slim, which I obtained from the British Ministry of Defence, the British commanders describe Niazi's gallantry in detail: "He organized the attack with such skill that his leading platoon succeeded in achieving complete surprise over the enemy." They speak of how he personally led his men, the 'great skill and coolness' under fire with which he changed tactics with changing circumstances, created diversionary attacks, extricated his wounded, defeated the enemy and withdrew his men by section, remaining personally at the rear in every case.

 

The British honoured Niazi for "personal leadership, bravery and complete disregard for his own personal safety." On 15 December 1944 the Viceroy Lord Wavell flew to Imphal and in the presence of Lord Mountbatten knighted Slim and his corps commanders Stopford, Scoones and Christison. Only two 'Indian' officers were chosen to be decorated by the Viceroy at that ceremony — 'Tiger' Niazi was one of them.

 

In 1971 Niazi was a highly decorated Pakistani general, twice receiving the Hilal-e-Jurat. He was sent to East Pakistan in April 1971 — part of a sorry tradition in South Asia of political rulers attempting to find military solutions to political problems. By then Tikka Khan had already launched the crackdown of 25 March for which he has been known to Bengalis as the 'butcher of Bengal' ever since. The population of East Bengal was completely hostile and Pakistan condemned around the world.

 

Authoritative scholarly analyses of 1971 are rare. The best work is Richard Sisson and Leo Rose's War and Secession.

Robert Jackson, fellow of All Soul's College, Oxford, wrote an account shortly after the events. Most of the principal participants did not write about it, a notable exception being Gen. Niazi's recent memoirs (1998).Some Indian officers have written books of uneven quality — they make for an embarrassing read for what the Indians have to say about one another.

 

However, a consistent picture emerges from the more objective accounts of the war. Sisson and Rose describe how India started assisting Bengali rebels since April, but "the Mukti Bahini had not been able to prevent the Pakistani army from regaining control over all the major urban centers on the East Pakistani-Indian border and even establishing a tenuous authority in most of the rural areas." From July to October there was direct involvement of Indian military personnel. "...mid-October to 20 November... Indian artillery was used much more extensively in support ...and Indian military forces, including tanks and air power on a few occasions, were also used...Indian units were withdrawn to Indian territory once their objectives had been brought under the control of the Mukti Bahini — though at times this was only for short periods, as, to the irritation of the Indians, the Mukti Bahini forces rarely held their ground when the Pakistani army launched a counterattack."

 

Clearly, the Pakistani army regained East Pakistan for their masters in Islamabad by April-May, creating an opportunity for a political settlement, and held off both Bengali guerrillas and their Indian supporters till November, buying more time — time and opportunity that Pakistan's rulers and politicians failed to utilise.

 

Contrary to Indian reports, full-scale war between India and Pakistan started in East Bengal on 21 November, making it a four-week war rather than a 'lightning campaign'. Sisson and Rose state bluntly: "After the night of 21 November...Indian forces did not withdraw. From 21 to 25 November several Indian army divisions...launched simultaneous military actions on all of the key border regions of East Pakistan, and from all directions, with both armored and air support." Indian officers like Sukhwant Singh and Lachhman Singh write quite openly in their books about India invading East Pakistani territory in November, which they knew was 'an act of war'.

 

None of the outside scholars expected the Eastern garrison to withstand a full Indian invasion. On the contrary, Pakistan's longstanding strategy was "the defense of the east is in the west". Jackson writes, "Pakistani forces had largely withdrawn from scattered border-protection duties into cleverly fortified defensive positions at the major centres inside the frontiers, where they held all the major 'place names' against Mukti Bahini attacks, and blocked the routes of entry from India..."

 

Sisson and Rose point out the incongruity of Islamabad tolerating India's invasion of East Pakistani territory in November. On 30 November Niazi received a message from General Hamid stating, "The whole nation is proud of you and you have their full support." The same day Islamabad decided to launch an attack in the West on 2 December, later postponed to 3 December, after a two-week wait, but did not inform the Eastern command about it. According to Jackson, the Western offensive was frustrated by 10 December.

 

Though futile, the Western offensive allowed India to openly invade the East, with overwhelming advantages. " ...despite all these advantages, the war did not go as smoothly and easily for the Indian army...", but Sisson and Rose come to the balanced judgment that "The Pakistanis fought hard and well; the Indian army won an impressive victory." Even Indian officers concede the personal bravery of Niazi and the spirited fight put up by the Pakistanis in the East. That the troops fought so well against such overwhelming odds is a credit both to them, and to their commanders, for an army does not fight well in the absence of good leadership.

 

However, as Jackson put it, "...India's success was inevitable from the moment the general war broke out — unless diplomatic intervention could frustrate it." As is well known, Pakistan failed to secure military or diplomatic intervention. Sisson and Rose also say, "The outcome of the conflict on the eastern front after 6 December was not in doubt, as the Indian military had all the advantages." On 14 December Niazi received the following message from Yahya Khan: "You have fought a heroic battle against overwhelming odds. The nation is proud of you ...You have now reached a stage where further resistance is no longer humanly possible nor will it serve any useful purpose... You should now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting and preserve the lives of armed forces personnel, all those from West Pakistan and all loyal elements..." Sisson and Rose naturally describe this message as "implying that the armed forces in East Pakistan should surrender".

 

No matter how traumatic the outcome of 1971 for Pakistan, the Eastern command did not create the conflict, nor were they responsible for the failure of the political and diplomatic process. Sent to do the dirty work of the political manoeuvrers, the fighting men seem to have performed remarkably well against overwhelming odds. It is shocking therefore to discover that they were not received with honour by their nation on their return. Their commander, Niazi, appears to have been singled out, along with one aide, to be punished arbitrarily with dismissal and denial of pension, without being given the basic right to defend himself through a court-martial, which he asked for.

 

The commission set up allegedly to examine what had happened in 1971 was too flawed in its terms of reference and report to have any international credibility. However, even its recommendations of holding public trials and courtmartials were ignored. There is much for Pakistan to come to terms with what happened in 1971. But the answers don't lie in unthinking vilification of the fighting men who performed so well in the war against such heavy odds in defence of the national policy. Rather, in failing to honour them, the nation dishonours itself.

Sarmila Bose is the niece of Subhas Chandra Bose or Netaji of Indian National Army fame who fought against the British supporting the Japanese. He is considered as a great hero in Bengal and India.Sarmila Bose is Assistant Editor, Ananda Bazar Patrika, India & Visiting Scholar, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University

 

 






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