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Saturday, November 26, 2011

[chottala.com] GEOPOLITICS ------ KAPTAI & TIPAIMUKH !!!!!!!!!



Dear All,

Lots of "HUE & CRY" are going on with the project of building of Tipaimukh Dam . Before we protest about the ill effects of the proposed dam , we should look at our own Kaptai Dam !! When Kaptai Dam was built in 1962 about 100,000 people were displaced and few of them received adequate compensation . Many of the displaced people ( 40,000 ) had left the country ( Settled in India and Burma ). In 2002 during BNP led govt. , two more units were installed to increase the the capacity of the Dam . The BNP govt. did not discuss the new plan with the potentially affected tribal groups who are concerned about loosing the fringe land and an important source of income ( Rice cultivation ).
This the true character of BNP and their ally ! When they are in power they don't care about the people . When you can't protect your own environment , then don't cry and don't do politics with "TIPAIMUKH" !! Please read the following article on Kaptai Dam.

Regards,
Dr. Muhammad Ali Manik
Member, Advisory Committee,
US Awami League.








Water Resources Development, Vol. 18, No. 1, 197–208, 2002
People versus Power: The Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in
Bangladesh
SAILA PARVEEN & I. M. FAISAL
Environmental Studies, North South University, 12 Kemal Ataturk, Banani C/A, Dhaka 1213,
Bangladesh. E-mail: imfaisal@agni.com
ABSTRACT This paper examines the impacts of the Kaptai dam, in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts of Bangladesh, on the tribal communities of that area. Kaptai dam is the only
hydropower source in Bangladesh, with an installed capacity of 230 MW; about 5% of
the electricity consumed in the country is produced there. When the dam was built in
1962, some 100 000 people were displaced and few of them received adequate compensation.
Recently, the Power Development Board (PDB) of Bangladesh has announced a
plan to install two new 50 MW units that will bring the capacity of the dam to 330
MW. This plan will cause the reservoir water level to rise and may take away about 7500
ha of the fringe land, which the tribal people use for rice cultivation during the
April–August period each year. As before, the PDB has not discussed this plan with the
potentially affected tribal groups, who are concerned about losing the fringe land and an
important source of income. The paper discusses the original displacement issue and this
recent development in the light of the geopolitical history of this region. It attempts to
present an objective analysis of these issues and views held by various concerned parties.
It then proposes a scheme for managing the Kaptai reservoir based on a participatory
approach that will ensure both economic efciency and social equity.
Introduction
Located in the scenic landscape of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), the Kaptai
dam, on the River Karnafuli, is the only hydro-electric power source in
Bangladesh (Figure 1). Commissioned on 30 March 1962, the dam initially had
two hydropower units with a total capacity of 80 MW. Presently, the dam has
ve units with a total capacity of 230 MW and it produces approximately 5% of
the electricity consumed in Bangladesh. Basic features of the dam are shown in
Table 1 (PDB, 1985).
The Kaptai dam was supposed to provide benets in terms of hydropower,
ood control, irrigation and drainage, navigation and enhanced forest resource
harvesting. Most of these objectives have been served in various degrees except
irrigation and drainage. More recently, commercial sh culture and recreation
activities have been introduced in the lake.
This, however, is part of the story. During construction, the dam ooded an
area of some 655 km2, which included about 22 000 ha of cultivable land—40%
of all such land in the CHT. The lake took away the homes of 18 000 families and
displaced 100 000 tribal people, of which 70% were Chakma (Government of
0790-0627 Print/1360-0648 On-line/02/010197–12 Ó 2002 Taylor & Francis Ltd
DOI: 10.1080/0790062022012175 6
198 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
Figure 1. Location of the Kaptai dam in the CHT.
Bangladesh, 1975). The dam also ooded the original Rangamati town and the
palace of the Chakma Raja (king).
A rather casual attempt was made to rehabilitate this large group of people—
nearly 25% of the local population. Ofcially, the majority of the displaced
people were rehabilitated on the upper reaches of the rivers Kasalong and
Chengi during the early phase of the project (construction of the dam began in
Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 199
Table 1. Basic features of the Kaptai dam
Feature Size/type
Body of the dam Earth
Length 670.6 m
Height 45.7 m
Crest width 7.6 m
Maximum water level 33.5 m (110 feet above
mean sea level (MSL))
Minimum water level 20.1 m (66 feet MSL)
Capacity at 33 m MSL 6477 3 106 m3
Reservoir at 33 m MSL 777 km2
Spillway length 227 m
Maximum spillway discharge 16 000 cumecs
Installed capacity (ve units) 230 MW
October 1957). In reality, the newly created 'environmental refugees' were
resettled in the low-lying areas of Langdu, Barkal and Bhaghaichari as per the
advice of the project ofcials. Much of this resettlement area had gone underwater
by 1962 as the reservoir gradually lled up, causing many to be displaced
for the second time. This had naturally aggrieved the tribal population as they
received few if any of the benets of the dam.
Many of the displaced people had left the country; some estimates say that
40 000 of them went to the sparsely populated states of Mizoram, Tripura,
Assam and Arunachal in India. Another 20 000 may have gone to Burma
(Samad, 1998). The Chakma people call this event Bara Parang or the Great
Exodus, a detailed account of which may be found in Chakma et al. (1995).
This event and a series of administrative and legislative actions taken since the
birth of Pakistan had ultimately led to the 22-year-long violent and armed
confrontations between the Bangladesh government and the tribal people that
began in the mid-1970s and lasted till the signing of the peace treaty in 1997.
Some provisions of the treaty have not been implemented yet and these remain
as the source of discord between the government of Bangladesh and the tribal
people of the CHT.
In this backdrop, the Power Development Board (PDB) of Bangladesh is
considering a plan to install two new 50 MW units at Kaptai. If materialized,
more water will have to be stored in the reservoir, which may cause the lowest
reservoir level to rise by as much as 6.5 m. As a result, approximately 7500 ha
of the seasonal fringe land may become permanently inundated where rice is
grown from mid-April to mid-August.1 This plan has sparked the old debate
and fear that the dam authority and the government are not sensitive to the
needs of the local people in this region.
This issue has given rise to a series of questions that must be addressed. What
are the arguments put forward by the PDB in support of this plan? Have the
local people been consulted about this plan in advance? Is the government
aware of the geopolitical implications of this potential impact? What actions, if
any, are being considered by the government to address this concern? And
nally, what approach should the government follow so that development of
fresh contentions can be avoided in future?
200 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
Objectives and Methodology
The questions raised above will be critically examined in this paper in the light
of the historic development of the geopolitical events in the CHT. The paper will
specically look at the human and environmental impacts of the dam created in
the past as well as the potential impact of the proposed expansion plan
(installing units 6 and 7). Views from both sides—the tribal communities and the
PDB—will be presented in relation to the operation of the dam and its impacts
on the local people and the environment. The paper will then suggest an
approach that can help resolve this latest issue of dispute in a mutually
agreeable way.
The study will be based on information collected from secondary sources in
the form of papers, reports, books and academic publications and primary
information collected through interviews with key informants.
Geopolitical Description of the CHT
The CHT is located in the south-east part of Bangladesh. The British created this
region in 1860 under the 22nd Administrative Act. At that time, most of it was
densely forested and inhabited by tribal people (less than 5% of the population
were Bengalis from the plain lands). The district was created in recognition of its
unique natural and cultural characteristics. At present, the CHT is comprised of
three administrative districts, Rangamati, Khagrachari and Bandarban, which
were created in 1983. The total area of the CHT is 13 148 km2, which is about
10% of the land area of Bangladesh, although only 2% of the population lived in
the CHT in 1991. Currently, the population of the CHT is evenly composed of
Bengalis (50%) and tribal communities (50%). The Chakma are the largest tribal
group, constituting about 24% of the CHT population. The other major tribes are
the Marma and the Tripura, representing 14% and 6% of the population
(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 1995).
Geographically, the CHT can be divided into a number of river valleys:
Chengi, Maini, Kasalong, Rankhiang and Sangu. All these rivers except the
Sangu are tributaries to the Karnafuli River, on which the Kaptai dam is located.
These river valleys are 30–80 km long and 3–10 km wide, surrounded by hills a
few hundred to a thousand metres high. In some places the valleys may be
20–30 km wide. These valleys are very suitable for agriculture and horticulture.
The rest of the CHT mostly comprises hills and forests where the tribal people
practice jhum (shifting slash and burn) cultivation. It includes 1538 km2 of
reserved forest and another 5400 km2 of unclassied state forest areas (Johnson
& Ahmed, 1957; Rashid, 1991). The forests are of both evergreen and deciduous
types and provide valuable resources such as wood (both timber and fuel),
bamboo, cane and honey. Commercial tea and rubber plantations and horticulture
have been introduced in the CHT in recent years.
Chronology of Events in the CHT and the Issue of Human Displacement
The tribal people have been living in the CHT for a long time but they are not
the original settlers in that area. Most of the CHT was not inhabited or was
barely inhabited by people till the large-scale in-migration in the 17th and 18th
centuries. The Chakmas moved into the CHT with their king when the Marma
Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 201
Table 2. Chronology of major events in the CHT (1860–1971)
Year Event
1860 Formation of hill tracts under Lord Canning.
1900 The CHT manual was introduced as the basic framework for administration.
1935 The British government of India dened the hills as a 'totally excluded area', taking it out of
Bengal's control.
1948 The CHT Police Regulation was annulled and the police force,whichwasmanned by the tribal
people, was disbanded.
1955 The CHT area was surveyed and legal measures for land registration were adopted.
1955 Muslim League leaders tried to designate the CHT as a regular district; this was resisted by
Colonel Niblett, the last British-born Deputy Commissioner of the CHT and the Chakma Raja.
1956 The rst constitution of Pakistan retained the special status of the CHT as the 'excluded area'.
However, under Clause 51(I), only a Muslim could hold the position of the Head of the State
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thus, all the tribal and non-Muslimpeople were effectively
downgraded to second-class citizens.
1958 After the military takeover in Pakistan the 'opening up' of the CHT was accelerated.
1960 Government transferred all local indigenous employees in administration to other parts of East
Pakistan.
1962 The constitution changed the status of the CHT from an 'excluded area' to a 'tribal area'.
1962 Construction of the Kaptai hydro-electric dam was completed, which submerged 22 000 ha of
cultivable land and displaced 100 000 people without proper compensation and rehabilitation.
1964 By an act of parliament, the CHT ceased to be a tribal area from 10 January 1964. Accelerated
inux of Bengalis had sown the seed of politicization of the CHT.
1971 Liberation war and independence of Bangladesh.
king of Arakan (most of Arakan lies in Myanmar now) drove him out. Later on,
the Mughols drove the Marma people out of Arakan in 1756 (Hutchinson, 1906).
Other tribes of the CHT have a similar history.
According to Thomas Herbert Lewin, a soldier-cum-administrator of British
India's north-east frontier, "a greater proportion of the hill tribes at present
living in the Chittagong Hill Tracts undoubtedly came about two generations
ago from Arakan. This is asserted both by their own traditions and by records
in Chittagong Collectorate" (Lewin, 1869). Accordingly, the claim often made by
the tribal people that they are the 'sons of the soil' is not valid in the sense of
being original settlers in the CHT. Bengali settlers lived in parts of the CHT long
before that time, albeit in small numbers.
The different tribal communities of the CHT have lived separately from the
beginning and have distinct linguistic, cultural and anthropological features.
Over the course of about 300 years, these hill communities have gone through
a series of interventions sometimes protecting and sometimes undermining their
interests. These events have been summarized in Table 2 for the 1860–1971
period.
It is evident from the series of events that the displacement of 100 000 tribal
people due to the Kaptai dam was almost inevitable, as their control over the
region was gradually being curtailed, which culminated with the annulment of
the tribal area status of the CHT in 1964.
The issue of resettlement of the displaced people was handled poorly for a
number of reasons. There was a general lack of understanding of the tribal
culture by the government of Pakistan and the donor agencies (the dam was
202 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
funded by USAID). They thought that these were 'nomadic' hill-people practising
jhum cultivation and it was unnecessary to design a permanent resettlement
programme for them. In reality, the tribal people did move from hill to hill but
they had a long cycle of jhum cultivation. Before the inundation of the Karnafuli
valley, the average cycle of jhum cultivation was 7–10 years, and in some cases
10–15 years. After inundation of the river valleys, which took away 40% of the
fertile agricultural land, this cycle became reduced to only 3–5 years as thousands
of local people were forced back to jhum cultivation. This pressure on land
was further intensied by the rapid population growth that took place during
the 1960s and 1970s in the entire CHT area. The collective outcome of these
developments was intensive agriculture both in the remaining plain lands and
in the hills, leading to soil erosion, productivity loss and water pollution caused
by increased use of fertilizer and pesticides.
The other important reason for not having an adequate relocation scheme was
simply the lack of adequate budgetary provision. Initially, some compensation
was paid for the loss of land, trees and structures but there was little money
available for rehabilitating 100 000 people. The majority of them were taken to
the Kasalong valley, where a reserved forest was partly cleared to create land for
these people. When the water level of the reservoir rose after completion of the
dam in 1962, much of this land went underwater and the government simply
gave up all efforts to resettle these people again, thus contributing to the Bara
Parang.
Interviews with the local people as well as senior government ofcials indicate
several inadequacies of the resettlement programme. The government could not
keep its promise to compensate for the lost arable land with similar land
elsewhere. First, not enough arable land was available in the region; each family
was given a maximum of 10 acres (4 ha) of land even though they owned more
land in the project area. Secondly, fertile land in the river valley was compensated
by hilly lands, which was of no immediate use to the people, who had got
accustomed to the plain land farming introduced in the CHT by the British from
the early 20th century. Thirdly, when monetary compensation was made, it was
too small: for example, the displaced people received only Taka 500–700 per
hectare as compensation whereas they had to pay Taka 5000 per hectare to buy
similar arable plain land in other areas where some of them eventually settled
(Chakma et al., 1995).
The government of Pakistan had made a rather late attempt in 1968–69 to
rehabilitate some 11 000 families in 51 moujas surrounding the lake.2 A total of
66 000 ha of land was allocated for this purpose. As per the plan, each family
received on average 2.4 ha of land for growing fruits, in addition to fruit
saplings, fertilizer and pesticides. Extension ofcers arranged training in horticulture
and initially the resettled people participated in the programme enthusiastically.
Unfortunately, the plan did not work well in the end because little or
no attention was paid to the storage and marketing aspects of the produce.
People grew mango, jackfruit, pineapple and lemon but did not receive a fair
price for the products. In fact they fell prey to exploitation by the middlemen.
Moreover, over the years the productivity of the land has fallen signicantly,
rendering the programme less effective now.
The large-scale displacement of the tribal people caused by the Kaptai dam is
certainly one of the important factors that have contributed to the worsening of
the relationship between the tribal and Bengali populations in the CHT. In the
Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 203
latter part of the 1960s, the rate of inux of the Bengalis increased due to the
setting up of some major industrial infrastructures such as the Karnafuli pulp
and paper mill and administrative ofces of various departments of the government.
Events after Independence
During the independence war of Bangladesh in 1971, the CHT population
supported the Mukti Bahini (freedom ghters) against the Pakistani army. The
following year, Manobendra Larma, a leading gure from the tribal people,
became a member of the rst national parliament of Bangladesh. He formed the
Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samiti (PCJSS, or the Chittagong Hill Tribal
People's Co-ordination Association) on 24 June 1972 in a convention of tribal
leaders held in Rangamati. At the same time the tribal students formed an
association called the Pahari Chatra Samity (PCS).
Initially, both the PCJSS and the PCS tried to establish their claims through
democratic and non-violent ways. First, Larma called on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,
the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, to protest the fact that the ethnic
minorities were designated as Bengalis in the rst constitution of Bangladesh.
Larma, with a delegation of the tribal people, also demanded autonomy for the
CHT region, which was denied on grounds of territorial integrity and sovereignty
of the country. Other issues taken up by the PCJSS included: legal
protection from attacks by the Bengali settlers and illegal dispossession of
property; ending the migration of Bengalis from plain lands; the recovery of lost
property; and tolerance of tribal culture and religion.
In 1975, the Mujib government was overthrown by a military coup and the
relationship between the PCJSS and the military government worsened. During
this time (1975–76), the PCJSS formed its secret armed wing, the Santi Bahini
(Peace Force). It received shelter and training in the neighbouring Indian states
of Tripura and Mizoram, and began to engage in guerilla warfare with the
Bangladeshi police and army. As a result, a large contingent of the Bangladesh
army remained deployed in the CHT after then and both sides suffered major
causalities, although reliable statistics are hard to come by. In the early 1980s, the
Bangladesh government brought a large number of landless people from the
districts of Chittagong, Sylhel, Comilla and Noakhali into the CHT.3 This action
contributed to the rapid change in the population composition in the CHT
(Figure 2) and intensied the number of conicts with and the resentment of the
tribal people.
The armed confrontation slowed down in the early 1990s. After the general
election of 1991, the newly formed government formed a special committee on
the CHT region to arrive at political solutions for issues raised by the PCJSS. The
rst meeting of this committee with the PCJSS was held on 5 November 1992.
This marked the beginning of the peace-making process, which led to an
agreement between the two parties regarding the repatriation of the tribal
refugees from India. Accordingly, the rst batch of the refugees returned home
on 15 February 1994. The peace process continued, which culminated in signing
the peace treaty between the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS in
December 1997.
204 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
Figure 2. Changing composition of the population in the CHT. Source: Bangladesh
Bureau of Statistics (1995).
The Debate over the Proposed Expansion Plan
In the backdrop of all this turmoil, the PDB has recently announced its plan to
install two new hydropower units, 50 MW each, in the dam. These units are to
be installed with nancial assistance from the Japan Bank of Investment Corporation
(JBIC) in the form of a 30-year soft loan with a grace period of 10 years.
However, how these extra units will be run has not been clearly spelled out.
PDB ofcials have made statements that these units will be operated using the
excess water that is released through the spillway. This excess water will be
stored during the storage period (July–November) and released gradually over
the drawdown period (December–July) as per the rule curve (Figure 3). It should
be mentioned that this rule curve was last revised in 1981 before installing the
third unit. Since then three more units have been added and two more are being
considered and, therefore, the rule curve needs updating. The PDB ofcials have
said that installation of the two new units will change the rule curve and raise
the lowest reservoir water level from 76 feet above mean sea level (MSL)
(24.93 m MSL) to 90 feet MSL (29.52 m MSL). However, the reservoir level will
be maintained at 90 feet MSL or lower throughout the April–August period,
during which rice is grown in the fringe land, as per the instruction of a
government circular.
However, there are doubts as to whether the reservoir level can be maintained
at or below the 90 feet MSL limit during the fringe land cultivation period. The
economic analysis done by the consulting agency, the Tokyo Electric Power
Services Company (TEPSCO), indicated that the project internal rate of return
(IRR) is most favourable if the lowest reservoir level is kept at 96 feet MSL
(31.5 m MSL). This will cause permanent ooding of about 7500 ha of fringe
land, which is at the heart of the new debate. The tribal community of Kaptai,
based on their long and bitter experience with the authorities in the past, are
understandably apprehensive about the possibility of losing their income from
the fringe land should the water level exceeds the 90 feet MSL limit. The issue
has already been raised at various forums by the PCJSS including with the
project sponsor JBIC.
Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 205
Figure 3. Rule curve for the Kaptai hydropower station. Source: Noman (1997).
The Future Course of Action
The root of the problems emanating from the Kaptai dam lies in not recognizing
the rights of the indigenous people and in the lack of willingness on the part of
the authorities to communicate with them. There was virtually no consultation
with the tribal people in the 1960s during construction of the Kaptai dam. Now
the consequences can be seen: both the Bengalis and the tribal people have paid
a high price for the problems created by the dam and the displacement of
100 000 people.
In relation to the recent expansion plan, the tribal people, through the PCJSS,
have made three specic demands. First, the benet of the dam—electricity—
should be made available to the hill communities. The PDB, on principle, is in
agreement with this demand. However, the question here is of economic
feasibility. The hill communities are small and dispersed, and extending power
lines to those communities may be a very expensive undertaking. The PDB is
also concerned that once the service is provided it will be very difcult or
impossible to collect bills from these remote locations. This is an issue that the
PDB and the PCJSS have to discuss in detail and come to an agreeable solution.
The second issue raised by the PCJSS is that the PDB must compensate for any
loss of crop grown in the fringe land that may be caused by the rise of the
reservoir water level after installation of the proposed units. There is a government
circular according to which the PDB is supposed to maintain the reservoir
level below 90 feet (27.43 m) MSL during the rice-growing season. However, the
government or the PDB is not legally obligated to compensate for any loss of
crop in the fringe land should the water level rise above this limit. According to
the PDB, all displaced people who used to reside within the area below 120 feet
(36.57 m) MSL have been relocated and compensated by the then East Pakistan
Water and Power Development Authority (EPWAPDA) during or after completion
of the dam. Therefore, the PDB may try to minimize the potential loss of
crop, but it is not required to compensate for such losses.
The PDB further mentions that even without the new units, it is not possible
to maintain the reservoir level below 90 feet MSL every year. In years with more
than usual rainfall, more water is stored in the reservoir for protecting the
downstream areas from ooding. In those years, fringe land cultivation is
206 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
affected due to natural reasons and compensation is neither demanded nor paid
by any side. Here, the argument put forward by the PDB seems reasonable.
However, its position should be explained to the potentially affected group
clearly and honestly. The extent of loss in economic terms should also be
quantied and compared with the benet of power generation to get a better
perspective on the issue. The PDB may set aside some funds to gradually train
the affected group in alternative income generation means so that this issue
becomes inconsequential over time. Due to the volatile and sensitive sociopolitical
situation in the CHT, this issue has received a lot of local and international
attention. As a result, the PDB has been asked by the sponsor JBIC to carry out
a social impact study with the following specic objectives as mentioned in the
terms of reference of the study: (1) develop a rule curve for reservoir operation;
(2) assessment of social impact due to the proposed expansion of the Kaptai
power plant for the sixth and seventh units, including the existing units; and (3)
recommendation of impact mitigation measures, including assessment of needs
for rehabilitation of affected people. Once the study is completed as per the
terms of reference, the issue will be adequately addressed and this should be
acceptable to the PDB and the PCJSS.
The third demand of the PCJSS was to involve tribal labour in the dam-related
maintenance and extension works. The PDB is not opposed to this idea but
security issues may prevent the implementation of this proposal immediately.
Besides, such activities are carried out only occasionally. However, this may be
a politically important issue for the PCJSS and should be given serious consideration
by the dam authority.
In fact, taking a more holistic view, the government and the PCJSS need to
work closely on developing an institutional framework that will allow them to
discuss and deal with all dam-related issues in a systematic and democratic way.
At present, there is a body called the Reservoir Operation Committee (ROC),
which is supposed to provide general guidelines on reservoir operation.4 This is
a high-level committee consisting of 18 members, who include the Divisional
Commissioner of Chittagong, the Manager of Kaptai power station, District
Commissioners of the CHT and representatives from various government agencies,
including one from the army. There is no member in the ROC who directly
represents the interest of the tribal community. Moreover, due to its too high a
prole, it has not been able to meet even once since the commissioning of the
dam in 1962. This clearly has to change: the ROC must be made smaller and it
must include one or more representatives from the PCJSS so that it begins to
operate as an efcient, effective and fair management body for the Kaptai
reservoir.
The issue of the dam related rehabilitation and loss of fringe-land cannot be
separated from the general issue of dealing with the ethnic minorities in an
equitable manner. In this regard important progress has been made by the
government by enacting the Local Government Council Act 1989. This Act
provides for a number of legal safeguards for the tribal population for preserving
their rights and culture and for arbitration of social disputes. Another
important milestone along this direction is the peace treaty of 1997. After signing
the peace treaty, the people of the CHT—both the Bengali settlers and the tribal
communities—have been hoping for a peaceful and prosperous future in this
region and the government should avoid any attempt to disrupt this process.
Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh 207
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) has already prepared the road map
to a better planning approach when it comes to planning, constructing and
managing a dam. According to the WCD, issues pertaining to dams should be
examined in the light of a few key criteria: efciency, equity, accountability,
participatory decision making and sustainability. In the case of the Kaptai dam,
the principles of equity, accountability and participatory decision making have
not been followed from the beginning. The time has come to incorporate these
at the earliest opportunity, not only to avoid fresh contentions in this region but
also to let the tribal people have their say and reap some of the benets that the
dam has to offer.
Concluding Remarks
All over the world, there are more than 15 000 large and numerous other small
dams that have displaced some 60 million people from their homelands. In the
recent past, Turkey has built the Ataturk dam in the Kurdish region, where some
60 000 people were displaced. Another project in this region, the Illisu dam, will
affect about 75 000 people of the Kurdish region. Such encroachments on the
resources and rights of the people of the land are not isolated—the Narmada in
India, the Three Gorges in China, the Nam Theun II in Laos and the Itoiz in
Spain are just a few examples of such violations.
Unfortunately, a large part of the population displaced by dams has come
from the underclass and the tribal communities. In India, about 40% of the
people displaced by dams have been low castes or tribal people, even though
they make up less than 6% of the Indian population. The story looks very similar
in Bangladesh. It is about time that the government and the affected groups
worked out a peaceful and mutually agreeable solution in a democratic way and
through a properly designed institutional framework. This would go a long way
in ensuring the security and prosperity of the CHT region in the new millennium.
Notes
1. This estimate is based on the data provided by the Agricultural Extension Department of
Rangamati via memo. no. 65(A) to the PDB ofce at Kaptai.
2. A mouja is a cluster of villages; several moujas make a union and several unions make a thana,
which is the smallest administrative unit in Bangladesh.
3. The resettlement programme was carried out under government instructions issued through
condential letters from the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division to the Deputy Commissioner
of the CHT district dated 4 September 1980, Ref. No. 66(a), and from the Deputy
Commissioner of the CHT district to his counterparts of the other districts dated 10 September
1980, Ref. No. 1055(a). In the letters, Bengali families from other districts were promised 2 ha of
high land, 1.6 ha of mixed land and 1 ha of paddy land if they migrated to the CHT region
(Chakma et al., 1995).
4. The latest composition of this committee has been specied in a circular of the Ministry of Power,
Energy and Mineral Resources dated 25 February 2001, Ref. No. 2/B:/PG-88/251 (part)/88.
References
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (1995) Statistical Yearbook (Dhaka, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics).
Chakma, H., Chakma, T., Dewan, P. & Ullah, M. (1995) Bara Parang: The Tale of the Development
Refugees of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Dhaka, Center for Sustainable Development).
Government of Bangladesh (1975) Chittagong Hill Tracts District Gazetteer (Dhaka, BG Press).
208 S. Parveen & I. M. Faisal
Hutchinson, R.H.S. (1906) An Account of Chittagong Hill Tracts (Calcutta, Bengal Secretariat Press).
Johnson, B.C.L. & Ahmed, N. (1957) Geographical record: the Karnafuli Project, Oriental Geographer,
1(2), pp. 159–164.
Lewin, T.H. (1869) The Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the Dwellers Therein (Calcutta, Bengal Printing
Co.).
Noman, N.S. (1997) Optimal operation of the Karnafuli reservoir, Bangladesh, Master of Engineering
thesis, School of Civil Engineering, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand.
PDB (1985) Karnafuli Hydro Station (Dhaka, Bangladesh Power Development Board).
Rashid, H. (1991) The Geography of Bangladesh (Dhaka, University Press Ltd).
Samad, S. (1998) Dams caused environmental refugees of the ethnic minorities in Chittagong, report
presented at the WCD Regional Consultation Meeting held in Sri Lanka, 10–11 December


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