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Wednesday, June 18, 2008

[chottala.com] U.S. abuse of detainees was routine at Afghanistan bases

 
AP File Photos:
In this Feb. 2, 2002, file photo, a detainee from Afghanistan ...     
 
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Wed Jun 18, 3:42 AM ET
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In this Feb. 2, 2002, file photo, a detainee from Afghanistan is carried on a stretcher before being interrogated by military officials at Camp X-Ray at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The prisoner is one the detainees whom U.S. officials say have war wounds inflicted before they were captured in Afghanistan. Years after being released by the U.S. military, former detainees held in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay Naval Base are suffering debilitating injuries and mental disorders from their interrogation and alleged torture, according to a new report by a human rights group.

This file image obtained by The Associated Press shows Sgt. ... 
This file image obtained by The Associated Press shows Sgt. Michael Smith, left, with his dog Marco, watching a detainee at an unspecified date in 2003 at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, Iraq. Years after being released by the U.S. military, former detainees held in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay Naval Base are suffering debilitating injuries and mental disorders from their interrogation and alleged torture, according to a new report by a human rights group.(AP Photo/File)
This is a file image obtained by The Associated Press which ... 
This is a file image obtained by The Associated Press which shows an unidentified detainee standing on a box with a bag on his head and wires attached to him in late 2003 at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, Iraq. Years after being released by the U.S. military, former detainees held in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay Naval Base are suffering debilitating injuries and mental disorders from their interrogation and alleged torture, according to a new report by a human rights group.(AP Photo)
 
U.S. abuse of detainees was routine at Afghanistan bases

By Tom Lasseter, McClatchy Newspapers Wed Jun 18, 5:15 PM ET

(This is the second part of McClatchy's Guantanamo: Beyond the Law, a five-part series that is available in full at www.mcclatchydc.com)

KABUL, Afghanistan - American soldiers herded the detainees into holding pens of razor-sharp concertina wire, as if they were corralling livestock.

The guards kicked, kneed and punched many of the men until they collapsed in pain. U.S. troops shackled and dragged other detainees to small isolation rooms, then hung them by their wrists from chains dangling from the wire mesh ceiling.

Former guards and detainees whom McClatchy interviewed said Bagram was a center of systematic brutality for at least 20 months, starting in late 2001. Yet the soldiers responsible have escaped serious punishment.

The public outcry in the United States and abroad has focused on detainee abuse at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba , and at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq , but sadistic violence first appeared at Bagram, north of Kabul , and at a similar U.S. internment camp at Kandahar Airfield in southern Afghanistan .

"I was punched and kicked at Bagram. ... At Bagram, when they took a man to interrogation at night, the next morning we would see him brought out on a stretcher looking almost dead," said Aminullah, an Afghan who was held there for a little more than three months. "But at Guantanamo, there were rules, there was law."

Nazar Chaman Gul , an Afghan who was held at Bagram for more than three months in 2003, said he was beaten about every five days. American soldiers would walk into the pen where he slept on the floor and ram their combat boots into his back and stomach, Gul said. "Two or three of them would come in suddenly, tie my hands and beat me," he said.

When the kicking started, Gul said, he'd cry out, "I am not a terrorist," then beg God for mercy. Mercy was slow in coming. He was shipped to Guantanamo around the late summer of 2003 and imprisoned there for more than three years.

According to Afghan officials and a review of his case, Gul wasn't a member of al Qaida or of the extremist Taliban regime that ran Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. At the time he was detained, he was working as a fuel depot guard for the U.S.-backed Afghan government.

When U.S. soldiers raided the house he was visiting, acting on a tip from a tribal rival who was seeking revenge against another man, they apparently confused Gul with a militant with a similar name - who was also imprisoned at Guantanamo, according to an Afghan intelligence official and Gul's American lawyer.

The eight-month McClatchy investigation found a pattern of abuse that continued for years. The abuse of detainees at Bagram has been reported by U.S. media organizations, in particular The New York Times , which broke several developments in the story. But the extent of the mistreatment, and that it eclipsed the alleged abuse at Guantanamo, hasn't previously been revealed.

Guards said they routinely beat their prisoners to retaliate for al Qaida's 9-11 attacks, unaware that the vast majority of the detainees had little or no connection to al Qaida.

Former detainees at Bagram and Kandahar said they were beaten regularly. Of the 41 former Bagram detainees whom McClatchy interviewed, 28 said that guards or interrogators had assaulted them. Only eight of those men said they were beaten at Guantanamo Bay .

Because President Bush loosened or eliminated the rules governing the treatment of so-called enemy combatants, however, few U.S. troops have been disciplined under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and no serious punishments have been administered, even in the cases of two detainees who died after American guards beat them.

In an effort to assemble as complete a picture as possible of U.S. detention practices, McClatchy reporters interviewed 66 former detainees, double-checked key elements of their accounts, spoke with U.S. soldiers who'd served as detention camp guards and reviewed thousands of pages of records from Army courts-martial and human rights reports.

The Bush administration refuses to release full records of detainee treatment in the war on terrorism, and no senior Bush administration official would agree to an on-the-record interview to discuss McClatchy's findings.

The most violent of the major U.S. detention centers, the McClatchy investigation found, was Bagram, an old Soviet airstrip about 30 miles outside Kabul . The worst period at Bagram was the seven months from the summer of 2002 to spring of 2003, when interrogators there used techniques that when repeated later at Abu Ghraib led to wholesale abuses.

New detainees were shoved to the floor of a cavernous warehouse, a former Soviet aircraft machine shop that stayed dim all day, and kept in pens where they weren't allowed to speak or look at guards.

The Afghan government initially based a group of intelligence officers at Bagram, but they were pushed out. Mohammed Arif Sarwari , the head of Afghanistan's national security directorate from late 2001 to 2003, said he got a letter from U.S. commanders in mid-2002 telling him to get his men out of Bagram.

Sarwari thought that was a bad sign: The Americans, he thought, were creating an island with no one to watch over them.

"I said I didn't want to be involved with what they were doing at Bagram - who they were arresting or what they were doing with them," he said in an interview in Kabul .

The rate of reported abuse was higher among men who were held at the U.S. camp at Kandahar Airfield . Thirty-two out of 42 men held there whom McClatchy interviewed claimed that they were knocked to the ground or slapped about. But former detainees said the violence at Bagram was much harsher.

The brutality at Bagram peaked in December 2002 , when U.S. soldiers beat two Afghan detainees, Habibullah and Dilawar, to death as they hung by their wrists.

Dilawar died on Dec. 10 , seven days after Habibullah died. He'd been hit in his leg so many times that the tissue was "falling apart" and had "basically been pulpified," said then-Lt. Col. Elizabeth Rouse , the Air Force medical examiner who performed the autopsy on him.

Had Dilawar lived, Rouse said in sworn testimony, "I believe the injury to the legs are so extensive that it would have required amputation."

After Habibullah died, a legal officer for U.S. forces in Afghanistan asked two military police guards at Bagram to demonstrate how they'd chained detainees' wrists above their heads in a small plywood isolation cell.

"Frankly, it didn't look good," Maj. Jeff Bovarnick , the legal adviser for the Bagram detention center from November 2002 to June 2003 , said during a military investigation hearing in June 2005 .

"This guy is chained up and has a hood on his head," Bovarnick continued. "The two MPs that were demonstrating this took about five minutes to get everything hook(ed) up; and I was thinking to myself, if this was a combative detainee, it must have been a real struggle for them to get him to comply, and the things they must have been doing to make him comply."

The only American officer who's been reprimanded for the deaths of Habibullah and Dilawar is Army Capt. Christopher Beiring , who commanded the 377th Military Police Company from the summer of 2002 to the spring of 2003.

Beiring told investigators that he'd received no formal training in leading a military police company, "just the correspondence courses and on-the-job training."

Then-Lt. Col. Thomas S. Berg , the Army lawyer who investigated Beiring in the deaths of Habibullah and Dilawar, argued that: "The government failed to present any evidence of what are 'approved tactics, techniques and procedures in detainee operations.' "

On Berg's recommendation, the charges against Beiring were dropped, and he was given a letter of reprimand.

"It's extremely hard to wage war with so many undefined rules and roles," Beiring said in a phone interview with McClatchy . "It was very crazy."

The commander of the military intelligence section that worked alongside Beiring's military police company at Bagram, Capt. Carolyn Wood , declined to comment.

The soldier who faced the most serious charges, Spc. Willie Brand , admitted that he hit Dilawar about 37 times, including some 30 times in the flesh around the knees during one session in an isolation cell.

Brand, who faced up to 11 years in prison, was reduced in rank to private - his only punishment - after he was found guilty of assaulting and maiming Dilawar.

'EVERYBODY STRUCK A DETAINEE'

U.S. soldiers' testimony in military investigations after the deaths of Habibullah and Dilawar suggested that detainee abuse at Bagram occurred from the summer of 2002 to spring of 2003, a period of about seven months.

Soldiers who served at Bagram before that time said detainees were never beaten. Col. Matthew Bogdanos , a Marine Reserves officer who worked there from December 2001 to April 2002 , said in an interview that none of the soldiers or American operatives he knew had resorted to abusing detainees.

An Army interrogator who was based at Bagram in the spring of 2002 and later wrote a book under the pseudonym of Chris Mackey for security reasons, said in an e-mail exchange that while soldiers pushed the limits - such as using stress positions and sleep deprivation - he never saw or heard of detainees getting beaten.

Former detainees interviewed by McClatchy and by some human rights groups, however, claimed that the violence was rampant from late 2001 until the summer of 2003 or later, at least 20 months.

Although they were at Bagram at different times and speak different languages, the 28 former detainees who told McClatchy that they'd been abused there told strikingly similar stories:

-- Bashir Ahmad , a Pakistani who fought with the Taliban, said that in the late spring or summer of 2003, U.S. troops would chain him to the ceiling by his hands or feet. "Then they would punch me or hit me with a wood rod," he said.

-- Brahim Yadel, a French citizen, said he was punched and slapped during interrogations at Bagram in December 2001 .

-- Moazzem Begg , a British citizen, said he was assaulted regularly at Bagram for most of 2002, until he was transferred to Guantanamo in January 2003 .

-- Akhtar Mohammed , an Afghan, said that at Bagram during the spring of 2003, "when they moved me to the interrogation room they covered my eyes, and took me up steep stairs. I always fell on the ground. And when I fell down, they punched and kicked me."

-- Abdul Haleem , a Pakistani, said that U.S. soldiers threw him to the ground at Bagram in 2003 and kicked him in the head, "like they were playing soccer."

-- Adel al Zamel , a Kuwaiti, said guards frequently waved sticks at him and threatened to rape him at Bagram during the spring of 2002. During an interview in Kuwait City , Zamel shook his head and said he remembered hearing detainees being beaten and "the cries from the interrogation room" at Bagram.

He wasn't the only person to report sexual humiliation.

Sgt. Selena Salcedo , a U.S. military intelligence officer, said that sometime between August 2002 and February 2003 she saw another interrogator, Pfc. Damien Corsetti , pull down the pants of a detainee and leave his genitals exposed.

In a 2005 sworn statement in the court-martial of Corsetti, she said she'd left the room and that when she'd returned the detainee was bent over a table and Corsetti was waving a plastic bottle near his buttocks. She said she didn't know whether the detainee had been raped.

Corsetti was acquitted of any wrongdoing. He didn't respond to a request for comment submitted through his attorney. Salcedo pleaded guilty to kicking a detainee - Dilawar - and grabbing his ears during a December 2002 interrogation.

Soldiers who served at Bagram starting in the summer of 2002 confirmed that detainees there were struck routinely.

"Whether they got in trouble or not, everybody struck a detainee at some point," said Brian Cammack , a former specialist with the 377th Military Police Company , an Army Reserve unit from Cincinnati . He was sentenced to three months in military confinement and a dishonorable discharge for hitting Habibullah.

Spc. Jeremy Callaway , who admitted to striking about 12 detainees at Bagram, told military investigators in sworn testimony that he was uncomfortable following orders to "mentally and physically break the detainees." He didn't go into detail.

"I guess you can call it torture," said Callaway, who served in the 377th from August 2002 to January 2003 .

Many human rights experts say the U.S. military began cracking down on detainee abuse at Bagram in 2004, in response to the public outcry over pictures of abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq .

RETRIBUTION FOR 9-11

Asked why someone would abuse a detainee, Callaway told military investigators: "Retribution for September 11, 2001 ."

When detainees first had their hoods removed on arriving at Bagram, looming behind them was a large American flag and insignia of the New York Police Department , a reminder of Sept. 11 .

Almost none of the detainees at Bagram, however, had anything to do with the terrorist attacks.

Bovarnick, the former chief legal officer for operational law in Afghanistan and Bagram legal adviser, said in a sworn statement that of some 500 detainees he knew of who'd passed through Bagram, only about 10 were high-value targets, the military's term for senior terrorist operatives.

That hardly mattered.

Khaled al Asmr , a tall, gaunt Jordanian, was hauled off a U.S. military cargo plane at Bagram in early 2002. Flown in from Pakistan in heavy shackles and with a hood on his head, he was accused of being an al Qaida operative with possible connections to the Sept. 11 attacks.

Standing in an interrogation room, Asmr said, he'd already been punched in the face several times by American guards. Two Americans walked into the room, wearing civilian clothes. They pulled out pistols and held them to either side of his head as a third American man entered and walked up to Asmr, according to his account.

The third man leaned toward Asmr's face and whispered, his breath warm, "I am here to save you from these people, but you must tell me you are al Qaida."

Asmr, who told his story to a McClatchy reporter in Jordan , was declared no longer an enemy combatant after a 2004 U.S. military tribunal at Guantanamo. He said he'd known some al Qaida leaders, but that was more than 15 years earlier, during the U.S.-backed Afghan uprising against the Soviets.

Nazar Gul was of even less intelligence value. None of the Afghan security or intelligence officials whom McClatchy interviewed said they'd heard of Gul, making it unlikely that he was the dangerous insurgent the U.S. said he was.

Gul's American attorney, Ruben L. Iniguez , went to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2006 to check the details of his story of working as a guard for the Afghan government, and later said in sworn court filings - which included videotaped testimony by witnesses - and in an interview with McClatchy that every fact checked out.

A LAWLESS PLACE

The mistreatment of detainees at Bagram, some legal experts said, may have been a violation of the 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, which forbids violence against or humiliating treatment of detainees.

The U.S. War Crimes Act of 1996 imposes penalties up to death for such mistreatment.

At Bagram, however, the rules didn't apply. In February 2002 , President Bush issued an order denying suspected Taliban and al Qaida detainees prisoner-of-war status. He also denied them basic Geneva protections known as Common Article Three, which sets a minimum standard for humane treatment.

Without those parameters, it's difficult to say what acts were or were not war crimes, said Charles Garraway , a former colonel and legal adviser for the British army and a leading international expert on military law.

Bush's order made it hard to prosecute soldiers for breaking such rules under the military's basic law, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, in large part because defense attorneys could claim that troops on the ground didn't know what was allowed.

In sweeping aside Common Article Three, the Bush administration created an environment in which abuse such as that at Bagram was more likely, said Garraway, a former professor at the U.S. Naval War College .

"I think it's completely predictable, because you no longer have standards," he said.

In 2006, Bush pushed Congress to narrow the definition of a war crime under the War Crimes Act, making prosecution even more difficult.

UNTRAINED, UNDISCIPLINED

The military police at Bagram had guidelines, Army Regulation 190-47, telling them they couldn't chain prisoners to doors or to the ceiling. They also had Army Regulation 190-8, which said that humiliating detainees wasn't allowed.

Neither was applicable at Bagram, however, said Bovarnick, the former senior legal officer for the installation.

The military police rulebook saying that enemy prisoners of war should be treated humanely didn't apply, he said, because the detainees weren't prisoners of war, according to the Bush administration's decision to withhold Geneva Convention protections from suspected Taliban and al Qaida detainees.

The military police guide for the Army correctional system, which prohibits "securing a prisoner to a fixed object, except in emergencies," wasn't applicable, either, because Bagram wasn't a correctional facility, Bovarnick told investigators in 2004.

"I do not believe there is a document anywhere which states that ... either regulation applies, and there is clear guidance by the secretary of defense that detainees were not EPWs," enemy prisoners of war, Bovarnick said.

Compounding the problem, military police guards and interrogators lacked proper training and received little instruction from commanders about how to do their jobs, according to sworn testimony taken during military investigations and interviews by McClatchy .

The guards who worked there from the summer of 2002 to the spring of 2003 were all reservists from the 377th Military Police Company , based in Cincinnati , and many of the military intelligence interrogators serving at the same time were from the Utah Army National Guard .

Good order and discipline had evaporated.

1st Sgt. Betty Jones said during a 2004 interview with investigators that a fellow military police sergeant and his men on several occasions were "drunk to the point that they could not go to duty."

Salcedo, the military intelligence soldier, said in her statement at Corsetti's court-martial that she and others drank alcohol during their time at Bagram, and at one point smoked hashish on the roof of a building.

Cammack told McClatchy that one of his sergeants drove a John Deere Gator, a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle, to a nearby town and traded with locals for bottles of vodka.

"Really, nobody was in charge ... the leadership did nothing to help us. If we had any questions, it was pretty much 'figure it out on your own,' " Cammack said. "When you asked about protocol they said it's a work in progress."

PENTAGON RESPONSE

Senior Pentagon officials refused to be interviewed for this article. In response to a series of questions and interview requests, Col. Gary Keck , a Defense Department spokesman, released this statement:

" The Department of Defense policy is clear - we treat all detainees humanely. The United States operates safe, humane and professional detention operations for unlawful enemy combatants at war with this country."

No U.S. military officer above the rank of captain has been called to account for what happened at Bagram.

The head of U.S. forces in Afghanistan when prisoners were being abused at Bagram, then-Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill , declined an interview request. McNeill was later made the commander of all NATO forces in Afghanistan , a post he held until recently.

His predecessor, then-Maj. Gen. Franklin L. "Buster" Hagenbeck , said in an e-mail exchange that from late 2001 to 2002, his attention wasn't on detainee facilities.

"Unfortunately, I have nothing to add to your reporting ... I was focused on battling the Taliban and al Qaida, as well as reconstruction and coordinating with the nascent Afghan government," Hagenbeck wrote. "I do not personally know of any abuses while I was there, and we focused on treating all with dignity and respect - even, and perhaps especially, those persons in our custody."

Hagenbeck is now the superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point .

Capt. Carolyn Wood , who led the interrogators at Bagram, was sent to Abu Ghraib in the summer of 2003 and assumed control of interrogation operations there that August.

A military investigation that followed the Abu Ghraib scandal - known as the "Fay-Jones Report" for the two generals who authored it - found that from July 2003 to February of 2004, 27 military intelligence personnel there allegedly encouraged or condoned the abuse of detainees, violated established interrogation procedures or participated in abuse themselves.

The abuse resembled what former Bagram detainees described.

A key factor in serious cases of abuse at Abu Ghraib, the report found, was the construction of isolation areas, a move requested by Wood, who said that "based on her experience" such facilities made it easier to extract information from detainees.

Wood remains an active-duty military intelligence officer.

( Matthew Schofield contributed to this report from Paris and Lyon, France .)

 

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[chottala.com] GUANTANAMO: BEYOND THE LAW

Guantanemo: Beyond The Law
A prisoner at Kandahar in Afghanistan

Tom Pennington / Fort Worth Star-Telegram / MCT

Prisoner Mahmood looks out from behind the bars at the Kandahar prison in Afghanistan, Dec. 13, 2001.

Easing of laws that led to detainee abuse hatched in secret

The framework under which detainees were imprisoned for years without charges at Guantanamo and in many cases abused in Afghanistan wasn't the product of American military policy or the fault of a few rogue soldiers.

It was largely the work of five White House, Pentagon and Justice Department lawyers who, following the orders of President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, reinterpreted or tossed out the U.S. and international laws that govern the treatment of prisoners in wartime, according to former U.S. defense and Bush administration officials. The Supreme Court now has struck down many of their legal interpretations.

The lawyers drafted legal opinions that circumvented the military's code of justice, the federal court system and America's international treaties in order to prevent anyone — from soldiers on the ground to the president — from being held accountable for activities that at other times have been considered war crimes.

Sen. Carl Levin, who's leading an investigation into the origins of the harsh interrogation techniques, said at a hearing Tuesday that the abuse wasn't the result of "a few bad apples" within the military, as the White House has claimed. "The truth is that senior officials in the United States government sought information on aggressive techniques, twisted the law to create the appearance of their legality and authorized their use against detainees," said Levin, a Michigan Democrat.

The international conventions that the United States helped draft, and to which it's a party, were abandoned in secret meetings among the five men in one another's offices. No one in the War Council has publicly described the group's activities in any detail, and only some of their opinions and memorandums have been made public.

Neither the White House nor the Department of Defense has taken responsibility, and the U.S. military's top uniformed leadership remained silent in public while its legal code was being discarded. It was left to lawyers in the military's legal system, the Judge Advocate General's Corps, to defend the rule of law. They never had a chance.

Only one of the five War Council lawyers remains in office: David Addington, the brilliant but abrasive longtime legal adviser and now chief of staff to Cheney. His primary motive, according to several former administration and defense officials, was to push for an expansion of presidential power that Congress or the courts couldn't check.

Alberto Gonzales, first the White House counsel and then the attorney general, resigned last August amid allegations of perjury related to congressional hearings about the firings of U.S. attorneys.

The Defense Department in February abruptly announced the resignation of William J. Haynes II, the former Pentagon general counsel, amid sharp public criticism by military lawyers that he failed to ensure a just system of detainee trials at Guantanamo.

Even some conservatives have condemned former Justice Department lawyer John Yoo for what many called sloppy legal work in drafting key memorandums about detention policy. He's now a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley.

The last and least known member of the group, Timothy E. Flanigan, a former deputy to Gonzales, withdrew his nomination to be deputy attorney general in 2005 amid mounting questions in the Senate about his role in drafting the administration's legal definition of torture and other issues.

All five refused to answer questions from McClatchy for this story. Only Flanigan gave a reason, saying that he doesn't discuss past clients, in this case the U.S. government. Yoo previously has denied any connection between his work and detainee abuse.

The quintet did more than condone harsh treatment, however. It created an environment in which it was nearly impossible to prosecute soldiers or officials for alleged crimes committed in U.S. detention facilities.

The Bush administration pursued a strategy from the beginning to exempt American soldiers and operatives from legal repercussions for their actions, said Nigel Rodley, a British lawyer and professor who was the United Nations' special rapporteur on torture from 1993 to 2001.

The U.S. said it was continuing to follow the rule of law but at the same time it sidestepped any international treaties that could create problems for soldiers or officials, said Rodley, a member of the U.N. Human Rights Committee.

The legal architecture, he said, hinged on the notion that "The treaties that were relevant to U.S. criminal law were not relevant. That was the trick."

The administration, in other words, set out to circumvent any law that might have restricted Bush's detainee and interrogation programs.

MEMOS THAT PAVED THE WAY

A handful of legal opinions opened the way to the abuses documented in McClatchy's investigation. Among them:

  • In a Jan. 9, 2002, memorandum for Haynes, co-author Yoo opined that basic Geneva Convention protections known as Common Article Three forbidding humiliating and degrading treatment and torture of prisoners didn't cover alleged al Qaida or Taliban detainees — the entire incoming population of detainees in Afghanistan and Guantanamo.

  • In a memorandum to Bush dated Jan. 25, 2002, Gonzales said that rescinding detainees' Geneva protections "substantially reduces the threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the War Crimes Act." Doing so, Gonzales wrote, also would create a solid defense against prosecutors or independent counsels who may in the future "decide to pursue unwarranted charges based on Section 2441," the U.S. War Crimes Act, which prohibits violations of the Geneva Conventions. Gonzales added that by withholding Geneva protections and prisoner-of-war status, Bush could avoid case-by-case reviews of detainees' status.

  • On Feb. 7, 2002, Bush issued a memorandum declaring that alleged al Qaida or Taliban members wouldn't be considered prisoners of war and, further, that they wouldn't be granted protection under Common Article Three. Most nations accept Article Three, common to all four Geneva Conventions, as customary law setting the minimum standard for conduct in any conflict, whether internal or international.

  • An Aug. 1, 2002, memorandum that Gonzales requested from the Justice Department defined torture as "injury such as death, organ failure or serious impairment of body functions," a high bar for ruling interrogation techniques or detainee treatment illegal. U.S. law, according to the memorandum's analysis, "prohibits only extreme acts."

  • A March 14, 2003, memorandum that Yoo prepared at Haynes' request concluded that even if an interrogation method violated U.S. criminal statutes — such as the one against war crimes — the interrogators involved most likely couldn't be prosecuted because they were operating within the scope of Bush's constitutional authority to wage war against al Qaida and other militant groups.

"In wartime, it is for the president alone to decide what methods to use to best prevail against the enemy," Yoo wrote.

Now it appears that reinterpreting the law to lift legal protections for detainees could backfire. On May 13, the Pentagon announced that it was dropping all charges against Mohammed al Qahtani, a Saudi man held in Guantanamo who's accused of planning to take part in the 9-11 attacks as the "20th hijacker."

The official overseeing the case, Susan J. Crawford, gave no reason for the move, which followed the leak of an interrogation log that detailed harsh attempts at Guantanamo to break Qahtani mentally. Among the methods used were forcing him to act like a dog, putting women's underwear on his head, keeping him in stress positions and accusing him of homosexuality.

In its decision last week, the Supreme Court restored the right of habeas corpus, that is, the detainees' right to challenge the cause of their detention.

The five lawyers on the War Council met every few weeks behind closed doors in Gonzales' or Haynes' office to plot legal strategy, according to Jack Goldsmith, a former senior Justice Department lawyer.

Several other former U.S. officials confirmed that the group was the driving force for White House policy on detainees.

Fears of future prosecution motivated many officials in the administration, Goldsmith said in his book "The Terror Presidency," published last year. The five lawyers saw legal opinions drafted by Yoo and others in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel as a shield, Goldsmith wrote, that would make it hard to convict someone of acting on legal advice from the premier legal office in the administration.

"In my two years in the government, I witnessed top officials and bureaucrats in the White House and throughout the administration openly worrying that investigators acting with the benefit of hindsight in a different political environment would impose criminal penalties on heat-of-battle judgment calls," wrote Goldsmith, who declined interview requests.

As the head of the Office of Legal Council from the fall of 2003 to the summer of 2004, Goldsmith reversed the August 2002 and March 2003 opinions.

MILITARY LAWYERS CONCERNED

The military's lawyers were among those who were most concerned about what the new policies would mean for soldiers in the field.

Though not well known to the public, the Judge Advocate General's corps prides itself on defending the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the military's law book, which demands strict discipline and moral behavior in wartime. The legal officers are fond of saying that military commanders can depend on two people for honest advice: their chaplains and their JAG lawyers.

The military legal community complained, to little avail, that the policies hatched with the consent of Bush, Cheney and then-Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld were replacing decades of U.S. military policy on handling detainees.

When they protested, the War Council shut them out.

"We were absolutely marginalized," said Donald J. Guter, a rear admiral who served as the Navy's judge advocate general from 2000 to 2002. "I think it was intentional, because so many military JAGs spoke up about the rule of law."

Thomas Romig, a major general who was the Army's judge advocate general from 2001 to 2005, agreed that the JAGs were pushed to the side: "It was a disaster," he said.

Trust between the uniformed military lawyers and the Bush administration collapsed in the months after 9-11.

Guter said he began to think that Haynes "was playing games" in late 2001, when the two met regularly to figure out how to handle detainees in Afghanistan.

Haynes, then the Pentagon's head lawyer, had asked whether hundreds of the prisoners could be detained on Navy warships. The security and logistics involved in operating a ship while maintaining a maximum-security prison onboard would have been impossible. Guter thought that Haynes was raising such ideas to push him toward establishing a prison at the Guantanamo Bay U.S. Naval Base.

Guter said "it became apparent pretty quickly" that Haynes wanted a place "outside of the courts," where no judge could consider whether detainees were being held lawfully or under appropriate conditions.

"What they were looking for was the minimum due process that we could get away with," said Guter, who's now the dean of Duquesne University's law school. "I felt like they knew the answer they wanted to hear."

Romig recalled tense discussions with Yoo in November and December 2001 about setting up military commissions to try detainees.

"John Yoo wanted to use military commissions in the manner they were used in the Indian wars," Romig said. "I looked at him and said, 'You know, that was 100-and-something years ago. You're out of your mind; we're talking about the law.' "

The military commissions that the U.S. used against Native Americans during the mid-19th century were often ad hoc and frequently resulted in natives being hanged or shot.

"As they viewed it, due process is legal mumbo jumbo," said Romig, who's now the dean of Washburn University's law school. "They wanted to get them, get the facts and convict them. ... If you're caught as a terrorist, you're presumed guilty and you have to prove you're innocent. It was crazy."

When Romig objected to pushing the boundaries of interrogation procedures during meetings in late 2002 or early 2003, he recalled that civilian defense officials replied that the time for law had passed.

"Guys, it's time to wake up and smell the coffee. It's time to take the gloves off," Romig said he was told by Marshall Billingslea, a deputy to Douglas Feith — who was then the undersecretary of defense for policy, the Pentagon's third-ranking official.

Romig said that he and other military officers asked, "Do you realize the implications of what you're saying?"

Like many in the military, Romig doubted the quality of intelligence gathered by physical coercion.

Haynes, who also was present, had no objections to what Billingslea had said, according to Romig. Billingslea and Haynes declined requests for comment.

In June 2006, over the objections of the White House, the Supreme Court ruled that Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions was applicable to detainees at Guantanamo Bay.

Four months later, Bush signed the Military Commissions Act, which said that no foreign unlawful combatant subject to trial by military commission could invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights, and that no U.S. court or judge has jurisdiction to hear cases in which such detainees contest their incarceration.

The bill also rewrote part of the U.S. legal code on war crimes, changing the definition of a war crime from conduct that "constitutes a violation of Common Article 3" to the much higher standard of "a grave breach of Common Article 3."

Within that new definition, it excluded "pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions," meaning harsh treatment that's allowed by the Bush administration's legal interpretations.

Among those whom Bush thanked at a bill-signing ceremony were Cheney — Addington's main backer in the White House — and Gonzales.

Two years later, the Supreme Court ruled that detainees have the right to challenge their detention before federal judges, striking down that section of the Military Commissions Act. The 5-4 decision said the law applied to everyone: "From an early date it was understood that the king, too, was subject to the law."

The policies hatched in the offices of Gonzales, Addington and Haynes muddied decades of U.S. military policy on handling detainees.

Changes to detainee law such as rescinding Common Article Three give a "dehumanizing message about the people (detainees) we're dealing with," said Lt. Col. Bryan Broyles, a defense attorney in the Office of Military Commissions, which was set up to try detainees at Guantanamo.

"The people who pursue that sort of academic, intellectual pursuit," said Broyles, who represents Qahtani, "don't understand the effect it has on the people (soldiers) who only see the end result."

McClatchy Newspapers 2008

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/detainees/story/38886.html

READ THE EVIDENCE

Browse an archive of documents obtained by McClatchy in the course of this investigation.

http://detainees.mcclatchydc.com/

 

ABOUT THIS SERIES

An eight-month McClatchy investigation of the detention system created after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks has found that the U.S. imprisoned innocent men, subjected them to abuse, stripped them of their legal rights and allowed Islamic militants to turn the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba into a school for jihad.

READ THE EVIDENCE

Browse an archive of documents obtained by McClatchy in the course of this investigation.

VIDEO

 

 

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[chottala.com] Oil, gas protection body - looking at it in different light

Oil, gas protection body - looking at it in different light
The protection from what? The agenda should never align with 'keep oil, gas underground'


This issue has many stakeholders. If one wants to tackle all the issues and do justice to this important topic, you will have to write a book, instead of writing an article. So, we would keep ourself bounded within this specific body - the oil, gas protection body which is led by one of the well-knonw grass-roots economists of the land Professor Anu Muhammad, among others and who is esteemed by many as working tirelessly to help protect the national treasure being plundered by the syndicate of incompetent bureaucracy, the corrupt politicians and the foreign companies.
 
These foreign companies are here just to make some money by transferring technology and investing money. As long as the country gives provision to invest the money, they will do it in good faith, albeit with many uncertainities on the ground. So, they will be looking at some extra bucks to compensate for the uncertainties. Any straight head analyst will agree with that analysis. At the face of it, it would seem very straightforward. So, whats the big fuss all the time? Lets try to look at the issues from a different light - if you are willing to give us some space.

The protection body has primarily two types of membership - in the broad sense.

One type of the membership who is leading the national body. In other words, the people who are involved with the activities of this body for the sake of patriotism, for the love of general people, for the love of the country, and those who wants to oppose social injustices that is often a trademark of many projects which is done in the name of development projects bourne out of World Bank / ADB type organization (these orgs now recognize that most of the money they loaned so far was plundered or stolen, however, they would happily take the money back from the poor people, not from those who actually stole their money! And they spread around their knoweldge of governance and accountability to all over the world! Selukas, isn't it?)

The other type of members of this body comes from the local people - representing those are directly affected by the proposed projects - be it the project of Asia Energy or some other projects. Presumably, these people do not have much time to think about national interest (That is not to say that they are not patriots. Our guess is that they will act more patriot than all the other parties if such a need arises as was the case in 1971). But now, in everyday regular life, they are too busy with placing two meals on their plate, or arranging money for their children's education or trying to help their old parents with a better treatment. They do not have any interest in how or what you do your thing, but what they are worried about is that they will loose whatever they have now and be forgotten.

So, if we accept this categorization of two types of membership within this group, we can now proceed to our analysis.
 
The national body often talks about raising local capacity which is certainly a good thing. Local capacity building also needs time. There are two ways to build local capacity - "first learn and then do the job" OR "learning by doing alongside others who already knows how to do it". As a policy, both the approach are fine if we did not have any time urgency. However, we have wasted too much time as a nation. Every month we pass without decision, that hurts the future of the millions. Millions of people go to bed without proper food, millions of children grow up without education and so on. Considering the time urgency, the second option of learning by doing is certainly a quicker option. There should not be any opposition to this approach. The government can hire companies who has done the job before in other countries, making sure that those companies hire local technical hands as much as possible.
 
But this point is lost whenever we talk about the issue. They tie the issue of local capacity building with the issue of national interest. The implication is that if we do not do the mining with our local capacity, we will be loser as a nation. So what they imply is that we have to wait until local capacity is built, which in turn implies that we have to wait much more time. How long? Nobody knows - they talk about something which they do not know, to tell you the truth.
 
On the other hand, this particular demand that we have to wait until local capacity is built could be deemed as a way to make sure that our national treasure is prevented to be used for nation-building. Coal underground is nothing for millions of people without electricity. Buje houk, na buje houk, the national committee of this particular type of experts are trying to delay the process - someone could say that easily, isn't it?
 
Let us make one thing very clear. Allow us to ask a clear-cut question. Do you think when Saudis started their oil drilling, they did it with their own capacity? Nope, the technical know-how was imported from the west. But, how come Saudis are in control of their oil? What is the missing link here? Why don't you guys ask this very simple thing? If one do the thinking, one would find that the missing capacity is not the technical know-how, rather the missing is the "capacity to negotiate". If you represent a soverign nation, the benefit from the mining projects will depend on the capacity to negotiate. Thats what the Saudis could do, but our Ershad, Hasina or Khaleda could not do so far.
 
Would you ask why didn't they do that? A simple answer could be a very simplistic one. If you negotiate a better deal, that would mean you have to wait until the drilling is done, coal is mined and only after that they could start stealing money from the proceeds. But if you do the deal during negotiation stage, you get your deal-money right at the negotiation stage, paid in dollars. Make sense? The missing thing for Ershad, Hasina or Khaleda is patience, they were not willing to wait! And everyone knows that a negotiator without patience is a very bad in thier job. Some ninduk will say that the actual missing thing is the lack of patriotism on the part of these leaders. What patriotism? We never thought that they understand the meaning of that complex word. Their supporters have all the patritism, they don't need any.
 
Coming back to the national level leaders of the Oil, gas protection body, we fail to understand what is missing for this group of people. It can't be lack of patience, as was the case for our national chief executives of the past. Presumably, they also do not lack the patriotism. Otherwise, why would they be in this committee, right? So, what is missing here? We hope that they will correct their position and rather focus on the negotiation part - instead of the technology transfer part. Those who have the technology will come here and do the job, just like they are doing in Saudi. If you do not understand the complexity of the problem, then just demand to copy some of the best practices that has been done in the past. But the demands should never align with the agenda of 'keep oil, gas underground'. If someone is acting on the interest of nation, they should demand that mineral resources be used for solving energy crisis at the quickest possible timeframe, which means NOW. Off course, we also want to learn as quickly as possible since we do not have any lack of human resources. If that mean to reopen the books that was closed by Hasina, Khaleda or Ershad, current govt should do that. It should be made clear to the foreign parties that we are open for business, and business only, nothing else.
 
The next issue is the problem of the local level people who have to be relocated and who faces the dire possibility of losing their everything and even worse, be forgotten. We think the whole liability of this opposition lies with our bureacrats. These people has forgotten why they exists. They take course after course, training after training, degree after degree with the expense of government, only to get promotion and only to have foreign tours. They learn nothing. Even if they learn, they forget those as soon as they enter GoB offices. Those knowledge are for the retired age career when they will be doing consultancy with donor agencies.
 
 
The solution is very straight-forward. You can not use a 50 years old compensation policy for a project which will be earning thousands of crores of taka over the next 20 years. If you have to relocate 1 lac people, you have to come up with a project proposal which includes the compensation of these mostly poor people - not based on a 50 years old generic govt. compensation policy which is used in case of road construction or similar works - the compensation policy for a mining project should be specific to the particular project. The projection and economic viability of the project has to consider the compensation - whatever is required to make a happy relocation. For example, if your current estimation envision that initial investments will be recouped within five years, adjust the recoup period to 6 years or 7 years. In other words, increase the initial investment asssessment to make sure that the project have enough money for a healthy compensation for the people who will be relocated. Its very simple, doable. The only thing that is needed is pragmatism. Off course, if the policy makers are looking for making extra bucks, then the issue is different (we really hope that the rumors about the person whom the CA has charged with these policies aren't true).
 
If you thought some of the ideas are worth of your reading time, please forward it to others. If you have an ear to the columnists in regular traditional media, please forward it to them. If you have an ear to the journalists and news editors of the electronic media, discuss it with them. Hope they would look at the suggestions and give due diligence. 
 
Thanks for your time,
Innovation Line
 
=======================================================
Note: This is a freelance column, published mainly in different internet based forums. This column is open for contribution by the members of new generation, sometimes referred to as Gen 71. If you identify yourself as someone from that age-group and want to contribute to this column, please feel free to contact. Thanks to the group moderator for publishing the article as Creative Commons contents.
 
Dear readers, also, if you thought the article was important enough so it should come under attention of the head of the government please forward the message to them. Email address for the Chief Advisor: feeedback@pmo.gov.bd_ or at http://www.cao.gov.bd/feedback/comments.php .
 
The more of you forward it to them, the less will be the need to go back to street agitation. Use ICT to practice democracy.
Also send to your favourtie TV channel:
Channel i: http://www.channel-i-tv.com/contact.html
ATN Bangla: mtplive@atnbangla.tv_
NTV: info@ntvbd.com_
RTV: info@rtvbd.tv_
BTV: info@btv.gov.bd_
======================================================
 
 
 
Phulbari Coal Extraction
Oil, gas protection body leaders tell meetings at Phulbari, Nilphamari
Our Correspondent, Dinajpur

Leaders of National Oil, Gas, Power, Mineral Resources and Port Protection Committee said here yesterday the food security will be affected in the district if the coal in Phulbari is extracted through open pit mine method.

They said about 40 square mile land in four upazilas in the district will be damaged in the process.

The committee leaders were addressing a meeting titled, 'People's Demand and Phulbari Coalmine,' held yesterday at Rabeya Community Centre at Phulbari where three persons were killed during a carnage there on August 26, 2006.

The meeting was presided by committee convener Md Saiful Islam Jewel.

The coalmine will bring numerous sufferings to villagers, they said.

They said the coal will be utilized outside the country rather than using for domestic purpose.

The meeting expressed dissatisfaction as the government is yet to implement the 6-point demand signed after Phulbari carnage on August 30, 2006. They urged the caretaker government to implement the demand.

They urged the people of the four affected upazilas to thwart any conspiracy of foreign investors in this regard.

Md. Saiful Islam Jewel, convener of Phulbari Oil, Gas and Mineral Resources and Port Protection Committee told the meeting that nation will decide to utilize the underground resources of the country and Phulbari people will thwart any conspiracy against them with the Phulbari coal project, he added.

The speakers observed that a strong political will is needed to resolve the issue.

In his address, Prof Anu Mohammad, general secretary of the committee said that the underground asset belongs to people who will decide their fate.

Among others, Prof Anu Mohammad, Engineer Sheikh Muhammad Shahidullah and Haider Akbar Khan Rano of Workers' Party, Zunayed Shaki, Gano Sanghati Andolon, Prof Samsul Alam (member), Tipur Biswas of Gano Front and Advocate Abdus Salam spoke.

Earlier, the committee leaders held a press conference at 'Media House' in Nilphamari on Thursday, said our district correspondent.

They said the countrymen won't not allow any amendment in proposed coal policy.

They said for coal extraction, the principle of utilisng mineral resources for betterment of people, not for making profit, should be followed. The coal also should be extracted by national organisations, they said.

Chaired by Sreedam Das, convener of the district unit of the committee, the press conference was addressed by Engineer Sheikh Muhammad Sahidullah, Prof Anu Mohammad and Noor Mohammad.

They said 'Asia Energy' is spreading corruption in order to establish their 'devastating' plan as a development project.

They said the expert committee formed earlier termed the development plan of 'Asia Energy' as illegal and their project against the national interest.

Prof Anu Mohammad alleged 'Asia Energy' is trying to divide public opinion by making some agents.

Phulbari bed reserves at least 572 million tonnes of coal. If Bangladesh Government signs any deal with a company then coal extraction will last for 30 years where about 50,000 people will be relocated, according to officials of Asia Energy.
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[chottala.com] Historic Bangladesh papers 'lost'

I am very frustrated as a young Historian after knowing that the Cabinet Secretary Ali Imam Majumder told an English daily newspaper that officials in the cabinet division could not find the original versions of the hand-written independence proclamations. He said "We only had photocopies, which we handed over to the national archives." He told the newspaper that he did not know how the originals had gone missing. Bangladesh's first Cabinet Secretary, HT Iman, told the same daily newspaper that the original proclamation of independence had definitely been placed in government custody. He said that it was "really unfortunate" for the nation that it and other promulgations had now disappeared.
It is not the critic who counts, not the man who points out how the strong man stumbled, or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes short again and again, who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, and spends himself in a worthy cause, who at best knows achievement and who at the worst if he fails at least fails while daring greatly so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory nor defeat.False history gets made all day, any day, the truth of the old or new is never on the news.
 
Gopal Sengupta
Canada
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[chottala.com] CTG

The CTG are trying to remove the corruption day by day. Specially, we can see the improvment to custom Department but the problem is they can not remove all corruption immediately but they are trying to remove it slowly.
Their corruption will be removed and they will be punished by the court, if they do same like previous government same as Sk Hasina, Khalida Zia and Tarek Rahman.
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[chottala.com] Re: [khabor.com] Re: Bravo! Bravo! Bravo! Our army backed caretaker government - if Tarek – Koko – Khaleda - Nizami gong are released from the custody – than no need keeping anyone in the custody of Bangladesh.

Zia Vai,
 
Thanks for your inputs and comments.
 
Anu
NZ
 


On 6/18/08, Ziaur Rahman <luckytoaccess@gmail.com> wrote:
Dear All,
 
We are quickly progressing into becoming a full-fledged 'banana republic.' We should simply ask the Hollywood studios to set shop in Bangladesh and chronicle stories and videos of these high and mighty folks and then perhaps their movies will turn into international block busters. Imagine the power of movie magic present in Bangladesh.

 

What happened to the separation of the judiciary? Did we not just see a monumental hoax played out at the top enclaves of Bangladesh. I pity the system and I pity the people pulling the strings from behind, local or international. In the commentary of life and history, these superfluous and enigmatic decisions without any respect to the law will eventually haunt these people down, while the entire country continues to suffer its afflicted miseries. The oppression of the elites over the proletariat continues unabated with no sign in receding.

 
It is not about AL, BNP or other parties, it is about justice being played in the hands of some people. Someone had commented that there are other flesh and blood people in the prisons needing health-care and, therefore, before becoming 'political human beings' we need to become 'good human beings' and without speaking along partisan lines.
 
Time has come to tow the 'Bangladeshi line' first and then work on individual political schemes. However, all said and done, we need to be responsible in discharging decisions. We have made some quick gains (perhaps very popular) but in the end the country has received a severe slap on its judiciary and the democratic process. 
 
I am making a very unpopular statement but it comes from my heart. No one should be above the law.
 
Thanks
 
Zia
IITM
Dhaka 


 
On 6/17/08, Citizen Bangladesh <citizen.bangladesh@gmail.com> wrote:

Dear Shafiq,
 
Very logical input.
We support and agree with your  views.
Government should not proceed on this line.
 
Regards and stay well in NZ
 


 
On 6/16/08, Engr. Shafiq Bhuiyan <srbanunz@gmail.com> wrote:
 
Bravo!   Bravo!   Bravo! 
Our  army  backed  caretaker  government

 

 

If Tarek – Koko – Khaleda - Nizami gong are released from the custody – than no need keeping anyone in the jail or custody of Bangladesh.

 

 

Is there was any crime which were not committed (directly and indirectly) by these gongs during their tenure of 2001 – 2006?

 

  • They looted - stolen cores of taka of people of Bangladesh
  • They took thousands of acres of govt owned land
  • They transferred cores of taka to overseas (even when this CA Mr. Fakruddin was Governor of Bangladesh Bank)
  • They killed, injured political leaders - MPs (from topmost level, like Ex Minister & current MP ASMS Kibria, ex MP Mrs. Ivy Rahman, current MP Ahsanullah Master, ex MP Momtazuddin, Manjurul Imam etc to the grass root level workers - supporters of opposition political parties, even person (in Bogura) reading Quran in the mosque)
  • They gave safe shelter to killers in exchange of cores of taka (Basundhora)
  • They killed, insulted their own party leaders - supporters - sympathisers (like Prof Aftab of DU, Jamal Uddin of Chittagong, Badruddoza Choudhury, Mahi Choudhury, Maj Mannan)
  • They tried to cleansing the religious minority group (killed hundreds of non Muslim, including Principal Binod Bihari, Buddhist spiritual leader)
  • They created thousands of "god fathers"
  • They gave 'mega size' (more than 62) corrupt minister
  • They polluted & destroyed the PSC
  • They polluted & destroyed judicial system
  • They polluted & destroyed the educational system
  • They polluted & destroyed the Administration - Bureaucracy
  • They polluted & destroyed the Election Commission (cores of false voter)
  • They polluted & destroyed the Army - Police and other law enforcing system
 

They  had  polluted  &  destroyed  every  thing of  Bangladesh

 
To find their huge number of crimes – no need of the high power electronic microscope or "intensive investigation"!

 

Only need a fair, unbiased normal mind. So, no need of carry out any "intensive investigation" with "high power electronic microscope"!

 

If you go through the "un protested" newspapers reports (also in abroad) on the corruptions published during the tenure of the notorious Jamat-BNP tenure of 2001 – 2006 (and also after that, till now) including the newspapers sympathised or loyal to them including like, the Prothom Alo, the Amader Shomoy, the Jugantor, the Daily Star, the Inkilab, the Amar Desh, the Manabzamin, the Nayadiganta,. Leave the neutral & sincere newspaper like the Sangbad, the Janakantha, the Shamokal, the Ittefaq and other news paper like the Bhorer Kagoj, Ajkerkagoj (now closed) etc etc. (I can quote hundreds of such news paper report).

 

That is why Bangladesh was "champion" in corruption out of 5 terms 4 terms of Jamat-BNP era (and one time in Awami League era)!

 

Now these culprits are getting released from the custody by this ABCG!

 

Bravo!  Bravo!  Bravo!  Our army backed caretaker government

 

Really SELUKAS!

 

Our present neutral army backed caretaker government is really strange! SELUKAS!

 

 

 
"Sustha thakon, nirapade thakon ebong valo thakon"

Shuvechhante,

Shafiqur Rahman Bhuiyan (ANU)
NEW ZEALAND.

Phone: 00-64-9-828 2435 (Res), 00-64-0274  500 277 (mobile)
E-mail: srbanunz@gmail.com

N.B.: If any one is offended by content of this e-mail, please ignore & delete this e-mail. I also request you to inform me by an e- mail - to delete your name from my contact list.

 

 

 





--
Ziaur Rahman
CEO
International Institute of Technology & Management
56/2 Lake Circus, West Panthopoth
Dhaka 1205
Tel: 8112916, 01726153318, 01711-543431
www.iitmbd.org

&

Chief Executive Officer
IITM Software
www.iitmsoftware.com
info@iitmsoftware.com



--
"Sustha thakon, nirapade thakon ebong valo thakon"

Shuvechhante,

Shafiqur Rahman Bhuiyan (ANU)
NEW ZEALAND.

Phone: 00-64-9-828 2435 (Res), 00-64-0274  500 277 (mobile)
E-mail: srbanunz@gmail.com

N.B.: If any one is offended by content of this e-mail, please ignore & delete this e-mail. I also request you to inform me by an e- mail - to delete your name from my contact list. __._,_.___

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