[chottala.com] Declassified US documents on coups in 1975

Soviets were rebuilding and expanding Sylhet Airport and their Fleet was anchored in Chittagong rebuilding and expanding that port. Sh. Mujib had taken all the powers in his hand to declare Bangladesh a Communist Country. What did you expect USA to do?
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--- In chottala@yahoogroups.com, Isha Khan <bdmailer@...> wrote:
>
> *Declassified US documents on Bangladesh coups in 1975 *
>
> We do not know what message the US Embassy in Dhaka had sent to the State
> Department after the Pilkhana massacre. We will have to wait for another 30
> years to get full text of the official message from the US Embassy.
>
> However, I can share with you the message the US Embassy in Dhaka had sent
> after the August 1975 coup. This declassified document confirms Sheikh
> Mujib was warned by the US about the coup but he simply brushed the
> information aside.
>
> The Embassy also provided early analysis of the August 15 coup against
> President Mujibur Rahman. It tentatively predicted that the United States
> would enjoy greater influence under the government of new president
> Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed.
>
> The Embassy had also provided a narrative account and analysis of the
> military unrest and resulting coup of November 3, 1975.
>
> http://bdfact.blogspot.com/2009/03/declass...bangladesh.html<http://bdfact.blogspot.com/2009/03/declassified-us-documents-on-bangladesh.html>
>
> -----------------------------------------------
>
> *Telegram 5470 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State,
> November 10, 1975, 1010Z*
>
> 1. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OFFER A CAPSULE SUMMARY OF THE CHAOTIC EVENTS OF
> LAST WEEK IN BANGLADESH WHICH SAW THREE DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS, MUCH
> KILLING, AND THE AVOIDANCE OF CIVIL WAR, WITH ATTENDANT POSSIBILITY OF
> INDIAN INTER-VENTION, BY THE NARROWEST OF MARGINS. THIS ACCOUNT IS SECRET.
> THE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN BRIGADIER MOSHARRAF, CHIE FOF THE ARMY GENERAL
> STAFF, WHO HAD BEEN EMBITTERED BY HIS FAILURE TO SHARE IN THE PROMOTIONS
> RECEIVED BY SOME OFHIS COLLEAGUES AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
> MUJIB BY THE MAJORS ON AUGUST 15 AND WHO WAS ALSO BELIEVED TO BE ON A LIST
> OF ARMY OFFICERS TO BE INVESTIGATED WHICH HAD RECENTLY BEEN DRAWN UP BY THE
> MAJORS, BEGAN IN THE EARLYHOURS OF MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 3.
>
> WE DO NOT KNOW POSITIVELY WHETHER MOSHARAFF WAS THE ARCHITECT OF THE
> CONFRONTATION, AS MANY CONTEND, OR WHETHER, AS ONE GOOD SOURCE HAS TOLD
> TOLD US, HE SIMPLY WENT ALONG WITH SUBORDINATES WHO WERE DETERMINED TO END
> THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE MAJORS IN THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT, A ROLE WHICH
> HAD RESULTED, AMONG OTHER THINGS, IN THE HARRASSMENT OF SOME OF THE
> MILITARY OFFICERS. THIS SOURCE ALSO HELD THAT ONE OF MOSHARRAF'S
> OBJECTIVES--ALTHOUGH HE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY MINDFULOF THE PERSONAL GLORY THAT
> MIGHT AWAIT HIM--WAS TO TAKE CONTROL OF HIS SUBORDINATES' PLANS IN SUCH A
> WAY AS TO AVOID MAJOR BLOODSHED.
>
> 3. MOSHARRAF AND HIS ALLIES QUICKLY TOOK CONTROL EARLY MONDAY MORNING OF
> THE ARMY CANTONMENT AS WELL AS MOST OF THE CITY OF DACCA AND PRESSED THEIR
> CONFRONTATION WITH THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT BY FLYING A MIG FIGHTER AND
> ARMED HELICOPTER OVER THE CITY IN A SHOW OF STRENGTH WHICH WAS ALSO
> INTENDED TO INTIMIDATE THE TANK CREWS LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT. AGAINST THIS
> BACKGROUND, MOSHARRAF LEVIED FOUR DEMANDS ON MOSHTAQUE:
>
> 1) THAT MOSHARRAF REPLACE MAJOR GENERAL ZIAUR RAHMAN, HIS PERSONAL RIVAL,
> AS CHIEFOF STAFF; 2) THAT THE MAJORS BE RETURNED TO REGULAR ARMY
> DISCIPLINE; 3) THAT THE TANK FROCES LOYAL TO THE GOVERNMENT BE DISARMED;
> AND 4) THAT MOSHTAQUE REMAIN IN OFFICE.
>
> OUTGUNNED AND APPARENTLY INTEND ABOVE ALL ON AVOIDING BLOODSHED, WHICH
> WOULD ALSO HAVE INVITED INDIAN INTERVENTION, MOSHTAQUE EVENTUALLY YIELDED
> AFTER NEGOTIATING DURING THE COURSE OF A LONG DAY A COMPROMISE WITH
> MOSHARRAF BY WHICH THE MAJORS AND SOME OF THEIR COLLEAGUES, TO WHOM
> MOSHTAQUE WAS INDEBTED FOR HIS PRESIDENCY, WERE PERMITTED
>
> SECRET
>
> *SECRET PAGE 03 DACCA 05470 01 OF 02 101306Z *
>
> TO DEPART BANGLADESH.
>
> BEFORE THIS COMPROMISE HAD BEEN REACHED, THE MOSHTAQUE GOVERNMENT HAD
> CALLED ON THE ARMY FORCES AT COMILLA TO COME TO ITS AID BUT HAD BEEN
> REFUSED ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE COMILLA COMMANDER WOULD ONLY RESPONDTO THE
> ORDERS OF THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF (WHO WAS THEN UNDER ARREST)OR THE CHIEF
> OF THE GENERAL STAFF (I.E., MOSHARRAF).
>
> 4. THE CONFRONTATION BROUGHT ANOTHER BLOODY RESULT WHICH,WE HAVE GOOD
> REASON TO BELIEVE, HAD BEEN PART OF AN EARLIER CONTINGENCY PLAN TO BE
> CARRIED OUT IN THE EVENT THAT MOSHTAQUE WERE TO BE KILLED, I.E., THE MURDER
> OF HIS FORMER COLLEAGUES IN THE AWAMI PARTY LEADERSHIP WHO WERE NOW HIS
> POLITICAL ENEMIES--FORMER PRIME MINISTER MANSOOR ALI,FORMER VICE PRESIDENT
> SYED NAZRUL ISLAM, FORMER PRIMEMINISTER, FINANCE MINISTER AND INDIOPHILE
> TAJUDDIN AHMED, AND FORMER INDUSTRIES MINISTER KAMARUZZAMAN. THESE LEADERS
> WERE KILLED, EVIDENTLY AT THE ORDER OF ONE OR MORE OF THE MAJORS, EARLY
> MONDAY MORNING AT DACCA JAIL. THE EVENT ADDED A NOTE OF MYSTERY TO
> MOSHARRAF'S ACQUIESCENCE LATER IN THE DAY TO THE DEPARTURE OF THE MAJORS,
> ONE VERSION HAVING IT THAT MOSHARRAF DID NOT YET KNOW OF THE DEED WHEN THE
> PLANE LEFT DACCA AT MIDNIGHT MONDAY.MANY OBSERVERS ALSO NOTED THAT ONE
> EFFECT OF THE MURDERS WAS TO REMOVE THE LOGICAL LEADERSHIP OF ANY
> PRO-INDIAN GOVERNMENT.
>
> 5. WITH THE EXPLOSIVE SITUATION DEFUSED TO A DEGREE BY THE DEPARTURE OF THE
> MAJORS, NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN MOSHTAQUE AND MOSHARRAF CONTINUED ON TUESDAY
> AND WEDNESDAY, RESULTING IN MOSHARRAF'S DESIGNATION AS CHIEF OF STAFF LATE
> TUESDAY NIGHT, AND EVENTUALLY IN MOSHTAQUE'S RESIGNATION EARLYTHURSDAY
> MORNING WITH THE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT THATA NON-POLITICAL FIGURE,
> CHIEF JUSTICE A.S.M. SAYEM, WOULDBE APPOINTED PRESIDENT. SAYEM WAS SWORN IN
> ON THURSDAY AND PROMPTLY DISSOLVED THE PARLIAMENT. REPORTS, WHICH WE
> ACCEPT, WERE RIFE THAT THE CABINET HAD ALREADY RESIGNED IN PROTEST AGAINST
> THE MURDER OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT LEADERS.
>
> 6. BUT IT NOW BECAME CLEAR THAT MOSHARRAF'S ASSUMPTION OF POWER IN THE ARMY
> WAS UNPALATABLE TO MOST OF HIS FELLOW SECRET
>
> SECRET PAGE 04 DACCA 05470 01 OF 02 101306Z
>
> OFFICERS AND ENLISTED RANKS, BOTH BECAUSE GENERAL ZIA EVIDENTLY HELD A MUCH
> WIDER POPULAR FOLLOWING AMONG THE MBUT ALSO, AND VERY IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE
> MOSHARRAF WAS WIDELY SEEN, WHETHER ACCURATELY OR NOT, AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
> INDIAN POLICY. THIS PERCEPTION WAS BUTTRESSED BY THE PRO-MUJIB PROCESSION
> ON TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY'S HARTAL TO PROTEST THE KILLINGS AT DACCA JAIL.
> THE LOWER RANKS REVOLTED IN THE EARLY HOURS OF FRIDAY MORNING, QUICKLY
> OVERTHROWING THE MOSHARRAF FORCES AND, ACCORDING TO VIRTUALLY ALL ACCOUNTS,
> KILLING MOSHARRAF. EXTENSIVE FIRING WENT THROUGHOUT THE CITY ALL NIGHT AND
> ALL DURING THE DAY FRIDAY, MOST OF IT CELEBRATORY AFTER MOSHARRAF WAS
> OUESTED. ONE AUTHORITIATIVE SOURCE HAS TOLD US THAT ONLY ABOUT THIRTY WERE
> KILLED IN THE OVERTHROW; OTHER REPORTS HAVE REACHED US WHICH PUT THE FIGURE
> IN THE HUNDREDS.
>
> 7. THE SUCCESSFUL REVOLT OF THE LOWER RANKS NOW BROUGHT ANEW PROBLEM, THE
> RAMPANT INDISCIPLINE OF THE ENLISTED MEN,MANY OF WHOM NOW TURNED ON
> OFFICERS AGAINST WHOM THEY MIGH THAVE GRUDGES AND OTHERS BEGAN PRESENTING
> DEMANDS ON THE ARMY LEADERSHIP FOR A BETTER DEAL IN THEIR FUTURE
> TREATMENT.WIDESPREAD REPORTS WERE CURRENT THROUGHOUT THE WEEKEND THAT LARGE
> NUMBERS OF MILITARY OFFICERS HAD FLED OR WERE ATLEAST STAYING AWAY FROM THE
> CANTONMENT OUT OF FEAR OF THE RAMPAGING SEPOYS, AND SEVERAL REPORTS REACHED
> US OF THE MURDER OF MILITARY OFFICERS AND OF THEIR WIVES.
>
> 8. MEANWHILE THE POST-MOSHARRAF GOVERNMENT TOOK SHAPE IN A MEETING EARLY
> FRIDAY MORNING BETWEEN GENERAL ZIA,MOSHTAQUE AND PRESUMABLY OTHER PRINCIPAL
> AIDES. MOSHTAQUE WAS OFFERED THE PRESIDENCY A NEW BUT DECLINED ON THE
> GROUND THAT, IN THE STILL EXPLOSIVE SITUATION, THE COUNTRY REQUIRED A
> NON-POLITICAL, NON-CONTROVERSIAL PRESIDENT.CONSEQUENTLY THE DECISION WAS
> REACHED TO KEEP JUSTICE SAYEM IN THE PRESIDENCY AND TO TURN OVER TO HIM AS
> WELL THE FUNCTIONS OF CHIEF OF THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION,
>
> SECRET PAGE 02 DACCA 05470 02 OF 02 101246
>
> A ROLE WHICH HAD BEEN FILLED BRIEFLY BY GENERAL ZIA. WEWERE POINTEDLY
> ASSURED THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS ENJOYED FULL SUPPORT BOTH WITHIN THE
> MILITARY AND WITHIN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SO THAT THE WAY WAS NOW CLEAR
> FOR THERESTORATION OF STABILITY IN THE COUNTRY.
>
> 9. AS OF MONDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 10, THE SITUATION HAD RETURNED TO AN
> APPARENT NORMALCY, WITH INTERNATIONAL AIR SERVICE RESUMED ON SUNDAY, BUT
> THE GENERAL UNEASINESS WAS STILL BEING FED BY REPORTS OF CONTINUED KILLINGS
> AMONG THE MILITARY AND OF POSSIBLE INDIAN ACTIONS ALONG THE BORDER.THE
> PROSPECT WAS FOR, AT BEST, A CONTINUED STATE OF TENSION AND UNCERTIANTY.
>
> 10. COMMENT. THREE CONCLUSIONS IMPLICIT IN THE ABOVE ACCOUNT SHOULD BE
> UNDERLINE. THE FIRST IS THAT THE ACTIONS OF THE MAIN PARTICIPANTS IN THE
> COUP AND COUNTER-COUP APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN NON-POLITICAL, EXCEPT IN THE
> SENSE THAT MOSHARRAF HAD THE ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGE OF APPEARING TO BE
> PRO-INDIAN. THE ARMY FORCES WHICH OVERTHREW MOSHTAQUE AND THE MAJORS APPEAR
> TO HAVE ACTED PRIMARILY OUT OF A SENSE OF GRIEVANCE AGAINST THE MAJORS. THE
> COUNTER-COUP WAS THE WORK OF LOWER RANKS WHO FAR PREFERRED ZIA TO MOSHARRAF
> AND WHO WERE ALSO CONCERNED WHRE MOSHARRAF'S LOYALTYMIGHT LIE. WE HAVE NO
> REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF THE REGIMES OF THE PAST WEEK WERE
> ANTI-AMERICAN, PRO-INDIAN, OR PRO-SOVIET IN CHARACTER.
>
> 11. THE SECOND IS THAT WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT INDIA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
> ANY OF THE WEEK'S ACTIONS.
>
> 12. THE THIRD IS THE CONFIRMATION OF HOW STRONGLY AND PERVASIVELY
> ANTI-INDIA ANTIPATHIES ARE FELT HERE-FROM THE TOP OF THE LEADERSHIP TO THE
> LOWEST GROUPS OF THE SOCIETY. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT MOSHARRAF
> WAS PRO-INDIAN, AND SOME THAT HE WAS NOT, HE WAS WIDELY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH
> AND THE WILD CELEBRATIONS HERE OF HIS OVERTHROW CARRIED DISTINCTLY
> ANTI-INDIAN OVERTONES.
>
> BOSTER
>
> http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97075.htm
>
> --------------------------------------------
>
> *Minutes of the Secretary of State's Regional Staff Meeting, Washington,
> August 15, 1975, 8 a.m. *
>
> The Secretary’s 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting
> Friday, August 15, 1975
>
> Participants:
>
> THE SECRETARY OF STATE - HENRY A. KISSINGER
>
> P Mr. Sisco
> E Mr. Robinson
> T Mr. Maw
> AF Ambassador Mulcahy, Acting
> ARA Mr. Rogers
> EA Mr. Zurhellen, Acting
> EUR Mr. Armitage, Acting
> NEA Mr. Atherton
> INR Mr. Hyland
> S-P Mr. Lord
> EB Mr. Enders
> S/PRS Mr. Funseth, Acting
> PM Mr. Vest
> PM Ambassador Buffum
> H Ambassador McCloskey
> L Mr. Leigh
> S/S Mr. Borg, Acting
> S Mr. Bremer
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's talk about Bangladesh.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: Well, it was a remarkably well-planned and executed coup for
> Bangladesh.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does that mean? Is Mujibur alive or dead?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: Mujibur is dead; his immediate clique, which was largely
> family, nephews, brothers.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: I get good advice from INR.
>
> MR. HYLAND: He wasn't dead when I talked to you.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Really? Did they kill him after some period?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: As far as we know -- I can't say we have got all the details.
> But the indications are that the plan was to kill him. And they simply
> surrounded his palace and went in and killed him. That is as far as we know
> now.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him that last year?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: In March we had lots of indications --
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him about it?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: We told him at the time.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Didn't we tell him who it was going to be, roughly?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I will have to check whether we gave him the names.
>
> MR. HYLAND: We were a little imprecise on that.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: He brushed it off, scoffed at it, said nobody would do a
> thing like that to him.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: He was one of the world's prize fools.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: But it seems that the coup leaders are in complete control.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who are they?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: They are military officers, middle and senior officers, who
> are generally considered less pro-Indian than the past leadership;
> pro-U.S., anti-Soviet.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Absolutely inevitable.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: Islamic. They have changed the name to the Islamic Republic --
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: That they would be pro-U.S. was not inevitable. In
> fact, I would have thought at some turn of the wheel they were going to
> become pro-Chinese, and anti-Indian I firmly expected. I always knew India
> would rue the day that they made Bangladesh independent. I predicted that
> since '71.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think our biggest problem is going to be to avoid too close
> an embrace.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why -- because they are friendly to us?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think they are going to want us to come in with promises.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: The principle being we only embrace on the
> sub-continent those who oppose us. What is the principle?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think our principle ought to be we are giving about all the
> aid we can really give or Bangladesh can really absorb.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before we implement it, let's check that. I know we
> can't do a huge increase in aid. But I think if people who think they are
> pro-U.S. come to us and then get a technical lecture that unfortunately we
> can't do any more -- there must be some maneuvering we can do on food aid
> and some token increase in aid.
>
> MR. ENDERS: We can do a little more on food aid.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like them to get it, if they are indeed what
> you say they are, which I don't know.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: These are all the initial indications.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then they ought to get a friendly reception.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think the immediate question is how we comport ourselves
> with the new government. It seems to me despite what the memo says which we
> sent you, which I didn't have time to go over carefully this morning -- I
> think we ought to simply respond to any overtures.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: What did the memo say?
>
> MR. ATHERTON: It says we ought to hold off on a decision on recognition.
> But I don't think that needs to be posed as that sharp a question.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: We ought to recognize.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I don't know what recognizing means in this case. I think we
> simply --
>
> MR. SISCO: Just continue. That memo said also we have to check all this
> with the Indians, as if to give the Indians a veto. I certainly don't agree
> with that.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think it would be useful --
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: We certainly shouldn't go to the Indians.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think there might be some merit in an exchange of views
> with them.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: After we have done it. We will not even discuss
> establishing contact with the new government with the Indians. After
> contact is established, we would be interested to hear their views, as long
> as they clearly understand that they cannot tell us what to do, and as long
> as they cannot go to the Bangladesh and tell them -- and then ask
> Bangladesh for their views, so that they can be transmitted to us.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I fully agree.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which is what India would dearly love to do.
>
> You better let me see any approaches.
>
> MR. ATHERTON: I think we have to prepare a telegram today, and we will
> clear it with you, on what we say to the Indians. And the Pakistanis are
> important. There will be some move towards Pakistan.
>
> SECRETARY KISSINGER: I also want to see you for a few minutes on a sober
> instruction to Bhutto, and some of his ideas on commitments. Okay.
>
> http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97038.htm
>
> ------------------------------------------------------
>
> *Telegram 3964 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State,
> August 16, 1975, 1135Z*
>
> FM AMEMBASSY DACCA
>
> TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7733INFO
> AMEMBASSY ISLAMABADAM
> EMBASSY KATHMADUAM
> EMBASSY NEW DELHIAM
> CONSUL CALCUTTA
> CINCPAC
> C O N F I D E N T I A L DACCA 3964
> CINCPAC FOR POLADE.O. 11652: GDSTAGS: PINT, PFOR, BG, US, IN, UR, CH, XD
>
> SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON THE COUP IN BANGLADESH
>
> 1. THE EVENTS OF THE FIRST TWENTY-FOUR HOURS GIVE PROMISE THAT THE COUP
> WHICH BEGAN AT 0515 LOCAL TIME ON AUGUST 15 WILL NOT BE CHALLENGED. THE
> OATHS OF FEALTY TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT SWORN BY THE SERVICE CHIEFS, THE
> HEADS OF THE PARAMILITARY BANGLADESH RIFLES AND RAKKHI BAHINI ANDTHE HEAD
> OF THE POLICE BRING ALL ARMED ELEMENTS INTO SUPPORT OF THE NEW REGIME.. THE
> PUBLIC HAS DISPLAYED NO PARTICULAR JIBILATION AT THE FALL OF MUJIB BUT
> RATHER ACALM ACCEPTANCE, AND PERHAPS SOME SENSE OF RELIEF. THERELATIVE EASE
> WITH WHICH POWER HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED SUGGESTS ABOVE ALL THE DEGREE TO
> WHICH MUJIB AND THE BANGALEES HAD BECOME ALIENATED FROM ONE ANOTHER, THE
> BANGALEES FROM MUJIB BECAUSE OF HIS FAILURE TO MEET THEIR ASPIRATIONS AND
> HIS APPARENT DESIRE TO HOLD POWER LARGELY FOR PERSONAL AGRANDIZEMENT AND
> DYNASTIC REASONS, AND MUJIB
>
> CONFIDENTIAL
>
> CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 02 DACCA 03964 161135Z
>
> FROM THE BANGLAEES AS HE GREW MORE ISOLATED FROM OBJECTIVE COUNSELS AND
> BEGAN TO SUFFER THE CLASSIC PARANOIA OF THE DESPOT. THE QUICKENING TEMPO OF
> SHEIKH MUJIB'S EFFORTS SINCE EARLY JUNE TO INSURE HIS STRANGLEHOLD ON
> POWER,TOGETHER WITH THE GROWING INFLUENCE OF HIS NEPHEW SHEIKHMONI,
> DOUBTLESS MADE THE COUP PLOTTERS CONCLUDE THAT NO FURTHER DELAYS IN TAKING
> ACTION WAS POSSIBLE. THAT INDIA'S INDEPENDENCE DAY WAS CHOSEN MAY HAVE BEEN
> MERELY INCIDENTAL, BUTWE NOTE THE COINCIDENCE.
>
> 2. IT IS TOO EARLY TO OFFER ANY SURE OPINIONS ON THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS.
> THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT UNDER KHONDAKAR MUSHTAQUE AHMED SEEMS LITTLE
> LIKELY TO AROUSEANY SENSE OF ENTHUSIASM. ALTHOUGH PURGED--BY DEATH OR
> EXCLUSION--OF THOSE WHO WERE CLOSEST TO SHEIKH MUJIB, IT IS STILL A
> COLLECTION OF OVERLY FAMILIAR FIGURES WHO ARE IDENTIFIED WITH THE POOR
> ADMINISTRATION OF POST-LIBERATION BANGLADESH. CLEARLY, ITS COMPOSITION IS
> INTENDED TO SUGGEST THAT BANGLADESH UNDER MUSHTAQUE WILL OFFER CONTINUITY,
> BUT ALSO THAT THERE WILL BE GREATER MODERATION. MUSHTAQUE'S RADIO ADDRESS
> LATE ON AUGUST 15 (DACCA 3955) SUPPORTS THIS VIEW, CONDEMNING AS IT DOES
> THE DOMESTIC CONSEQUENCES OF SHEIKH MUJIB'S RULE BUT CLEARLY SUGGESTING
> THAT IN SOFAR AS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE CONCERNED, BUSINESS WILLBE MUCH AS
> USUAL.
>
> THERE IS ALREADY SOME EVIDENCE THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL WANT TO
> STRENGTHEN ITS TIES WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD, INCLUDING PAKISTAN. AT THE SAME
> TIME,MUSHTAQUE'S WELL-KNOWN ANTIPATHY TO INDIA NOTWITHSTANDING,THE NEW
> REGIME WILL NOT WANT TO AROUSE UNDUE SUSPICIONS ON THE PART OF INDIA,
> CLEARLY COGNIZANT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING AN ADEQUATE MEASURE OF
> GOODWILL ON THE PART OF ITS IMPOSING NEIGHBOR. (PERHAPS ONE REASON FOR THE
> COMPOSITION OF THE CABINET, WITH ITS EXCLUSIVE RELIANCEON OLD FACES, IS A
> HOPE TO DEMONSTRATE TO INDIA ITS BASIC CONTINUITY.)
>
> INSOFAR AS THE MAJOR POWERS ARE CONCERNED, MUSHTAQUE HAS STATED HIS
> GOVERNMENT'S DESIRE TO ESTABLISH"CLOSER AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE BIG
> POWERS LIKETHE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA." THIS WOULD SEEM
> TO MEAN MORE BALANCE IN ITS RELATIONS, AND THUS SOME DIMINUTION IN THE
> INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION.
>
> CONFIDENTIAL
>
> CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 03 DACCA 03964 161135Z
>
> 3. THE EVIDENCE SO FAR SUGGESTS THE POSSIBILITY THAT OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH
> THE NEW GOVERNMENT COULD TURN OUT TO BE ON AN EVEN MORE CORDIAL BASIS THAN
> THEY WERE UNDER MUJIB. THE NEW PRESIDENT HAS IN THE PAST BEEN STRIKINGLY
> OVERT IN SUGGESTING HIS "PRO-AMERICAN" ATTITUDE; MOREOVER,THE FIGURES IN
> THE OLD REGIME WHO WERE KNOWN FOR THEIR LEFTIST AND ANTI-AMERICAN VIEWS
> (SHEIKH MONI AND SAMAD,EXAMPLE) ARE NOW GONE. THE POSSIBILITY IS ALSO
> STRONG THAT THEY WILL LOOK TO US FOR EVEN LARGER AMOUNTS OF AID--MUSHTAQUE
> HAS ARGUED WITH US BEFORE THAT WE ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO CAN TRULY HELP
> BANGLADESH--SO THAT OUR PROBLEM MAY WELL PROVE TO BE ONE OF TEMPERING THE
> NEW REGIME'S EXPECTATIONS OF US.
>
> 4. WE CANNOT PRESENTLY JUDGE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUSHTAQUE'S
> GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY. WE NOTE WITH INTEREST THAT EVERY OFFICIAL
> STATEMENT STRESSES THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE TAKEOVER. WE ARE
> TOLD THAT THEY MILITARY ARE AT PRESENT ENGAGED IN PREPARING MARTIALLAW
> ORDERS WHICH WOULD, IF THE PAKISTANI PATTERN IS FOLLOWED, SERVE AS BASIS
> LAW OF THE COUNTRY. WHETHER THIS MEANS A GROWTH OF TENSION BETWEEN THE
> CIVILIANS AND THE MILITARY WE CANNOT YET SAY, BUT WE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT
> THAT ONE OF THE FIRST STATEMENTS BY MUSHTAQUE WOULD HAVE BEEN A PROMISE OF
> A NEW, MORE LIBERAL CONSTITUATION THAN THAT IMPOSED LAST JANUARY BY MUJIB.
> THE CIVILIANS PROBABLY HAVEA MOMENTARY ADVANTAGE IN LIGHT OF THEIR
> EXPERIENCE; MOREOVER, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OUSTER
> OF MUJIB, WE ARE LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THATTHE COUP PLANNERS PREPARED
> FOR LITTLE BEYOND THE EVENTITSELF.
>
> HOWEVER, THE MILITARY--AND BY THIS WE MEAN THE YOUNGER OFFICERS WHO PLANNED
> AND LED COUP--DID WORK THE OVERTHROW OF SHEIKH MUJIB, AND WE SUSPECT
> THAT,HAVING TASTED BLOOD, THEY WILL WANT AT THE VERY LEAST TO EXERCISE SOME
> MEASURE OF INFLUENCE OVER THE COURSE OFEVENTS. WE HAVE NO REASON TO LOOK
> FOR BANGALEE QUADDAFI SAMONG THE COUP PLANNERS; RATHER, AS MEMBERS OF THE
> OLD,SERVICE-ORIENTED MIDDLE CLASS WHICH WAS THREATENED BY SHEIKH MUJIB,
> THEY MAY PROVE A MORE MODERATE FORCE THAN HAS BEEN SEEN IN EAST BENGAL
> SINCE PAKISTANI PERIOD. CONFIDENTIAL
>
> CONFIDENTIAL PAGE 04 DACCA 03964 161135Z
>
> 5. ONE POINT TO BE EMPHASIZED IS THAT, WHILE THE OVERTHROW OF SHEIKH MUJIB
> WAS SUCCESSFUL, IF BLOODLY, A GREAT DEAL REMAINS TO BE DONE. MUSHTAQUE'S
> SPEECH IS SIGNIFICANT LARGELY FOR ITS GENERALITIES AND ITS ECHOES OF
> EARLIER AWAMI LEAGUE RHETORIC, BUT CONCRETE ACTIONS HAVE SO FAR BEEN FEW.
> WE ARE NOT SURPRISED THAT THE DEGREE OF DIRECTION DISPLAYED SO FAR IS
> LIMITED FOR WE HAVE EVERY REASON TO THINK THAT THOSE PRIVY TO THE PLANNING
> OF THE COUP WERE SMALL IN NUMBER AND THUS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PREPARING ANY
> ELABORATE PLANS FOR THE GOVERNACE OF BANGLADESH WAS VERY SMALL.
>
> HOWEVER, UNLESS EARLY STEPS ARE TAKEN TO DEMONSTRATEVIGOR AND WILL, THE
> ADVANTAGE NOW HELD BY THE NEWREGIME WILL BEGIN TO DIMINISH, AN WE MAY
> CONFRONT AN UNSETTLED--AND UNSETTLING--SITUATION AS CONTENDERS FOR POWER
> EMERGE. NO ONE NOW ON THE BANGLAEE POLITIICAL STAGEHAS KIND OF COMMANDING
> PERSONALITY WHICH SUSTAINED SHEIKH MUJIB FOR SO LONG. THE CIVLIAN
> GOVERNMENT FALTERS, WE MAY FIND THE MILITARY CONCLUDING THAT IS MUST AGAIN
> SAVE THE NATION.
>
> BOSTER
>
> CONFIDENTIAL
>
> http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/97064.htm
>




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